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THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
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At a time when food is becoming increasingly
scarce in many parts of the world and food prices
are skyrocketing, no industry is more important
than agriculture. Humans have farmed for thou-
sands of years, yet agriculture has undergone more
fundamental changes in the past eighty years than
in the last few centuries. In 1900, 30 million
American farmers tilled the soil or tended live-
stock; today fewer than 4.5 million farmers feed a
population that is four times larger than it was at
the beginning of the century. Fifty years ago, the
planet could not have sustained a population of
6.5 billion; now, commercial agriculture ensures
the survival of millions.
Farmers can sustain an exponentially growing
world population because the greatest industrial
revolution in history has occurred in agriculture
since 1929, with U.S. farmers leading the way.
Productivity on American farms has increased
tenfold, even as most small farmers and tenants
have been forced to find other work. Today, a
mere 300,000 farms produce approximately 90
percent of the total output, and overproduction,
subsidized by government programs and policies,
has become the hallmark of modern agriculture. 
A Revolution Down on the Farm: The Transformation of
American Agriculture since 1929 charts the profound
changes in farming that have occurred during 
author Paul K. Conkin’s lifetime. His personal
experiences growing up on a small Tennessee
farm complement compelling statistical data as he
explores America’s vast agricultural transformation
and considers its social, political, and economic
consequences. He examines the history of
American agriculture, explaining how New Deal
innovations evolved into convoluted commodity
programs after World War II. Conkin assesses the
skills, new technologies, and government policies
that helped transform farming in America and
suggests how new legislation might affect farming
in decades to come.
Although the increased production and mecha-
nization of farming has been an economic success
story for Americans, the costs are becoming
increasingly apparent. Small farmers are put out
of business when they cannot compete with giant,
nondiversified corporate farms. Caged chickens
and hogs in factorylike facilities and dairy cattle in
close confinement require the use of chemicals
and hormones, which are ultimately ingested by
consumers. Fertilizers, new organic chemicals,
manure disposal, and genetically modified seeds
have introduced environmental problems with
long-term implications. A Revolution Down on the
Farm concludes with an evaluation of farming in
the twenty-first century and a perceptive survey
of possible alternatives to our present large-scale,
mechanized, subsidized, fossil fuel and chemically
dependent system.
PAUL K. CONKIN is Distinguished Professor
Emeritus of History at Vanderbilt University. He
is the author of numerous books, including The
State of the Earth: Environmental Challenges on the Road to
2100, The Southern Agrarians, and When All the Gods
Trembled: Darwinism, Scopes, and American Intellectuals.
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“This important book explores a recent revolution in American history that substituted tech-
nology for people and animals in farming and greatly increased output. Paul Conkin tells this 
tale in his own way, drawing upon his personal involvement in the story, as well as the relevant
scholarship and the basic documents.”                               —RICHARD S. KIRKENDALL, 
author of Uncle Henry: A Documentary Profile of the First Henry Wallace
“An accurate and straightforward account of agriculture in America down through the years, 
spiced with the experiences of the author himself. All the important farm issues and views 
about them are discussed in a format that is handy and easy to read. Perfect for the new 
student of agriculture who needs a quick but detailed introduction to farming history in the 
United States.”                                                                                     —GENE LOGSDON, 
author of The Mother of All Arts: Agrarianism and the Creative Impulse
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Preface
When this book reaches an audience, i will be almost eighty years old. 
i was born in late october 1929, at the time of the stock market crash 
on Wall Street. My parents were scarcely aware of these events or of their 
significance. What they remembered was the first major frost of the year, 
which whitened the farm fields around the small, three-room cabin 
where i was born. My first opaque memory is of being led, probably 
by my father, down into the meadow, where i was greeted by neighbors 
who were helping to cut our tobacco. Because of the location of the crop 
(we rotated it every year), i later determined that this was September 
1932, just before my third birthday.
it is appropriate that tobacco made such an early imprint on my 
memory, for it was our chief crop. Because it was a crop that required 
various tasks throughout the year, the cycles of work on tobacco were 
an important marker of the passing of time: gathering and then burning 
brush to sterilize beds for the plants; transplanting, cultivating, worming, 
topping, and suckering; cutting and hanging in the barn; stripping and 
grading the leaves; and finally the payoff—auction sales in December.
until i was seventeen and in my final year of high school, i had as-
sumed that i would make my career in agriculture. Four years of classes in 
vocational agriculture had idealized farming. But by my graduation after 
World War ii, agriculture had begun a rapid transformation. it was clear 
that, at best, only a few local farmers could make a living on the rather 
hilly farms in our part of east Tennessee. Two of my teachers persuaded 
me to attend college (i was the only one to do so in my small graduating 
class of seventeen). Even though i spent my college summers working in 
the tobacco control program in my county, i knew by then that my career 
would be in education, not agriculture. our small family farm survives. i 
now own it. i rent it to a neighbor for pasture and hay. it has been at least 
twenty years since anyone has grown cultivated crops, and even then it 
was less than an acre of land rented out for tobacco.
xin what may be, because of age or health, my last book, i decided to 
go back to my beginnings, to the inescapable landscapes of youth, to go 
home again. My goal is to describe and explain the changes that have taken 
place in agriculture during my lifetime, to chart the distance traveled from 
what i experienced firsthand as a boy. Also, i want to clarify a complex 
story—the evolution of federal farm programs in that eighty-year span, 
for such policies provided the context for a revolution in agricultural 
productivity. it is also at the policy level that all American citizens are 
involved with agriculture, for it is their representatives in Congress who 
develop such policies.
Recently i challenged a former student who referred to the decline 
of agriculture in America. What could she mean by such a statement? 
it implies that something has gone wrong in the most critical sector of 
any economy. Certainly, from many perspectives, much has gone wrong. 
But as i hope to demonstrate in this book, agriculture has been the most 
successful sector in the recent economic history of the united States. The 
greatest industrial revolution in our history has occurred, with all its eco-
nomic benefits and human costs, down on the farm, where productivity 
per full-time worker has increased at least tenfold since 1950.
This is a book based on memory as well as research. on one hand, i 
could not achieve my purposes without my own personal memories of 
growing up on a farm and my continued, if distant, involvement with 
what happened on that family farm. Throughout this book i rely on my 
past experience of farming and on my knowledge of the types of farming 
conducted by neighbors in our small community. on the other hand, i 
could not make sense of all those memories and experiences, place them 
in a broader context, or grasp their significance without having access to 
an enormous range of data, largely collected by the u.S. Department of 
Agriculture, and its subsequent analysis by economists and historians.
Agriculture, or at least the aspects of it devoted to the production of 
food, is the most basic of all human activities. Today, those who till the 
soil or tend livestock feed a world population of about 6.5 billion. Even 
fifty years ago the earth could not feed nearly so many people. And in 
fact, around 800 million hungry people are not well fed today. in another 
fifty years those who farm will have to feed an additional 3 billion. They 
will probably be able to do so, largely because of cumulative changes that 
occurred in my lifetime. What is sad, though, is that with each passing 
year, fewer and fewer local families can make a decent living on the farm. 
Today, my village is a far-out suburb of Kingsport, Greeneville, and John-
son City. Almost every adult has off-farm employment of some type.
Preface
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in 1959 my sister married her high school sweetheart, whose family 
had moved from Tennessee to a dairy farm in York County, Pennsylvania. 
in this rich agricultural area, their farm managed to make all the needed 
adjustments to compete successfully. My brother-in-law remained a full-
time farm operator until his death in 1994. During those years he bought 
a neighboring farm and increased his acreage to 400, making his farm 
one of the largest in the area. in later years even this was not enough 
land, so he rented more from his neighbors. He was able to upgrade his 
dairy farm to meet all the requirements of both the Philadelphia and new 
York marketing districts and managed to buy all the newest equipment, 
including several tractors and a self-propelled combine for both corn and 
small grains. in other words, he was a moderately successful commercial 
farmer. i thus use his experiences to illustrate some of the strategies that 
transformed American agriculture and reduced the number of American 
farm operators needed to produce 89 percent of our agricultural output 
from around 6 million in the 1930s to less than 350,000 today.
Preface
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1. American Agriculture 
before 1930
From the beginning, English settlers along the Atlantic coast tried to find 
products that they could sell back in Britain. Many of these products 
involved the harvest of abundant forests or the purchase of furs from in-
dians. But very quickly the first colonists in Virginia found an exportable 
crop that was in great demand in Europe: tobacco. it was the first com-
modity, or money crop, for the new colony. it set a pattern. American ag-
riculture from the beginning depended on markets. it was commercial. 
CommerCial origins
Despite their commercial endeavors, most of what these early American 
farmers grew supplied local needs. Some refer to this as subsistence ag-
riculture, but the label is misleading if it suggests that farmers, even in 
those first decades in America, supplied all their needs. They bought or 
traded for many items, including tools, housewares, exotic foods, and 
even some clothing and furniture. native Americans had long exchanged 
agricultural goods for manufactured items, some procured from a con-
siderable distance.
English colonists in north America simply adopted the same farming 
methods they knew from back home. They used the same draft animals 
and the same types of hoes and plows, and they planted the seeds they 
had brought with them to the new World. At first, they took advantage of 
the open land already cleared by the natives. Soon they added new land 
by clearing forests. They learned a few tricks from their indian neighbors 
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and adopted indian maize as the dominant cereal—more important than 
wheat, oats, barley, or rye in most regions of America. unlike in Europe, 
land was plentiful, although it took hard work to get forestland ready 
for cultivation. Rents were low to nonexistent. it was labor that was ex-
pensive. Thus, American farmers sought laborsaving innovations, not the 
means to extract more production from each acre of land. in a sense, they 
were reckless in their clearing of trees and in risking both soil erosion 
and soil exhaustion. like the native Americans before them, they simply 
moved their crops to new ground when yields on older fields declined.
unlike the indians, the English settlers adopted a fee-simple type of 
tenure, not an open commons. up through the nineteenth century, most 
American farms had more land than any one family could cultivate, even 
with many working children or one or two expensive hired hands. only 
in the South, with its tobacco, coastal rice, and cotton crops, did Ameri-
cans acquire a servile labor force that allowed the cultivation of large 
plantations—a pattern Europeans had earlier adopted in the Caribbean.
Through the early nineteenth century, Americans could best compete 
in world markets by selling farm and forest products as they grew or 
cut them at the first level of processing (such as ginned cotton, flour, or 
lumber). Quite simply, they were able to produce such goods at the low-
est possible prices. This involved not only a surplus of good land but also 
acquired skills and, gradually, the development of new and better tools. 
Americans exchanged such agricultural goods for more refined Europe-
an manufactured products (furniture, fancy clothing, clocks) that, given 
the labor constraints, they could not produce at a competitive cost at 
home. This gradually changed after 1815, particularly in new England, 
as good land became scarce, labor supplies increased (young women 
were the first source, then immigrants), and new forms of manufactur-
ing developed. Textiles led the way, as they still do in much of the world. 
They became the first major industry to adapt to a factory type of mass 
production.
in 1800 it took more than 50 percent of human labor worldwide to 
procure food. This was true even in England, despite its strong commit-
ment to manufacturing. in the united States, one can only estimate the 
amount of labor devoted to agriculture. At least 90 percent of the popula-
tion had some tie to agriculture, even if only part time. City artisans grew 
gardens and, if possible, owned cows, hogs, chickens, or all three. law-
yers, ministers, and schoolteachers almost uniformly owned farmland 
and at least supervised farming operations. At that time, given the level 
of agricultural technology, one farm family could supply food for only 
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one other family on average. Also, farmers devoted much u.S. cropland to 
nonfood crops—mainly tobacco before 1800, but within two decades, 
even more so to cotton. But very slowly, with each passing decade, farm-
ing became more efficient.1 By 1870, one able farmer growing wheat 
or corn could feed three other families. By 1900, one farmer might feed 
five other families; by 1930, almost ten. in 1900 agriculture was still, by 
far, the largest economic sector, with 40 percent of 76 million Americans 
living on farms. At least another 10 percent of workers were involved in 
agricultural services.
As a percentage of the total population, farmers declined year by year. 
The only possible exception was 1933 and 1934, when the normal pat-
tern of migration to cities reversed, and the rural population increased. 
Meanwhile, the total number of farmers grew very slowly until the mid-
1930s and then began a slow decline. in 1940 the farm population fell 
to what it had been in 1900—about 30 million (today it is around 4.5 
million, but a majority of these people are only marginally involved in 
agriculture). The amount of cultivated land on farms increased until 
about 1935; since then, it has very slowly declined. But even in 1930 the 
largest segment of the labor force remained in agriculture—around 25 
percent. By 1940, the agricultural revolution had begun in earnest, and 
the number of farmers and (less rapidly) the number of farms dropped 
precipitously with each decade until 1980. Both numbers have changed 
only marginally since then. However, the number of full-time farmers 
and the number of farms that contribute significantly to agricultural pro-
duction (320,000 farms accounted for 89 percent of the total production 
in 2002) have continued to decline.2
The steady but slow growth of agricultural productivity before the 
Great Depression reflected several important innovations but could not 
conceal many deeply rooted maladies. The most important problem was 
the economic plight of the South in the post–Civil War years. Another 
was the growth of farm tenancy, which does not necessarily cause lower 
productivity but was in fact a major drag on production in the South. 
Another problem was the heritage of reckless exploitation of the land, 
with much of the South plagued by soil erosion and the overfarmed areas 
of the Great Plains subject to the terrible dust storms of the mid-1930s. 
in many places, overcropping had also depleted soil nutrients, a problem 
only partly solved by 1940 with the increasing use of chemical fertiliz-
ers. Another problem was price instability, with cycles of boom and bust 
leading to credit crises. Progress in farming increasingly depended on 
credit and thus the maintenance of debt as an operating cost.
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Finally, as a whole, farmers were not very efficient. Almost everyone 
who writes about farm life stresses the hard work, even the drudgery. 
Farmers have helped nourish this image, often to their political benefit. 
But economists know better. Several farm tasks, particularly preparing the 
land for crops, planting, and harvesting, required long hours of work by 
several people, but only for short periods. larger farms often had hired 
hands to meet these peak labor demands, but they had to board and pay 
these employees year-round. Clearly, farmers had to work more days out 
of the year than did city workers. Almost all farms before 1930 had horses 
to care for and feed twice a day. Most had milk cows, hogs, and chickens, 
meaning chores every day of the year. in this sense, the work was unre-
lenting, although it might take only a couple of hours each day. But aside 
from the peak periods, labor was usually redundant on farms. This meant 
that farmers often looked for outside work in the winter months, and 
southerners often rented out the labor of their slaves. of course, farmers 
could find things to do on the farm in the winter or after the crops were 
laid by in the summer, but my observation is that they took plenty of 
time off for hunting and fishing or simply loafing at the country store. 
Also, apart from the intensity of labor during the harvest (or the thresh-
ing of wheat), i found the pace of farmwork to be leisurely, with rest 
periods, long lunch breaks, and the slow handling of more routine tasks. 
The amount of annual work performed by women easily exceeded that 
of men—child care, cooking, milking, churning butter, washing, iron-
ing, sewing, tending a vegetable garden, and canning an endless array of 
foods for the winter. The cure for most of these problems lay ahead and 
would account for the takeoff in productivity after the mid-1930s—the 
main themes in subsequent chapters of this book.
in 1930, the average farm was not all that different from one in the 
late nineteenth century. Despite the increasing use of tractors, most farms 
still used horses and mules—about 25 million of them that year (down 
only 5 million from the peak in the early 1920s). By 1930, horse-based 
technology had reached its maximum development, and in some cases 
this was quite an intricate technology. Although farmers had increased 
their specialization, in the sense that most of them grew only one or two 
money crops, almost everyone had to grow corn (for human food as 
well as for livestock). Food for home use still came largely from the farm, 
as did the all-important fuel needed for cooking and heating. Gradual im-
provements in agricultural productivity before 1930 involved two factors: 
reduced labor for each acre cultivated, and improved yields per acre. The 
most dramatic improvements before 1930 were in labor requirements.
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tilling anD PreParing the soil
Historically, the most basic agricultural tool was the plow. Before plows, 
the ground had to be prepared by sticks, hoes, or spades. The predeces-
sors of modern plows go back to ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia. The 
curved trunk of a small tree made up the beam, pulled by oxen, and 
either a sharp curve in the beam or a second strip of wood tied to the 
beam was sharpened at the end and used to make a furrow in the ground. 
Handles were also attached to this crude plow. of course, the wood point 
quickly became worn and dull, so the Egyptians made a hard cover from 
flint. By biblical times, iron was used for what we now call the share. in 
some light soils, furrowing plows work fairly well, but not in tight soils 
or in sod. The modern equivalent of these first plows was what we called, 
in my youth, the single-foot plow, which we used to create rows in the 
garden and in tobacco fields. The Romans added larger points or shares, 
as well as a flat board along one side of the share to force the disturbed 
soil to move in one direction. This was the origin of what became the 
moldboard and a true turning plow, one that flipped the sod over in such 
a way as to loosen the disturbed dirt.3
By 1700, the English had devised dozens of plow designs, most of 
which involved wooden moldboards that forced some turning of the 
soil, but these were usually sloped or only slightly curved. They were 
hard to pull and left the sod vertical to the ground, not fully flipped. The 
first moldboard with the double curve of a modern plow was perfected 
in England in 1730, and this type of plow sold well. Almost all plows 
used in America before 1800 had wooden beams and moldboards and 
cast-iron shares, which dulled quickly. But after the American Revolu-
tion, new designs appeared almost every year. Thomas Jefferson invented 
a new moldboard (curved, but still too flat) and proposed to replace his 
wooden model with one made of cast iron. The first American patent for 
a cast-iron moldboard was issued in 1800. By 1814, American inven-
tors filed patents for plows with cast-iron beams and moldboards. These 
had curved moldboards close to those of modern plows, and most had 
a colter attached to the beam, in front of the moldboard, to cut through 
the sod. By then, several inventors had found ways to bolt the plow-
share—the cutting edge—to the moldboard, allowing farmers to replace 
a broken or worn share quickly, but the intractable problem was finding a 
moldboard and share that easily scoured (shed the dirt). in 1837 a black-
smith, John Deere, became famous when he replaced cast-iron shares 
with ones made of steel, which was still quite expensive. Steel shares pro-
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vided the polished, dirt-shedding surface needed to turn the deep virgin 
soils of the Midwest. When steel became cheaper, he and others added 
steel moldboards and, after the Civil War, even steel beams.
in most soils, the single plow required two horses. on small farms, 
the two-horse plow remained dominant until 1930, or when horses be-
gan to give way to tractors. on larger farms, beginning as early as 1864, 
the standard plow became a riding plow with two wheels and a seat, 
often called a sulky (after harness racing). Four horses pulled it. At first it 
had only one moldboard, but inventors soon added a second. By World 
War i, an increasing number of farmers in the West, Great Plains, and 
Midwest did their plowing with heavy tractors that could pull four or 
more bottoms, which they called gang plows.
Except in the most friable soil, plowing did not leave the soil ready for 
the planting of seeds. Further preparation required leveling and break-
ing up clods—a process called harrowing. This was not a complex task. 
Some farmers used a simple tool called a drag—boards nailed to a frame 
and pulled over the soil, with stones or even children added to weigh 
it down. later, heavy rollers did the same work. Even in Roman times, 
farmers used brush from trees to drag over the soil. The Romans also 
used wooden pegs attached to a wooden frame to pulverize soil, or the 
first true harrow. By 1800, farmers had developed dozens of different 
designs and shapes for harrows and had replaced wooden teeth with 
iron spikes. When i was a boy, the favorite local design was a double A-
frame, with iron teeth. By then, more sophisticated harrows had spring 
teeth that could better hug the ground. However, no toothed harrow was 
as efficient as the disk harrow, which was perfected just after the Civil 
War. These implements had revolving concave disks that rolled through 
the soil at an angle determined by the operator (the greater the angle, 
the more the disks dug into the soil). later, large disks pulled by tractors 
could cut so deeply into soil as to become substitutes for turning plows. 
Such disks are still used today, although they are not as effective as revolv-
ing tines (called rotary hoes or, for gardens, rototillers).
tools For Planting anD Cultivating
Seed planting followed soil preparation. From ancient times, farmers did 
this by hand. They broadcast seeds of wheat and other small grains by 
hand and dropped the seeds for row crops into hills or prepared rows. 
The challenge was to find machines that did these jobs better and faster. 
For most of the grasses used for hay, the goal was a mechanical broad-
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caster. The earliest answer was a hand-held and hand-cranked hurricane 
spreader (i still own and use one of these). later, farmers attached ro-
tary spreaders to the backs of wagons, with power supplied by a wagon 
wheel. For the spreading of fertilizer and lime on pastures, large hurri-
cane-type spreaders, operated by a tractor or on the back of a truck, are 
still the preferred tools. Broadcasting worked best for seeds that did not 
require a covering of soil to germinate. When used for small grain, one 
had to use a harrow or brush to cover at least most of the seeds, to protect 
them from birds and to ensure enough moisture for germination.
What was needed was a drill. it took more than two hundred years 
and hundreds of experimental designs to perfect a single-row drill or 
planter for row crops, and multiple drills, placed side by side at about 
eight-inch intervals, for small grains. in each case, the challenges includ-
ed making a device to feed seeds from a hopper at the proper rate into a 
funnel or tube leading to the ground, a device to open a small furrow at 
the desired depth as a receptacle for the seeds, and a device to cover the 
seeds with soil. in addition, in a grain drill, with its width and multiple 
feeds (about eight in early drills; twenty or more in those pulled by trac-
tors), the feet that work at the ground level have to be flexible enough to 
maintain contact and the correct depth over uneven ground. This requires 
either springs on each tube or a hydraulic device (like a shock absorber 
on an automobile) to compensate for uneven surfaces and to spring back 
from rock or roots. Drills that met some of these requirements were in 
use by 1840, but it was only after the Civil War that drills meeting all 
these requirements were available at a price farmers could afford. later 
drills, like most contemporary ones, had double disks on each head to 
open space for the seeds. By 1900, drills usually had three bins—one 
for the grain, another for fertilizer, and one for grass seed that was often 
planted with wheat. By 1930, on moderate-sized, pretractor farms, the 
drill was usually the most complex farm implement except for the binder 
for small grains.
For row crops, the early drills or planters used a single wheel to pro-
vide the power. in time, almost all such planters would have revolving 
disks with holes that captured the seeds and dropped them when the hole 
passed over the funnel or top of the tunnel. Various hole sizes and various 
intervals between holes fit different crops and allowed different spacing. 
By the Civil War, most large farms used two-row planters for corn, with 
two wheels and a seat for the driver. in the Midwest, as part of a weed 
control strategy, the two plates were synchronized (check-row planters), 
so that the seeds (usually three or four) could drop at roughly three-foot 
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intervals, creating a checkerboard pattern. This meant that a cultivator 
could plow in two directions, almost eliminating the need for hoeing.
For some crops (tobacco, sweet potatoes, tomatoes), the most labor-
intensive task was the transplanting of seedlings. Either the seeds had to 
be started indoors early, before the end of spring frosts, or the tiny seeds 
did not lend themselves to field conditions. At the appropriate time, the 
tender plants had to be transplanted in the fields, which was backbreak-
ing work. only after World War ii did transplanting machines, pulled 
by either horses or tractors, lessen the drudgery. The machine opened a 
furrow, and two “droppers” rode on the moving machine and alternately 
placed a plant in the row.  The machine then both watered the plants from 
its large water tank and closed the dirt around them.
After planting, row crops had to be kept clear of weeds, which was 
one of the great challenges of agriculture. This had long been the main 
task for hoes, but the arduous work of hoeing corn, cotton, or tobacco 
cried out for a mechanical replacement. This meant horse-drawn plows 
that could cultivate between rows. it took a long time to perfect culti-
vating plows, but by 1820, farmers were using plows with two large 
feet (or shovels), and later plows with up to five smaller feet. As a boy, i 
plowed corn with a three-foot cultivator with shares or points of moder-
ate width; differently shaped points were available for different tasks. To 
cultivate a row crop, one would run the cultivator as close as possible 
to the plants, removing almost all the weeds except those actually in 
the row. By the Civil War, farmers had riding cultivators (pulled by two 
horses) that straddled the rows. When they ran such cultivators in both 
directions in cross-checked corn, they almost eliminated the need for 
hand hoeing. 
tools oF harvest
For most crops, harvesting was the most labor-intensive chore and there-
fore the greatest challenge for inventors. For small grains, harvesting in-
volved three tasks: cutting the stalks of grain with their golden ripe heads, 
separating the grains from the head (threshing), and winnowing out the 
chaff that remained after threshing. For a thousand years these three tasks 
involved the same labor-intensive methods. Farmers used a sickle or a 
scythe to cut handfuls or swaths of grain, leaving it to others to collect, 
bind, and shock the grain. When the grain was fully dry, they separated 
the seeds from the head by using flails or by having horses or cattle tramp 
them out. Finally, on windy days they poured the grain back and forth 
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between containers until all the chaff blew away, leaving a reasonably 
clean product. Eventually, new tools reduced this human labor by a factor 
of fifty. it is one of the better-known stories in agricultural history.4
The first laborsaving device may have originated in America, although 
we do not know who perfected it. By the American Revolution, the cradle 
was slowly replacing the scythe, which had largely assumed its modern 
form. The scythe had a long, curved steel blade with a thickened strip at 
the back edge to give it strength. The handle had a double curve, which 
allowed the operator to stand at a normal height, holding on to two nibs 
or wooden handles along the snath. This was a marvel of engineering 
in itself. The cradle had a light wooden lath with six or more curved 
wooden fingers attached to the base of the snath. The fingers matched 
the length and curvature of the blade. As the cradler swung the device 
through a long sweep, the falling grain collected on the fingers, allowing 
the operator to dump it in a neat pile for the shockers, who came along 
to collect and bundle the grain. A trained cradler could cut an acre a day, 
and a few young men claimed that they could cut up to five or six acres. 
i can still remember my grandfather cradling a field of grain when i was 
a boy.  The cradle remained the main tool for cutting grain until after the 
Civil War, but by 1835 a few large farmers had turned to a much more 
complex and costly cutting machine—the reaper and, with later refine-
ments, the binder. These machines eventually transformed the harvest 
of small grains. of all nineteenth-century agricultural inventions, only 
barbed wire was close to being as revolutionary, since it gradually dis-
placed rail fencing and transformed the range cattle industry.
After years of experimentation by several inventors, Cyrus McCor-
mick built one of the first almost successful grain reapers in 1831 (see fig-
ure 1). obed Hussey had a working reaper by 1833 and obtained the first 
American patent. His machine had the best cutter bar. The basic concept 
was thus established by 1835, but workable machines—ones that did not 
break down and did not cost too much—evolved slowly. By 1860, they 
were at work on a minority of farms (60,000), but they were clearly the 
technology of the future. The secret of a successful reaper was the cutter 
bar, which revolutionized not only the wheat harvest but also the cutting 
of hay. it is still used on contemporary grain heads for combines. The 
reaper had only one engaged, lugged wheel directly under the weight of 
the machine (called the bull wheel), which transferred power by pulleys 
and chains to a revolving wheel with an attached lever that propelled the 
bar back and forth, much like the drivers on a steam locomotive. it was, 
and still is, a very effective cutting device, but it allowed very little toler-
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ance in the various parts. one other innovation of the McCormick reaper 
(but not Hussey’s) was a revolving reel above the bar. it had wooden slats 
and moved the grain into the cutter bar.
The reaper’s early versions did not drastically reduce labor. The cut 
grain fell onto a stationary platform, and a worker had to use a hand 
rake to pull the grain off the end for the shockers who followed. An 
early innovation was an automatic raker. Standard after 1864 was a can-
vas on rollers that moved the fallen grain up to a platform on the reaper, 
where workers gathered it into bundles, tied together by twisted straws. 
By 1873, an automatic mechanism tied the clustered wheat with wire, 
but the wire was a deadly hazard in threshing and for livestock. At least 
two inventors patented knotting devices that would bind the grain with 
twine. in the early 1880s, both the Deering and the McCormick reapers 
used this device on the first successful binders. The binder remained the 
most advanced technology for the harvest of grain in much of the eastern 
united States until after World War ii. not so in the drier wheat areas of 
the West, particularly in California and eastern Washington and oregon. 
There, a machine called a header dominated the harvest. it consisted of a 
Figure 1. An exact replica of Cyrus McCormick’s 1831 reaper. (Courtesy of Harold 
Sohner)
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wide cutter bar and reel, with a rolling canvas that moved the short-cut 
wheat into special wagons to be hauled to stationary threshing machines. 
The machine was called a header because horses pushed the grain head 
from behind. it worked only with very ripe, dry wheat and eliminated 
the binding and shocking of wheat.
After the invention of the reaper, inventors tried to find a way to move 
a threshing machine through the fields and cut and feed grain into them. 
numerous patents for a combined implement ensued, and one 1839 mod-
el in Michigan cut and threshed wheat but did not clean (or winnow) 
the grain. This type of machine, to which cleaning blowers were soon 
added, was first adopted by wheat farmers in California before the Civil 
War. As late as 1880 these huge combines still harvested only 10 percent 
of the crop in California, but they quickly replaced headers and threshers 
in much of the West over the next two decades.
The combine, the most intricate and costly farm machine invented in 
the nineteenth century, used the same cutter bar and reel as the binder. 
it fed the cut grain into the large, efficient threshing machines that had 
been perfected by 1880. The early, heavy combine was practical only on 
the very large, dry, level wheat fields of the West. in 1891, in California, 
Benjamin Holt invented a leveling device for combines. His Holt Hillside 
combine made mechanical harvesting possible in the hilly Palouse region 
of eastern Washington. The aridity of the West meant short wheat and less 
falling over than occurred with heavy-headed, dead ripe wheat in the 
wetter eastern states. The early combines were pulled by from twenty to 
forty horses. These combines, and the horse hitches used to pull them, 
were marvels to behold (see figure 2). in hilly areas, horse-drawn com-
bines continued in use until the 1930s. Some of these machines were 
the largest ever employed on American farms. one inventor in Stockton, 
California, created a version of a self-propelled combine in 1886. in the 
center of it was, in effect, a detachable steam tractor. its first head mea-
sured twenty-two feet and, after 1888, forty feet, or as large as on any 
combine used today. After 1890, in level terrain, combines were increas-
ingly moved by huge steam traction machines, some weighing more 
than 40,000 pounds. only after 1940 were combines widely used in 
the eastern united States. This required the development of both lighter 
combines and electric or propane dryers that allowed wheat elevators to 
accept wheat with too much moisture, with the cost of the additional 
drying deducted from the selling price.
new threshing and winnowing tools made possible the modern com-
bine. Threshing machines actually preceded the invention of the reaper. 
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After the American Revolution, inventors perfected dozens of thresh-
ing machines. Some used hand- or horse-powered flailing devices; oth-
ers used revolving rollers with teeth or spurs. in time, rollers prevailed. 
Horses provided power for the larger machines by means of a treadmill 
or by walking in circles (as for old sorghum mills) to turn overhead pul-
leys attached by a belt to the thresher. These machines did not do a good 
job of cleaning the grain. For this, winnowing machines were required, 
and again, dozens of models were patented before the Civil War. They in-
volved a combination of two technologies—shaking or vibrating screens, 
and fans. A next-door neighbor had such a nineteenth-century machine 
in his barn when i was a boy (he still has it). Wheat is poured in at the 
top; it then falls through a series of variously sized mesh screens while a 
fan blows through the device. By the time the wheat falls to the bottom, 
it is clean. My neighbor’s is a hand-cranked machine, but horses pulled 
larger ones.
in 1844 J. i. Case marketed the first thresher that was able to win-
now the grain. it became the standard model after the Civil War, and 
Case remained the largest producer. initially, these heavy threshing ma-
Figure 2. Five Holt Brothers Hillside combines, each pulled by twenty-seven horses 
or mules, near Walla Walla, Washington, 1908. (Smithsonian, national Museum of 
American History)
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chines were powered by up to eight horses. Some of these horse-operated 
threshers remained in use into the twentieth century. First, a set of roll-
ers separated the grain from the straw. Then screens and a powerful fan 
winnowed it. The clean grain fed into an outlet to be bagged or gathered 
in a wagon or truck. By 1870, a few large steam engines, mounted on 
wheels, began to power threshing machines, and after 1880 they domi-
nated threshing. At first, horses had to pull these land locomotives, but by 
1890, most were self-propelled, either by a chain from the belt pulley to 
one lugged wheel or by a gear system with only one speed—very slow. 
They could pull themselves and a heavy thresher from farm to farm, but 
they could not travel on paved roads, where the cleats could do serious 
damage, or over most bridges. Early versions expelled the straw at one 
end, where rakers removed it with pitchforks. later machines had a net 
or canvas device that carried the straw out and piled it up. By 1900, the 
fans on most threshers were powerful enough to blow the straw and 
chaff out a long, maneuverable wind stacker, allowing the operator to 
create a beautiful cone of straw—the straw stack of legend (see figure 3). 
As a boy i looked forward to threshing time, for it provided us with fresh, 
buoyant straw that we used to refill our straw ticks, at a time when poor 
families could not afford mattresses.
Figure 3. A restored Rumely oil Pull steam tractor powering a threshing machine. 
(national Museum of American History)
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individual farmers could not afford this type of threshing machine. 
They simply could not use it often enough to justify the high cost. Thus, 
threshing in the late nineteenth century became the first major custom-
ized task in American agriculture. Custom threshers bought their own 
machines and moved them from farm to farm, often in a pattern repeated 
year after year. They received money or a portion of the threshed grain 
in payment. in some areas, multiple farmers formed a threshing network 
and collectively owned a threshing machine. Threshing required at least 
five workers to operate the machines: one to cut the twine on the bun-
dles, one to feed the bundles into the machine, one to operate the stacker, 
one to oil and care for the machines, and one to bag the grain at the end 
of the process. it took at least this many, and often more, to keep the 
wheat coming to the machine. Thus, on threshing day a crew of at least 
ten followed the thresher, assured of work at a higher than normal wage 
and a fabulous meal supplied by the farmer’s wife. These meals became 
justifiably famous, a point of honor and a type of competition among 
the wives. i followed the thresher for at least two years as a teenager. The 
work could be backbreaking, but i often received as much as $3 a day (at 
the time, standard pay for normal farmwork was $1).
unlike the small grains, the harvesting of most row crops was largely 
unaffected by the invention of new tools before 1930. only corn benefit- 
ed, but even there the changes were just beginning. Both cotton and to-
bacco required an enormous amount of hand labor to harvest. Tobacco 
still does. And as late as 1930, no machines had replaced the human hand 
in picking cotton bolls. The revolutionary cotton picker was not widely 
used until after 1950.
Corn was never as labor-intensive as either cotton or tobacco. Two 
modes of harvest were typical by 1920. When farmers wanted to pre-
serve the dried cornstalks for fodder or to clear the land for the plant-
ing of winter wheat, they cut the stalks by hand and clustered them in 
shocks, like the ones seen in Currier and ives prints. The other harvesting 
technique, which dominated in much of the midwestern Corn Belt, in-
volved shucking the corn in the field. Horses pulled a wagon alongside 
a row or two of corn, and pickers used gloves and a small steel hand 
tool (called a peg) to open up the shuck and get a clean ear, which they 
tossed into the wagon. Well-trained horses would keep the wagon in the 
correct position without a driver. The corn was hauled to a slotted crib 
(the slots allowed circulating air to dry the corn), and the stalks were left 
for cows or hogs to feed on in the field. This method required less labor 
than shocking. My father went to iowa in the fall of 1920 for the shuck-
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ing (also called husking), which paid well. He did not observe any corn 
picking machines, although a few were in use by then. As late as 1930, 
more than 90 percent of corn was still shucked by hand.
the traCtor
Among the many innovations in farming, the only one that would replace 
horses was the tractor. its enormous impact came largely after 1930, but 
by then the possibilities were already clear. For many farmers in 1930, a 
costly tractor might have saved some labor, but it would not necessarily 
be cost-effective unless it could replace—not just supplement—horses 
and mules. Within the next decade, it would be able to do so on most 
farms; within the next two decades, it would do so on all farms except 
those in mountain valleys or those farmed by the Amish.5
The word tractor derives from the term traction machine, used for early 
self-propelled steam engines. A few experimental and at least partly self-
propelled steam engines were in existence just after the Civil War, but 
they were not widely used until after 1880. At that time, they were 
employed almost exclusively for pulling threshing machines, for which 
they provided the necessary belt power. in the 1890s on the Great 
Plains, such self-propelled traction machines pulled both plows and 
early combines. They were much too heavy for other farming tasks, 
since they severely compacted the soil. Meanwhile, one-cylinder inter-
nal combustion engines were available after 1870 and were useful for 
some farm tasks, such as milling grain or sawing wood. The first known 
use of such engines for traction work came in 1892, when an internal 
combustion engine was substituted for steam to operate and move a 
threshing machine. The manufacturer (a predecessor of the John Deere 
Company) made no marketable machine, concentrating instead on pro-
ducing the new type of engine. But several inventors accumulated dif-
ferent parts and made what was, by then, called a tractor. The Hart-Parr 
company (later absorbed by oliver) placed the first production tractor 
on the market in 1902, with fifteen sold in 1903. A restored version of 
this early Hart-Parr tractor is now on exhibit in the Smithsonian (see 
figure 4). in form, it looks like a contemporary tractor, but this was 
not true of any number of experimental designs created over the next 
twenty years. in 1906, among dozens of competitors, the new inter-
national Harvester Company (a merger of the McCormick and Deering 
farm machinery companies) sold its first tractor, and it would build a 
thousand a year by 1910. This early boom ended by 1912, when the 
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very small market was saturated. These early tractors were often a disap-
pointment to their owners.
About the only profitable use of these early, very expensive tractors 
was for plowing, threshing, or pulling combines. They were huge ma-
chines, often weighing more than 20,000 pounds (one Hart-Parr tractor 
weighted 35,000 pounds). Some were powerful and could pull four or 
more deep plows through virgin prairie soil. But breaking the plains was 
a one-time operation, and they were too heavy for use on already cul-
tivated land. Even as late as 1917, there were fewer than 80,000 tractors 
on American farms. But by then a series of innovations, as well as some 
lighter tractors, had created an expansive market, leading to a brief boom 
during World War i. By 1918, tractors were switching from kerosene to 
gasoline, a few already had electric starters and lights, and a Moline mod-
el had a custom-made plow (most tractors had simply pulled existing 
horse-based implements) with a power lift. By 1921, American farmers 
owned more than 300,000 tractors.
The largest impact on the market was Henry Ford’s introduction of 
the mass-produced Fordson tractor in 1917 (see figure 5). it was not 
Figure 4. Hart-Parr no. 3, the first commercial tractor. (national Museum of Ameri-
can History, photograph courtesy of Sherry Schaefer)
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a marvel of engineering. The Fordson had a dangerous worm drive (it 
easily reared up when it hit obstacles and in this way killed many op-
erators) and a cheap magneto (it was hard to crank), but it was smaller 
(it pulled only two plows) than most tractors on the market, and it was 
comparatively inexpensive, at an initial wartime price of $750. Ford had 
sold more than 100,000 tractors by 1920. in 1922, during a price war 
with international Harvester, Ford lowered his price to $395— or what 
he claimed was the cost of a good team of horses. He lost so much money 
that he stopped making tractors in America in 1928. My father, who 
worked for two years on a farm in iowa in the early 1920s, encountered 
his first Fordson there. The owner never let my father, or even his own 
sons, drive his new pet, which he used only for plowing. i doubt that 
it was cost-effective, in large part because, with such a restricted use, it 
could not replace any of the farm’s four horses. But by 1925, at least in 
the Wheat Belt, tractors were profitable investments simply because the 
newer models could do all the soil preparation, drilling, and combining, 
or all the work required for small grains.
What eastern farmers needed was a small, inexpensive, all-purpose 
Figure 5. 1918 Fordson, the first mass-produced tractor. (South Dakota State Agricul-
ture Heritage Museum Photograph Archive)
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tractor that could cultivate as well as plow, was easily maneuverable in 
small fields, could directly power fully integrated tools, and could pull 
wagons. Such a tractor could replace horses and mules, thus freeing up 
almost 25 percent of all land under cultivation. A series of innovations in 
the 1920s almost met these requirements. The power takeoff, developed 
in France before World War i, was first sold on an American tractor in 
1922. it eliminated the bull wheel on binders and mowing machines, 
and when the shaft and speed became standard, it provided the main 
source of power for almost all farm implements. By then, improved air 
filters had eliminated an early problem with dust-clogged engines. in 
1924, international Harvester finally introduced a tractor that could cul-
tivate. it had the beguiling name of Farmall (implying that it could do all 
the tasks on a farm). it was narrow, was high enough off the ground to 
straddle growing row crops, and had both front and side attachments for 
cultivators. its most distinctive feature was a pair of closely joined front 
wheels that could fit between rows (see figure 6). in a competitive model 
introduced in 1927, John Deere added a hydraulic power lift to allow 
easy control over new equipment designed for tractors. By 1930, at least 
three companies—including the very successful Allis-Chalmers—had in-
troduced even smaller one-plow tractors. one, the Farmall A, is still in use 
Figure 6. 1928 Farmall with attached two-row cultivator. (South Dakota State Agri-
culture Heritage Museum Photograph Archive)
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on some farms. Thus, in most respects, the modern all-purpose tractor 
had reached its maturity by 1930, with 1.2 million in use (6.8 million 
farms still had no tractors; many could not afford one). But clearly, one 
reason for the dramatic rise in farm productivity in the 1930s was the 
increased use of tractors (with rubber tires after 1935 and a three-point 
hitch after 1940) and the gradual replacement of horses and mules.
researCh, eDuCation, anD extension
Without supportive governmental policies, the success of pre-1930 
American agriculture would have been impossible. These policies in-
cluded generous terms for the disposal of public lands; federal and state 
funding of roads, canals, and railroads; and land grants for public school 
systems and colleges. After the Civil War, this support increased and 
soon included government-supported research, regulatory legislation, 
subsidized irrigation projects, and accessible, low-interest credit. in the 
1920s, major debates about farm policies led to several new initiatives 
and helped prepare the way for the farm legislation of the new Deal, 
which, for the first time, directly supported agricultural prices well above 
free-market levels.
As early as 1862, with the Morrill Act, the federal government as-
sumed primary responsibility for agricultural research and development. 
Given the large number of individual proprietors in agriculture, only a 
public agency was in a position to undertake such research. The Morrill 
Act gave each state 30,000 acres of public land for each of its senators 
and representatives, with the proceeds from the sale of this land to be-
come an endowment for an agricultural and mechanical college. Three 
or four agricultural colleges already existed, but they needed additional 
funding. When these original endowments proved insufficient, Congress 
added annual appropriations that continue to the present. Today, these 
land-grant institutions include more than half of the largest and most 
prestigious public universities in the united States. Although the federal 
funds supported instruction in such fields as home economics, industrial 
arts, and engineering, farmers were the major beneficiaries. Today, the 
colleges of agriculture in these land-grant universities constitute the larg-
est pool of agriculturally related scientists in the world. The second larg-
est pool is probably in the u.S. Department of Agriculture, also founded 
in 1862.
The original Morrill Act did not make any provision for African 
American farmers in the South. All the southern land-grant colleges were 
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segregated. This concerned its sponsor, Justin Smith Morrill of  Vermont, 
and other northern legislators. Thus, in 1890 Congress amended the first 
Morrill Act by adding funds and requiring an end to discrimination 
against blacks. Within a few years, all the former slave states established 
separate black land-grant colleges (often referred to as the 1890 colleg-
es). A few states granted at least a part of these funds to private colleges, 
with Alabama distributing most of its funds to Booker T. Washington’s 
Tuskegee institute. These new agricultural and mechanical colleges be-
came in time the first public black colleges and universities in the South. 
But in the first fifty years, few of these struggling colleges were able to 
hire trained agricultural experts or to attract many students to what most 
blacks viewed as stigmatized vocational education. Most of these new 
colleges became, in effect, normal schools for blacks, with the level of 
instruction rarely above a high school level. The two exceptions to this 
sad story were Tuskegee and Hampton institute in Virginia. Both soon 
had able staffs in agricultural and industrial areas and would train almost 
all the early black scientists in these fields.
Soon after the first Morrill Act, several new agricultural colleges began 
rather extensive research and demonstration efforts in what were called 
experiment stations. in 1883 the Department of Agriculture joined in this 
early research, with an experimental farm on the Mall. This later moved 
to Arlington, Virginia, and in 1910 to the present home of the national 
Agricultural Research Center in Beltsville, Maryland. in the Hatch Act of 
1887, Congress authorized funds to support an agricultural experiment 
station in each state. This act preceded the 1890 Morrill Act revisions 
and made no provision for black experiment stations (the first federal 
funds for agricultural research in the black land-grant institutions came 
in 1967). According to the Hatch Act, these stations were to carry out 
original research, investigations, and experiments comparable to those 
in the manufacturing sector, with the objective of supporting an effec-
tive agricultural industry in the united States and improving rural life. 
To further these goals, the stations were to publish and distribute (with 
free postage) to farmers their bulletins, reports, and articles, as well as 
provide on-site demonstrations of the latest agricultural methods. The 
original appropriation was modest—$30,000 to each state, paid for by 
public land sales. later, direct appropriations would take over as land 
sales declined. The scientific staffs of such stations were members of the 
faculty of the parent college.
An office of Experiment Stations in the Department of Agriculture set 
the rules for the use of federal grants. At first, scientists on the faculties 
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of the universities undertook the research task, while still teaching their 
regular courses. Each land-grant university either used part of its exist-
ing campus or bought new land to establish an experimental farm. The 
federal office pushed the stations to engage in basic research, whereas 
farmers sought direct services, such as the testing of competing fertil-
izers. Farmers also requested the establishment of branch stations to im-
prove their access to the demonstration work. until after 1900, the office 
of Experiment Stations opposed such branches, but several states used 
state funds to establish them. Soon, almost all state experiment stations 
had regional branches. in 1906 Congress passed the Adams Act, which 
doubled the federal funding, but with the stipulation that at least half the 
funds be expended for original research. in the 1920s the federal fund-
ing for these stations tripled, with some states receiving more than $1 
million each year. From the beginning, the stations carried out work on 
soils, insects and diseases, new crop varieties, livestock improvements, 
and land use. The stations also tested soil for local farmers, offered advice 
to housewives on home management, helped farmers manage their for-
est resources, and, perhaps most important of all, used their own fields 
to demonstrate the latest farming methods.6
By subsidizing research and development in the experiment stations, 
Congress tried to ensure the rapid dissemination of the most advanced 
farming practices. For the largest farms and the best-educated farmers, 
this tactic undoubtedly worked as planned. But these stations had little ef-
fect on average farmers, most of whom lived a considerable distance from 
a college or even a branch station and did not read the literature emanat-
ing from them. Thus, other means of extending agricultural knowledge 
to farmers were needed. Early efforts included correspondence courses 
offered by land-grant universities and demonstrations and courses of-
fered by railroads. But the major tool was farmers’ institutes, modeled 
on the large number of institutes for public schoolteachers. By 1900, 
most rural counties were organizing weekend or weeklong institutes for 
farmers, who came to hear lectures, attend demonstrations, and learn the 
latest farming techniques.7
The one person most responsible for organized extension work was 
Seaman A. Knapp. Born in new York, Knapp was college educated and had 
an early career in teaching. He moved to iowa in 1865 for health reasons 
and became a hog farmer, clergyman, school superintendent, and editor 
of a farm journal. He joined the faculty of iowa Agricultural College in 
1879 and briefly served as its president. There he helped gain support 
for what would become the Hatch Act. in 1885 he moved to louisiana 
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to help a land syndicate develop a new inland Rice Belt. This new capital-
intensive crop led the way toward a scientifically informed agriculture in 
the South. To facilitate rice cultivation, Knapp helped set up demonstra-
tion farms and encouraged local farmers to visit and learn from them. 
in 1898 the Department of Agriculture appointed him a special agent 
to travel to the Far East to seek better varieties of rice. After two trips, 
he came home and accepted an appointment in 1902—the first of its 
kind—as a special agent to promote agriculture in the lagging South.
in a sense, agricultural extension began with Knapp’s work in 1903. 
He instituted a new type of demonstration farm in Texas, recruiting an 
ordinary farmer to lend part of his land for the demonstration of new 
varieties, fertilizers, and methods. Community leaders agreed to fund 
any losses occasioned by the experiments (however, the farmer actually 
profited from them). This was the model for what eventually became 
hundreds of such farms. Also in 1903, Congress appropriated funds for 
boll weevil control and gave some of it to Knapp. He used his demonstra-
tion farms to test new methods of control and in 1904 used his funds 
to employ temporary agents to spread this knowledge directly to farm-
ers. By the next year, he had twenty special agents working in louisiana 
and Texas. These agents were farmers, not college-trained experts; they 
worked for two-month terms and received $60 a month.
Knapp soon expanded the work of his agents from boll weevil control 
to all aspects of farming. Although he employed a professor from Texas 
A&M as an agent in 1909, he usually kept his extension service separate 
from the agricultural colleges and experiment stations. With some re-
luctance, in 1906 he appointed the first African American agents—one 
from Tuskegee and a second from Hampton institute. in 1906 the new 
Rockefeller-funded General Education Board began funding Knapp’s work, 
with the annual amount growing to $187,000 by 1914; that same year, 
federal appropriations reached $335,000. By 1913, two years after 
Knapp’s death, the system of extension agents had reached all the south-
ern states, while some northern states funded imitations. The number of 
agents grew from 49 in 1907 to more than 700 in 1912, 32 of whom 
were black. By then, most agents served in only one county and were 
usually referred to as county agents. Most received supplemental funds 
from states, local governments, or business organizations. By 1912, an 
increasing number of states had given administrative control of the pro-
gram to the land-grant universities. Also, many county agents had estab-
lished boys’ clubs, often tied to projects in a specific crop (for instance, 
many were called corn clubs and required a boy to grow one acre of 
23American Agriculture before 1930
corn); a few had also formed girls’ clubs. These were the predecessors of 
the 4-H Clubs formed by the new Cooperative Extension Service created 
in 1914 by the Smith-lever Act.8
The Extension Service was, in effect, the final expansion of the Morrill 
Act. in addition to operating experiment stations, the land-grant agricul-
tural colleges now had a legislative mandate to carry new knowledge in 
agriculture and home economics directly to farmers and homemakers 
in each rural county. As implemented, the Extension Service became the 
most ubiquitous facet of the huge Department of Agriculture bureau-
cracy. in all counties with a rural population (most in 1914), the ser-
vice employed extension agents to work directly with local farmers and 
homemakers. These agents were almost always graduates of a land-grant 
university and had faculty status in such a university; they had offices 
in the county seat but were often at work out in the field in rural com-
munities. Agents helped set up home demonstration clubs in most farm 
communities (my mother faithfully attended monthly club meetings for 
two decades). They sponsored local demonstrations for farmers; gave free 
advice about fertilizers, seed varieties, and livestock breeding; and even-
tually aided farmers in the sale of timber. The same southern states that 
had refused to establish black experiment stations followed Knapp’s pre-
cedent and hired black extension agents. After some bitter debates, south-
ern congressmen who had successfully resisted amendments to the act 
that required black access promised to set up a separate negro Extension 
Service. They did so, but it was the white land-grant college that selected 
the agents. Typically, African American agents served a larger constitu-
ency than white agents and received only half their salary.9
A final strategy—essentially one of adult education—helped alle-
viate the limited effectiveness of extension programs over succeeding 
generations. This was the Smith-Hughes Act or, formally, the national 
Vocational Education Act of 1917. it provided federal subsidies for vo-
cational education in secondary schools, which were finally becoming 
well established in most states. Except for the early land grants, this was 
the first major federal aid for public education in America, and it would 
remain the only such aid for the next forty-five years. The act established 
two funds to help pay teachers and their supervisors in vocational educa-
tion. one fund, for agriculture, amounted to $500,000 in 1918, increas-
ing incrementally to $3 million in 1926 and for each year beyond that. 
This fund was apportioned according to the percentage of rural residents 
in each state. The second fund involved the same amount of annual ap-
propriations for instruction in trade, home economics, and industrial 
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subjects, but with no more than 20 percent devoted to home econom-
ics. it was apportioned according to population but was clearly aimed 
primarily at urban schools, which developed programs in what were 
called the industrial arts. in rural areas, shop work was also a part of the 
vocational agriculture curriculum.
This support was much more than a subsidy to states, for the act set 
up stringent requirements. it appropriated $500,000 in 1918, and $1 
million a year after 1921, to train vocational teachers. For agriculture, 
this meant new training programs in the land-grant universities and an 
informal tie between agriculture teachers and both the agricultural col-
leges and the Extension Service. The act established and funded a Federal 
Board for Vocational Education to carry out studies and to set overall 
certification standards for qualifying secondary schools and for teachers. 
State boards had to implement such standards. The federal funds paid up 
to half the salaries of certified vocational teachers. The state paid the other 
half and was responsible for providing the necessary facilities, which 
usually meant fully equipped shops. unlike other schoolteachers, voca-
tional teachers taught for twelve months and, as a result, had the highest 
salaries.10
During the summer months, the teachers worked with students on 
the farm, helping them implement the latest innovations in record keep-
ing, plant and animal breeding, conservation practices, and the use of 
fertilizers and pesticides. To be eligible for such agricultural courses, a 
student had to live and work on a farm, or at least express an interest in 
becoming a farmer. Each student had to carry out farming or farming- 
related projects to gain high school credits in what amounted to a sum-
mer internship program. in effect, this program was a training ground 
for future farmers. Thus, almost every high school with vocational agri-
culture instruction (this meant only white high schools in most of the 
South) sponsored a club called the Future Farmers of America (FFA). 
it was organized on both state and national levels, had annual conven-
tions, and awarded prizes for the most successful projects. in most high 
schools, boys could take four years of vocational education, amounting to 
one-quarter of the requirements for graduation. in my small high school, 
all the boys took vocational courses for all four years because there were 
no alternatives in the curriculum. The Smith-Hughes program continued 
until 1997, when all vocational subsidies moved to the Department of 
Education. its unique culture survives today only in the still-strong FFA, 
which includes chapters for both men and women in high schools and 
agricultural colleges.
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no other federal programs before 1929 matched, in total impact, 
those related to research, development, and education. nevertheless, 
some were vitally important to farmers and were usually developed in 
response to their effective political lobbying. For instance, more than any 
other category of user, farmers chafed at locally high, usually noncompeti-
tive railroad rates. in new farm organizations, especially the Grange, they 
helped gain state rate regulations. When the u.S. Supreme Court invali-
dated these “Granger” laws, farmers eventually gained much of what they 
wanted in the interstate Commerce Act of 1887. The Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act of 1890, though less of an issue for farmers, prevented some types of 
industrial monopoly that would raise the cost of what farmers had to buy. 
later, when some farmers’ cooperatives seemed to restrain trade and thus 
violate antitrust laws, Congress exempted such cooperatives in 1922. Con-
sumer protection laws, such as the Food and Drug Act and the Meat inspec-
tion Act, both passed in 1906, helped ensure the safety of foods and thus 
increased the market for agricultural products. other laws set standards 
for apples, limited futures sales in cotton, licensed warehouses, regulated 
stockyards and meatpackers, and set standards for milk. Most important of 
all, under the newlands Act (Federal Reclamation Act) of 1902, the federal 
government assumed responsibility for developing large irrigation projects 
in sixteen western states. Contrary to early expectations, this meant major 
governmental subsidies for irrigation works. The major reclamation proj-
ect dams (such as the Hoover and the Grand Coulee) would eventually 
provide most of the early electricity for areas west of the Rockies.11
CreDit anD marketing
Some of the most important federal programs before 1930 were those 
involving farm credit. in many regions, the need was great. in much of 
the post–Civil War South, high-risk and high-interest liens on crops were 
often necessary to enable farmers and sharecroppers to plant and har-
vest their crops. For capital expenditures, farmers often borrowed from 
neighbors or local banks, executing notes or mortgages. Although most 
of these were for one year, they were normally renewable, but with no 
guarantee (the federal government prohibited commercial bank loans 
for more than five-year terms). Some mortgage companies sprang up in 
largely rural areas. But in times of low crop prices and thus periods of 
financial stress for farmers, lenders were most likely to call such short-
term loans. What farmers needed was a source of long-term loans at the 
interest rates that prevailed in other industries.
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in 1908 President Theodore Roosevelt established the Country life 
Commission to study and report on the special problems faced by ru-
ral Americans. it documented the lack of an adequate credit source for 
farmers. For four years, Congress studied and debated various proposals 
for credit relief, taking many of their ideas from Europe. Most farmers 
wanted direct loans from the federal government. Rural banks favored 
privately owned but federally chartered banks. What Congress created 
was, in effect, a federal reserve system for farmers, modeled in part on 
the new Federal Reserve System for commercial banks. it tried to create 
a system that involved farmer cooperation, private investment, and no 
cost to taxpayers. At the top of the new system were twelve regional Fed-
eral Farm loan Banks, plus some privately chartered joint-stock banks. 
The original capital ($750,000) for the Farm loan Banks came from the 
federal government, which subscribed the original bonds for each bank. 
These bonds, which were free from federal or local taxes, were then of-
fered to private investors (farmers had to buy bonds valued at 5 percent 
of their loans, making them, in a sense, part owners of the banks). in 
most years the system was fully self-financing (if the bonds were not 
fully subscribed, the government remained the buyer of last resort). Al-
though the federal government had to provide supplemental funding for 
these banks during the Great Depression, the banks eventually repaid the 
government’s investment in full. These federal banks did not loan directly 
to farmers; they discounted loans made by local farm credit associations 
owned by farmers. loans were issued for terms up to forty years, with 
interest rates no more than 6 percent. The maximum loan was $10,000 
and could not exceed 50 percent of the farm’s value.12
The Farm loan Banks aided able farmers (they held about 20 percent 
of all mortgages by 1929). They did not help less secure farmers, those 
with much higher credit risks. A second agency, the Federal intermedi-
ate Credit Banks, was created in the aftermath of the severe depression 
of 1921–1922. However, it had such stringent terms that almost no 
farmers took advantage of its loans in the 1920s. Also, up to this point, 
the federal government had not offered any type of production loans 
to farmers, including money for seed and fertilizer. Farmers with good 
credit secured such loans from local banks or, in the South, from local 
merchants (the notorious crop lien system). Finally, this original farm 
credit system was totally inadequate to deal with the credit crisis that 
began in 1930. in some cases, the Farm loan Banks had to foreclose on 
delinquent borrowers to remain solvent, adding to the number of rural 
bankruptcies. Thus, new initiatives in farm credit joined a dozen other 
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new agricultural innovations that began in 1930 and climaxed in 1938 
(see chapter 3).
none of the governmental programs that matured before 1930, im-
portant as they were to farmers, addressed their most insistent demand: 
the guarantee of a fair price for their crops and livestock. This demand 
became one of the great policy issues after the collapse of farm prices in 
1921 and was perhaps the most controversial political issue of the 1920s. 
During these policy debates, all possible alternatives were extensively dis-
cussed, and every aspect of American agricultural policy, all the way to 
the present, had some precedent in the many policy proposals and bills 
considered in the 1920s. 
The problem faced by farmers was largely a product of their own 
success—more food and fiber than the market could absorb. For locally 
marketed, perishable vegetables and fruit and raw milk, this was still a 
regional problem, despite improvements in refrigeration and transpor-
tation. For the major storable commodities—corn, wheat, cotton, rice, 
tobacco—the price-determining market was not only national but also 
international. The foreign demand for cotton was high and reasonably 
stable before 1930 but extremely volatile for wheat, pork, and beef (with 
meat production tied to the consumption of corn and other feed grains). 
By 1925, even though most prices were close to prewar levels, the major-
ity of farmers were becoming increasingly angry at what they considered 
unfair prices. This was especially true in the major wheat-producing areas, 
where price volatility was greatest and labor productivity was increasing 
at the most rapid pace. in the Great Plains, tractors were revolutionizing 
wheat production by changes in soil preparation, planting, and, above 
all, harvesting. Wheat farmers would thus be the first to organize and ef-
fectively lobby in Congress on behalf of legislation to guarantee farmers a 
fair price. This led to the creation of a powerful farm bloc, or farm lobby, 
that still exists today. of course, the concept of “fair” begged definition, 
but farmers generally tied the idea of fairness to the ratio between what 
they had to buy in order to produce a crop and the price they received 
for it. They based this comparison not on the obviously inflated and ab-
normal prices during World War i and its immediate aftermath but on the 
1909–1914 period, which represented a golden age for farmers. During 
that period, supply and demand seemed balanced. A fair price would en-
able farmers to buy what they needed and still retain a fair profit on their 
annual product. This meant that their prices would be on par with prices 
in general—hence the term parity.13
But what governmental policies could ensure such fair prices, and 
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at what cost? in a sense, Americans are still debating these issues. it is 
clear that most farmers rejected the equilibrating effect of knockdown 
competition in a wide-open agricultural marketplace. one obvious an-
swer was for farmers to limit production to match demand, thus gain-
ing higher prices. The problem was that no one could come up with a 
way to control production on a voluntary basis. Any governmental policy 
that forced production controls on individual farmers faced major con-
stitutional constraints and warred against American values. Besides, for 
decades, most farmers had vehemently rejected such restrictive policies. 
Also, almost all prior agricultural policies had worked in the exact op-
posite direction—to increase production. in all but localized and tightly 
organized crop areas, such as citrus or grape growers in California, it was 
almost impossible for farmers to work together as an associated unit. 
Voluntary production goals made sense only when all farmers agreed 
to adhere to such limits. otherwise, noncooperating farmers could take 
advantage of the price increases made possible by the “sacrificial” reduc-
tions of those who joined in solidarity with the group. Thus, it seemed 
impossible for production controls to work without coercion of some 
sort, or at least financial incentives to convince farmers to comply. Such 
incentives came in the 1930s.
other proposals that tried to chart a way around production controls 
proved more illusory than practical. They dominated the policy debates 
of the 1920s. one such policy involved various schemes to sell surplus 
production abroad at a loss, thus allowing competition to raise domestic 
prices. one export scheme dominated agricultural policy debates from 
1924 to 1929 and involved slightly different versions of the Mcnary-
Haugen bill, named after its congressional sponsors but advocated by 
George n. Peek, a former farm equipment manufacturer. The plan, de-
spite Peek’s claims, was not simple. As farmers came to understand it, 
the plan was beguiling or even magical, and its details have become a 
nightmare for college history students. it began with the idea that farm-
ers needed a protected market similar to that of manufacturers, who were 
protected by tariffs. To accomplish this, Peek wanted the government to 
establish export corporations that would buy farm commodities at a fixed 
price determined either by the parity principle (1909–1914 levels) or by 
the world price plus the rate of tariff on that product (for wheat in the 
mid-1920s, this was 42 cents a bushel). When world prices fell below 
the support level, each corporation would have to sell the surplus abroad 
at a loss. Who would pay for the loss? not, Peek emphasized, the federal 
government, but rather the farmers who benefited from the higher do-
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mestic prices (of course, consumers, who had to pay those higher prices, 
were the ultimate losers). The export corporation for wheat, for example, 
would determine the amount of the loss, and the farmers would pay an 
equalization fee to the corporation, proportionate to their share of the 
total crop; that fee would be deducted from the price received by each 
farmer. This was, in effect, a processing tax. in theory, if only 10 per-
cent of wheat was exported in a given year, farmers would have to pay 
back only one-tenth of the gain they received from the higher domestic 
price.14
one other proposal that dominated farm policy debates in the 1920s 
was the concept of cooperative marketing. For the most vehement crit-
ics of export bounties (the Mcnary-Haugen bill), this was an alternative 
strategy, but for many supporters of bounties, it was a supplementary and 
possibly complementary effort. The most influential supporter of this ap-
proach was Herbert Hoover, first as secretary of commerce and later as 
president. Hoover believed that the government should not intervene in 
the private economy to the extent of setting prices. instead, it should do 
all it could to help farmers improve prices through a more efficient, up-
to-date marketing system. As it was, individual farmers were at a great 
disadvantage in an economy increasingly dominated by large corporate 
enterprises. The way of the future was association or cooperation. Farm-
ers had already formed local cooperatives in most parts of the country 
and could use them to help market their crops; in particular, local or 
regional cooperatives could join as one large national cooperative for 
each crop. Congress had passed the Capper-Volstead Act in 1922, which 
exempted farm cooperatives from existing antitrust laws. The Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics (BAE), established by the Department of  Agri-
culture in 1922, had organized a small Division of Agricultural Coopera-
tion, and in 1926 Congress passed the Cooperative Marketing Act, which 
created an expanded Division of Cooperative Marketing in the BAE. its 
work, in many ways, anticipated that of the later Farm Board (see chapter 
3), which absorbed this division in 1929 (in 1933 it would become part 
of the Farm Credit Administration).15
it was never clear that cooperative marketing could solve the prob-
lem of low farm prices, particularly when overproduction was the root 
cause. Marketing cooperatives could help solve some problems, such as 
the often large variance between low prices just after harvest and higher 
ones later on. Cooperatives could store wheat or corn in warehouses or 
elevators for later sale, thus stabilizing prices over the whole crop season. 
Cooperatives could also advance loans to farmers at the time of storage, 
30 a revolution Down on the Farm
using the crop as security, thus alleviating the problem of short-term 
credit. utilizing the excellent statistics compiled by the BAE on prices 
and markets and on the amount of production needed in future years, 
cooperatives could at least propose production quotas, but they had no 
means of enforcing them. Hoover believed that well-informed farmers 
would voluntarily and unselfishly reduce their acreage to promote the 
general welfare of all farmers and the nation as a whole.
After President Calvin Coolidge twice vetoed the Mcnary-Haugen 
bill, presidential candidate Hoover made a campaign promise to address 
the farm crisis, perhaps the most critical problem faced by Americans. 
President Hoover supported and, in June 1929, signed a new farm bill—
the Agricultural Marketing Act—by far the most ambitious farm legisla-
tion to date. At its heart was federal support of cooperative marketing. But 
as usual, with Congress pressured from all sides to enact different farm 
relief measures, this turned out to be a complex omnibus bill. Some of 
its policy options went well beyond cooperation and well beyond what 
President Hoover desired. one provision allowed a new Farm Board (in-
dependent of the Department of Agriculture) to use a portion of a $500 
million revolving fund to purchase farm commodities in times of falling 
prices to stabilize the market. When implemented in 1930, this led to 
the creation of two stabilization corporations (one for wheat and one 
for cotton), which meant that, for the first time, the federal government 
intervened in the market to guarantee minimum prices for two crops.16
From 1930 to 1938, President Hoover and then President Franklin 
Roosevelt, working with Congress, matured a very complex farm policy 
whose main outlines are still evident today. in ways not always clear, and 
with consequences debated by both politicians and economists, these 
policies helped shape the patterns of development in American agricul-
ture that made it possible for less than 2 percent of workers to feed more 
than 300 million Americans, with a large amount left over for export.
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2. The Traditional Family Farm
A Personal Account
i was born in 1929 on a small, fifty-one-acre farm in Greene County in 
the valley of east Tennessee. My father had inherited the farm from his 
father in 1918, when he was eighteen. He borrowed money to build a 
good all-purpose barn and a small tenant cabin and then rented the farm 
for several years to a sharecropper. His net income from the farm was 
minuscule. He lived with a sister and her family and, at the time, had 
no interest in farming on his own. instead, he spent a short time shuck-
ing corn in iowa (a great adventure) and then, in the early 1920s, spent 
almost two years as a hired hand on a rather large farm in southeastern 
iowa. He practically became a member of the farmer’s family and kept in 
touch for the rest of his life. Sadly, the owner lost the farm in the Depres-
sion. After farmwork, my father spent two years working in automobile 
factories in Detroit, returning to Tennessee in the summers during re-
tooling time at the factories. But when my parents married in 1928, he 
decided to try to make it on his own as a farmer. He idealized farming 
then, and he always would.
My mother, eight years younger than my father, had grown up in the 
same small community. After high school, she completed one quarter 
at East Tennessee State Teachers College and had planned on a career in 
teaching. However, a mix-up in her high school credits forced her to 
drop out, and she went to work in a rayon factory in nearby Elizabeth-
ton. She had grown up on a farm and was not anxious to move back to 
a small farm and a less-than-adequate house. But in 1928, it seemed that 
one or two good burley tobacco crops would easily pay off the $500 
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mortgage my father had obtained to build the existing house and barn, 
which would then allow him to build a decent house. Then my parents 
could enjoy the independent life of freehold farmers. My birth did not 
alter these plans, but the stock market crash that would occur just as i was 
born (late october 1929) would place their farm at risk and lead to five 
years of almost desperate poverty. Tobacco prices fell to such low levels 
in 1932 that our crop scarcely earned enough money to pay the haul-
ing bill to get it to market. For a short time, my family reverted to a near 
subsistence form of agriculture. We had goods to sell on the market, but 
at prices too low to cover the cost of production. Everyone in the village 
suffered from this lack of demand. And it is this pattern of life in the vil-
lage during the Great Depression that i want to describe.
ProFile oF a Farming village
Aided by geological survey maps for 1937, i counted all the farms in 
my community, as defined by the location of the Bethesda Cumberland 
Presbyterian Church and the graveyard behind it. The people who lived 
around this church and attended it (if they attended any church at all) and 
those who chose to be buried in its cemetery made up a rather cohesive 
neighborhood. The village was further defined by the upper watershed of 
a creek and a highway that connected Greeneville with Kingsport, each 
seventeen miles from the church. Most children attended the two-room 
schoolhouse in the center of the village, except for those who lived on 
farms across the nearby Washington County line. of course, these bound-
aries are a bit arbitrary, but i identified eighty-two families that lived in 
this rural farming community in the early 1930s. i included two perma-
nent tenants but did not include a few temporary sharecroppers. With the 
exception of one absentee owner, all the local farmers knew one another, 
exchanged goods and labor, and more often than not met in church on 
Sunday. As a boy, i knew all the local owners and most of the tenants.
My village was in a former mixed farming area, but in the early twen-
tieth century, burley tobacco became the main money crop. For frugal 
and efficient farmers, the tobacco check that came in December or Janu-
ary was by far the largest monetary income and the source of any savings. 
But tobacco, a very labor-intensive and challenging crop, took up only 
a small fraction of the cultivated land. in our area, only a few farmers 
grew as much as three acres of tobacco; most grew only an acre or two, 
and the smaller farms grew less than an acre. The government acreage 
allotments, which began in 1934, were based on farm size and past lev-
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els of production. But even before 1934, farmers were restricted in the 
amount of tobacco they could grow by the labor requirements (at that 
time, forty-five days of work for each acre of tobacco) and the available 
space in tobacco or general-purpose barns. The role of tobacco somewhat 
equalized the incomes of large and midsized farms, for the tobacco crop 
of a farmer who cultivated or pastured only thirty acres (the amount on 
our farm) might be the same size as that of a farmer who cultivated sixty 
acres (close to the maximum cultivated acres on any local farm).
Besides tobacco, all the local farmers grew corn, a necessity for live-
stock; small grains, primarily wheat, but often oats for horses; and hay 
crops. i do not know of a single farmer who did not own at least one milk 
cow, hogs for butchering, and chickens for eggs or broilers. All large and 
middling farms had at least two horses or mules. no one farmed with 
oxen, and until the eve of World War ii, no one had a tractor. Few had 
beef-type cattle, although many used beef breeds for their bulls in order 
to get heavier veal calves from their milk cows. These calves were usu-
ally sold at eight weeks of age, a small but dependable source of income. 
Some farmers had surplus wheat, corn, or hay for sale on local markets. 
Wives sold eggs, butter, and young chickens to local stores or, in some 
cases, to selected customers in town. Those farmers with a number of 
milk cows sold separated cream in the 1920s, but in the early 1930s they 
all switched to the sale of grade B milk to the Pet Milk Company, which 
established a factory in Greeneville. Few had more than five or six milk 
cows. Everyone milked by hand, for no one gained electricity until 1940. 
By World War ii, three or four larger farmers—those with ten to twenty 
milk cows—qualified for the sale of grade A (or bottled) milk, and dairy-
ing competed with tobacco as the most profitable local enterprise.
The Tennessee valley had some very good farmland. Greene County, 
though joined to the southeast by the unaka mountain chain (up to 
4,800 feet), was largely in the valley of the nolichucky River or the 
higher land that stretched north of the river. it had sections of relatively 
level land. it led the state in burley tobacco production and, by the 1930s, 
in dairying. But my village was in the uplands that marked the watershed 
between the Holston and nolichucky rivers, at an elevation of 1,500 to 
1,900 feet. it was hilly in parts, with some land fit only for woods or 
pasture. But this limestone area had reasonably fertile soil, with a clay 
subsoil and good drainage, and stretches of only slightly rolling land. it 
was on the clear, or limestone, branch of lick Creek, which cut through 
the whole county from the northeast to the nolichucky at its western 
end. The main branch of this creek meandered through a rift-type valley 
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that was almost flat, with some wide meadows that often flooded, but its 
slate soil was not as fertile as the limestone soil in the uplands. The hills in 
our village were heavily cultivated and subject to major erosion, particu-
larly on south-sloping hillsides. And despite traditional rotation patterns 
(corn or tobacco, grain, hay, pasture), much of the land was nutritionally 
depleted, meaning a dependence on manure and fertilizer. By 1930, few 
farmers had adopted conservation strategies such as holding dams, ter-
races, or even contour farming on hillsides. our creek and its feeders ran 
red with soil particles after every heavy rain.
When i began my survey of village residents, i was surprised at some 
of my findings. Everyone at the time defined our community as a farm-
ing village, and on census forms, most men listed themselves as farmers, 
which was about as good a classification as possible. in my high school 
years during World War ii, every boy took vocational agriculture, most 
for all four years (most girls took home economics). All boys belonged 
to the Future Farmers of America, and most of us assumed that we would 
follow our fathers into farming. Actually, only a very small minority of 
boys would earn a living in agriculture (only one from my graduating 
class—my future brother-in-law, who would move to a large farm in 
Pennsylvania). A major economic transition was under way in our area, 
one that involved changes not only in agriculture but also in manufactur-
ing. We simply did not recognize it, even though many of the changes 
were happening right under our noses. 
only about fourteen of the seventy family farms in the village were 
large, by local standards. one was owned by a businessman in King-
sport and farmed by a manager. These farms were all more than 100 
acres, with only two or three as large as 200 acres. They had large, mostly 
two-story, traditional houses and at least two barns (one for livestock 
and hay, another for tobacco). Most had four horses. All these farms had 
tenant houses and one tenant or sharecropper. These large farms all had 
the more expensive horse-drawn farm equipment, including a binder 
and a grain drill. They depended on custom threshing. Yet because of the 
small fields and the hilly land, some of the equipment already present 
on midwestern farms was absent. They still plowed with a two-horse, 
single-turning plow. Few had riding cultivators. They used fertilizer, but 
it contained little or no expensive nitrates. Their farm technology largely 
dated from the late nineteenth century.
i have classified thirty-nine operators as midlevel farmers—the most 
typical in our community. My father was one of these, and so was the 
one black man in our community. These farmers owned 40 to 100 acres 
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of land. Their houses tended to be smaller or not as well maintained 
compared with those on the large farms. They usually had only one barn, 
which had to house livestock, hay, and tobacco. Most had two horses. The 
only midlevel farmers who had tenants were a few absentee owners or 
older, retired farmers. Few could afford binders and thus paid neighbors 
for the grain harvest. ownership was stable in the 1920s and 1930s, 
but not occupations. only two lost their farms in the Great Depression. 
Six owners gave up farming during the Depression and moved to near-
by cities. Four, including my father, continued to live on the farm and 
do some farming but took full-time factory jobs. one sold his farm in 
what amounted to the consolidation of two farms. Today, many of these 
smaller farms have been further subdivided; some are largely pastureland 
and are essentially hobby farms. only one or two are farmed by full-time 
operators. none of these farms contribute much to the total agricultural 
product or produce a net income for their owners.
Approximately seventeen other family heads would have listed them-
selves as farmers in the 1930 census, but they were marginal farmers at 
best. They owned less than forty acres, and some as little as ten. They rare-
ly had nice homes, but most had at least small barns. only about half had 
a team of horses. Most had at least one milk cow, two hogs, and plenty 
of chickens. Some grew a small patch of tobacco. For all these families, 
the farm was primarily a subsistence operation, for they had little to sell. 
none made a decent living from their farms, and almost all did off-farm 
work, even if nothing more than working as day laborers on larger farms 
in the area. one man made a fairly good living buying furs from the 
young boys who trapped and collecting medicinal plants in the summer. 
one lost a small farm and became dependent on charity. Four were able 
to procure full-time off-farm employment in the mid-1930s. Two wid-
ows had sons who worked off the farm. Four older men, of retirement 
age, depended on their extended families for income. For all practical 
purposes, these farms were already outside commercial agriculture. Dur-
ing World War ii, all able-bodied men and women on such marginal 
farms were able to get jobs in town. Some kept the old farmstead, but 
not as an income-producing asset. Many still enjoyed having a few cows 
or growing a garden. our community, even in the late 1930s, was on its 
way to becoming a far-out suburb of industrializing Kingsport, where 
many people worked at the huge Eastman Kodak plant. With the growth 
of full-time, off-farm employment, some of these marginal farmers had 
postwar incomes equal to those of established farmers, resulting in an 
equalization of local incomes.
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Finally, our village had twelve families that did not live on enough land 
to qualify as a farm. They had lots of one to three acres. Two of these fami-
lies had sunk to the lowest possible level, both economically and socially. 
They were, in our unfair language, trash. They had only pickup work and 
mere shacks for homes. The other ten families owned their homes and 
had nonfarm employment. They had gardens, hogs, and chickens, but 
most did not have enough land for a cow. one was the village blacksmith, 
two others owned grocery stores, two were widows (one with retire-
ment income), one worked in a local veterans’ hospital, one clerked in a 
store in Kingsport, and three worked at the Eastman Kodak plant.
The type of agriculture that was dominant in our village had some 
advantages in the Great Depression. only two families lost their farms. We 
almost lost our farm, but few of the other large or middling farmers had 
mortgages. Many had small savings accounts in local banks and suffered 
when a Greeneville bank failed, but their farms were not in jeopardy. 
The credit economy had not arrived in this part of the county. Else-
where in the county, where larger river-bottom farms predominated, 
and in much of the Corn Belt of the Midwest, it was often the largest, 
most specialized, credit-using farms that went under with the collapse 
of commodity prices. Had farmers in our area been as “progressive” 
and gone in debt to buy extra land or possibly a Farmall tractor, they 
might have suffered the same fate. Without such debt, local farmers 
suffered a severe loss of income but were able to weather a few bad 
years. Most had to give up some luxuries. They bought as few products 
as possible at local country stores and made less frequent trips to Greene-
ville or Kingsport, where one had to go to find hardware, medications, 
and dry goods.
By 1930, all the larger farmers had automobiles or trucks, and so did 
a good share of the midlevel farmers. A few had to give up their auto-
mobiles (as did my father). Because of the Depression, self-sufficiency 
became a necessity. The change was not dramatic, however, because in 
almost all farming areas in the united States, it was simply not yet profit-
able to divert labor from the production of goods consumed at home to 
the production of marketable commodities. Also, farmers used few out-
side services. For instance, with no phones and the nearest town seven-
teen miles away, farmers had to be their own veterinarians; most learned 
how to aid in the birth process and how to use home remedies to treat 
wounds. Every farmer in my community was a bit of a farrier, too, for 
they shod their own horses (i think i could still do it), using custom-
made horseshoes.
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home ProvenanCe
Certain subsistence items were so common as to be taken for granted. 
These included milk cows, chickens, hogs, vegetable gardens, cured 
meat, canned fruits and vegetables, firewood for cooking and winter 
warmth, and honey from backyard hives. Having such items reflected 
rational choices by farmers, for they offered the best real income available 
for the labor expended. This was generally true nationwide, not just in 
east Tennessee. As late as 1950, 78 percent of farmers kept chickens (to-
day, less than 1 percent) and 68 percent had milk cows (today, less than 2 
percent). outside arid areas, most still heated their homes with wood. A 
majority of farms remained without electricity until after World War ii.
Yet one qualification is in order. in many cases, it would be more cor-
rect to refer to this subsistence side of agriculture as community based 
rather than farm based. no one farmer grew all the locally produced 
food products. A degree of specialization had already developed. Thus, 
local exchange was critical, but it was a type of market involvement that 
never showed up in farm censuses. During the fall, almost every farmer 
butchered hogs, but the dates were staggered so that one family would 
share freshly ground sausage or tenderloin with neighbors one week, and 
two weeks later would receive reciprocal gifts. only a few people kept 
beehives, but everyone had access to cheap honey. only one local farmer 
had a mill to squeeze the juice from sorghum and a vat to boil off the 
excess water to produce sorghum syrup, which we mistakenly called mo-
lasses. others, such as my father, took wagonloads of fresh-cut sorghum 
stalks to this mill and, in effect, borrowed it to produce syrup. During the 
summer, only one wife might have extra early tomatoes, which she shared 
with neighbors. not all farmers had bountiful orchards, but apples and 
pears were plentiful because of a surplus on other farms in the area. Swaps 
of produce balanced out the local accounts, in the same way that farmers 
exchanged specialized labor. My grandfather, for instance, was an expert in 
meat cutting and was thus in demand on neighboring farms. Those skilled 
in carpentry or with mechanical abilities received money or food in ex-
change for their work. in times of heavy labor demands, farmers pooled 
their labor to accomplish tasks such as cutting and grading tobacco.
Although horses were, in a sense, the most important animals because 
they performed the work on the farm, one could not get milk from a 
horse, and no one considered eating horse meat. in my community, every 
farmer had cows, hogs, and chickens—the “big three” of farm animals. 
Even most owners of small lots had at least hogs and chickens, which 
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were still an integral aspect of farm life. only a minority had sheep, goats, 
geese, ducks, or turkeys. of the “big three,” the cow was most important. 
For a yearlong supply of milk, butter, buttermilk, cottage cheese, and 
yogurt, a family needed two cows. Since a cow goes dry of milk for a 
few weeks before bearing a calf, calving (and thus breeding) had to be 
scheduled so that one cow had a calf in the spring and one gave birth 
in the fall. But during certain times of the year, only a very large family 
would be able to consume all the milk produced, so even small farmers 
might sell some butter at the local store. For home use, most local farm-
ers preferred the smaller, higher-butterfat breeds, mostly Jerseys and a 
few Guernseys, rather than the larger, heavier milkers such as Holsteins or 
Ayrshires. A good Jersey cow’s milk contained 5 percent or more butter-
fat. The raw milk, before the cream rose to the top, was almost yellow. The 
cream could be whipped, used in coffee, or made into ice cream. When 
soured and churned, the whole milk produced an abundance of butter, 
leaving the buttermilk with small bits of butter floating in it. We used this 
for cooking and drinking. i still drink a glass of buttermilk each day. it is 
as good as yogurt for your stomach. My mother molded and sold but-
ter until we began selling raw milk in the mid-1930s. Each family had a 
distinctive mark or brand on its butter mold, and each wife had to estab-
lish the merits of her butter (clean, well colored) before local merchants 
would buy it. For several years, my grandmother sold butter and cottage 
cheese (they complemented each other, for they used different parts of 
the raw milk) to a select group of customers in Greeneville. Each week 
she took a bus to town, delivering the food in person and receiving well 
above the market price.
Hogs were almost as important as cows. of course, one could also 
get meat from cattle, sheep, or even goats, but it was not easy to pre-
serve these meats. Farmers who butchered steers would sell most of the 
meat locally. Beef was so rare in our home that we considered it almost a 
delicacy. Hogs were easy to raise and ate almost anything. They lived for 
most of the year on leftovers from the kitchen (slop), including extra 
milk, vegetables, and bits of meat. We also fed them pumpkins from the 
cornfields in the fall. But before the butchering in november, we fat-
tened them on corn. At hog-killing time we had all the fresh meat we 
could eat and more, including the liver, tongue, brain, and feet, plus 
freshly ground and seasoned sausage. We canned sausage and prime loin 
meat for later use. All the rest—hams, shoulders (Canadian bacon), jowls, 
sides (bacon)—we trimmed and cured, either in a salt pack or in a mix 
of sugar and spices (we called this sugar-cured). This cured meat had to 
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last a year and was the major source of animal fat and balanced protein 
in our diet. no one in our neighborhood smoked the pork, although we 
all referred to the building where we hung the meat as a smokehouse—a 
testimony to past practice. Finally, the fat from all the trimmings went 
into the outdoor cast-iron kettle, where it was boiled and stirred con-
tinuously to render the lard, which provided the only shortening we had 
for the next year. A family of four needed at least two one-year-old hogs 
weighing more than 300 pounds to meet these annual requirements.
one had to have chickens in order to have eggs. These were indis-
pensable ingredients in cooking as well as for eating (fried, scrambled, 
poached, boiled, or deviled). in one sense, one could have eggs on the 
cheap. Chickens, if left loose, could browse and scratch enough food 
to survive and lay eggs in season. But to have reliable egg production 
over the year or to grow flavorful fryers or broilers, one needed to care 
for the chickens. They required grain (cracked corn or purchased feed 
mixtures), plus gravel and plenty of clean water. They also had to be 
contained by a fence (to protect them from automobiles and to prevent 
hens from secreting their eggs), and they needed a dry place to roost (the 
coop or chicken house) and straw-lined boxes for their eggs. Feeding the 
chickens and gathering the eggs was a daily chore that was often assigned 
to children. An annual chore was cleaning out the chicken house and 
collecting the nitrogen-rich manure for the garden. And, to ensure the 
heaviest egg production, one performed a task called culling during the 
winter months. By using one’s fingers to measure the spread of the hens’ 
pelvic bones (wide for layers), one could identify which ones were still 
laying eggs. layers might be kept for a second year, while those not lay-
ing went to market or into the pot. To ensure freshness, local merchants 
candled all eggs (because they were fertilized, they spoiled quickly), ex-
cept for those from the best-known and most dependable families.
Chickens were also a much-prized source of meat when i was a boy. 
unlike today, when chicken is usually the least expensive meat of all, it 
was more dear in the interwar years. Chickens required more labor than 
hogs and, by weight, more than beef cattle. We did not hatch our own 
chicks in the spring. instead, like all our neighbors, we ordered them in 
the mail from any one of dozens of suppliers. Those who were willing 
to pay more could buy only female chicks, but we almost always went 
the cheap route and got a mixture. We wanted males for frying or, when 
older, for broiling. We always ordered the purebred, lighter egg breeds 
(mostly White leghorns). The all-purpose, or broiler, breeds were for 
people who sold the chickens on the market or kept only a few layers for 
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eggs to be used at home. one of the great expectations in the early sum-
mer, as the young chickens matured and the males became identifiable, 
was the first fried chicken of the season. if we ate chickens at other times, 
they were the older, culled hens that had to be boiled. in the early sum-
mer, we jumped the gun and fried young roosters that were scarcely two 
pounds. They were tender and flavorful, unmatched by any chickens now 
on the market, even free-range chickens. For two months, we might have 
fried chicken once a week or whenever company came (always when 
the preacher ate with us). But chickens were our most costly food, in 
the sense that we could get a good price for fryers at the local store or in 
town. We simply could not afford to eat very many of them. 
This sketch of home-produced foods can be misleading, because a 
large number of food and other products were purchased on farms by 
1930. it was a very different world from that of a hundred years ear-
lier. Farm families bought sugar, even when they kept bees for honey or 
boiled sorghum for syrup. Salt, soda, baking powder, oatmeal and dry 
cereal, dried beans (the largest source of winter protein in most local 
families), rice, gelatin desserts, pastas, canned beans and salmon, and 
herbs and spices were all purchased at the local store or from traveling 
salesmen. in my village, few farmers were still taking their own wheat to 
mill by 1930; they sold it and bought bags of flour from the store (in 
part to get the white flour needed for appealing biscuits and cakes). We 
did take corn to the local mill, however. This old mill, powered by the 
creek, continued to grind grain and even operate a sawmill until about 
1947. Some farmers ground their corn to produce feed for cows, but 
almost all added high-protein supplements such as cottonseed meal. By 
the late 1930s, most wives no longer tried to grow peaches (they were 
often killed by late frosts) and instead bought their fruit from truckloads 
hauled into the area from South Carolina. in addition to food, farmers 
bought soap (my grandmother was exceptional, in that she collected lye 
from wood ashes and fat from table scraps and made her own soap). 
Most men smoked, and they bought cans of tobacco and rolled their own 
cigarettes. in the depth of the Depression, a few took tobacco from their 
curing barns and baked it in an oven to save money. Farmers also bought 
garden seeds or plants, new varieties of fruit trees, cloth, most clothing, 
shoes (although they often repaired shoes at home), and furniture.
Most of the burden of providing food fell on the wives and daugh-
ters in our community, as in most farming areas. The men prepared the 
soil for gardens by spreading manure, plowing, and harrowing. For veg-
etables that took a lot of space—sweet corn, potatoes, squash, pumpkins, 
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and melons—the farmer might interplant vine crops in corn or tobacco 
fields (a practice now precluded by the use of herbicides and the closer 
planting of corn), plant sweet corn in allocated rows in the cornfield, or 
set aside a yard-size patch for potatoes or sweet potatoes. Women or chil-
dren tended the kitchen gardens and thus most of the vegetables. Farm 
diets were not always healthy (too much fat, starch, and fried foods; too 
few green vegetables), but in the summer this was the result of choice, 
not necessity. Milk and eggs were plentiful year-round. Cured pork pro-
vided meat in the winter months. it was possible to store potatoes and 
sweet potatoes, some varieties of onions, and fall-type apples and pears 
in root cellars for winter use. Fruits could be dried in drying huts or on 
rooftops and stored for winter use. Some vegetables, notably cucumbers 
and beets, could be pickled in apple vinegar, and cabbage could be turned 
into sauerkraut. By 1930, most vinegar was store bought, although one 
neighbor still made cider and let it ferment in barrels to turn into vinegar 
(a passing tradition). nevertheless, despite refrigerated railroad cars and 
a reasonably complete highway system, out-of-season foods were gener-
ally unavailable in stores, particularly country stores, before the coming 
of electricity. Thus, the “hungry” time on farms was the early spring, 
when most stored roots and fruit ran out or rotted, and even the most 
short-seasoned vegetables (lettuce, radishes) were not yet ready to har-
vest. it was then that early, mustard-type greens and canned vegetables 
and fruit were most valued. in the nineteenth century, the invention of 
vacuum-sealed jars had been a major revolution in food preservation, ex-
ceeded only by the advent of frozen foods after World War ii. By autumn, 
every housewife had hundreds of quart and half-gallon jars stored in the 
basement or root cellar.
What about wild foods? These were no longer a significant food 
source. This was true generally, not just in my part of the country. Some 
farmers loved to hunt and occasionally brought home squirrels or rabbits 
to eat. Most also did some fishing and, when lucky, had fish for dinner. in 
my area, the deer had been exterminated (they are now back), but except 
for the elk-hunting areas of the Rockies, game was not a major, let alone 
dependable, source of meat. The same is true of most nuts, berries, and 
wild fruit. Children gathered hickory nuts for winter eating, but the meat 
was small and hard to get at. The American chestnut had been a wonder-
ful source of food in the past, but by 1930, the last of these trees were 
dying from the blight. Everyone had black walnut trees, with their hard-
to-crack nuts. We always cracked enough to make homemade candies, 
and i loved black walnut ice cream. one widowed aunt, impoverished 
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with three daughters, collected bags of walnuts in the fall, cracked them 
day after day, and sold the meat for a good price (but not if one counted 
the difficult labor). During World War ii a national market for whole 
black walnuts led to widespread collecting.
Berries were much more important. i loved to eat wild strawberries, 
but they were too small and hard to pick to be an important food source. 
Almost every family had strawberries in the garden and cultivated, not 
wild, varieties of gooseberries and currants. Many people loved wild 
raspberries (two types grew locally) and gathered them to make pies or 
jellies, but they were never a major source of food. My mother planted 
improved varieties of black-cap raspberries and used them primarily as 
a dessert. Much more important in the eastern part of the country were 
wild blackberries. in our normally acid soil, they grew in profusion in 
pastures or along the fringes of woods. They were free for the picking 
and lent themselves to the making of pies, jams, and jellies. if families did 
not avail themselves of blackberries in July and fill jars of them for win-
ter use, they were considered indolent and irresponsible. Thus, picking 
blackberries was an annual summer ritual, one that i still observe when 
conditions allow it. i do not remember anyone in our area who cultivated 
blueberries, but each summer people from the mountains to the south 
peddled wild blueberries (huckleberries) both in town and along the 
highway that ran through our village.
householD Patterns
Women’s work was never done, particularly on farms. During the busy 
harvest time, they worked in the fields or barns; at threshing time, they 
prepared huge meals for the crew. They did at least half the milking, 
gathered slop for the hogs, and did the planting, cultivating, picking, 
and preserving of garden vegetables. They had full responsibility for the 
chickens, including killing them, scalding and removing the feathers, 
and cutting them into pieces for stewing, baking, or frying. They cooked 
three hot meals a day, seven days a week. Restaurants were simply un-
available except on those rare trips to town—and then no more than 
once a month, if one could afford it. Women did the laundry, ironing, 
and mending of clothing. Most, like my mother, sewed continually. My 
mother had a Singer sewing machine that she operated by foot pedals. 
She made almost all the dresses, skirts, blouses, and even suits for herself 
and my sister, as well as the occasional men’s shirts. She pieced quilts 
and even did less fancy quilting by machine. in some years, she made 
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some extra money by sewing for less skilled neighbors. All these tasks 
consumed enormous amounts of time and labor, particularly before the 
advent of electricity. But even in the home, new technologies were slowly 
reducing labor requirements, although not quite as rapidly as in the field. 
nothing as yet rivaled the binder or the tractor.
Before electricity, one could not have running water in the house or 
barn, except in very rare cases when upland springs or streams allowed 
gravity to move water into a home. one could, at best, pump water by 
hand from springs, wells, or cisterns. For a few years when i was a boy, 
we could not afford a pump and drew water by rope and bucket from 
a cistern. A few people carried water from a spring some distance away. 
This was a great burden on wash day (always Monday), when one had to 
have at lest ten gallons of water. The wash water was heated by fire in an 
outdoor cast-iron kettle and then moved in buckets to washtubs, where 
the clothes were soaked and scrubbed on a washboard, rinsed in another 
tub, wrung out by hand, and hung on outdoor lines. ironing day fol-
lowed on Tuesday. Before electricity, flat irons had to be heated on top of 
woodstoves. At least two irons were required: one heating on the stove, 
ready to replace the one being used as it slowly lost its heat. Baths were 
usually on Saturday, in anticipation of church on Sunday. The washtub 
did double duty as the bathtub. Hot water usually came from a hot water 
storage bin on the wood-fired kitchen range. For cooking purposes, a tea 
kettle was always kept hot on top of the stove.
For laundry, change was already under way by 1930. As early as 1900, 
manufacturers had created crude washing machines: a tub with wheels 
and an agitator turned by a hand crank, with a hand-cranked, two-roller 
wringer. By the 1920s, companies had attached small gasoline engines to 
such washers. Since Maytag was the largest manufacturer, we referred to 
these as Maytag washers. They were wonderful laborsaving machines. in 
fact, the first electric washers were identical except for the source of pow-
er. in about 1936, as we slowly emerged from the poverty of the Depres-
sion, my mother was able to buy her first Maytag. By then, one could hear 
the chug, chug of Maytag washers throughout the village every Monday 
morning. Even if automatic washers had been available, farms without 
electricity and running water could not have used them.
Cooling was a problem in the summer, just as frost-free storage was 
a problem in the winter. The most widely available solution for both was 
the root cellar or springhouse. Spring water, at fifty-five degrees in east 
Tennessee, did not freeze in the winter and cooled milk or melons to the 
same temperature in the summer. And on a hot day, fifty-five-degree milk 
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seemed cold. A root cellar or a dug-out basement, if mostly underground, 
would cool to almost the same temperature. This was also the safest place 
to store canned fruits and vegetables and root crops. But neither the spring-
house nor the cellar was cold enough to keep milk or meat for very long 
without spoilage. The new replacement was the icebox. in the early to mid-
1930s, an ice company in Greeneville began sending ice trucks out to our 
farm. Twice a week, the truck delivered fifty pounds of ice to our icebox, 
located on the back porch. it cost 10 cents. The ice kept foods and beverages 
at a temperature close to forty degrees, for relatively safe storage. Those off 
the main roads were not so lucky. Some did not get ice delivery until after 
World War ii, when the coming of electricity ended the need.
For the few farmers who could afford it, electricity and electrical ap-
pliances predated rural electrification. one farm that adjoined ours had 
installed a generator and a bank of storage batteries by the early 1930s 
(called a Delco system, after the manufacturer). This family was the envy 
of the neighborhood. The generator, with a small gasoline motor, charged 
the batteries at intervals. The main purpose was to provide electric lights, 
but this family also had an early, direct-current version of a refrigerator 
and a pump, which enabled them to have an indoor bathroom—the only 
one for miles in any direction. Also, they had a simple electric radio, while 
everyone else who could afford it (for us, this was in 1936) had a large, 
cumbersome radio powered by a set of three batteries; when one battery 
went out, we had to do without the radio until we could make a trip to 
town for a replacement. This became easier for us in 1937, when my 
father bought an automobile. The radio supplemented the hand-cranked 
phonographs already present in the homes of successful farmers, player 
pianos in a few homes, and reed organs in several others.
When people first gained electricity (beginning in 1940), they re-
ferred to their electric bills as their light bills (some still do). lighting 
seemed to be the most important result of electrification for both the 
house and the barn (electric lights eased the burden of after-dark milking 
and feeding in the winter). Before electricity, the simplest form of lighting 
was the kerosene wick lamp, which was used in homes and in the form of 
mobile lanterns in the barn. But even home lighting was not completely 
dependent on such lamps, with their yellowish light. Most homes had at 
least one mantle-type lamp, with small, attached pumps to create the pres-
sure needed to force the vaporized kerosene through the mantles. in qual-
ity, this white light rivaled that of incandescent bulbs today. Rows of such 
lamps were suspended from the ceiling in both church and school, but this 
required a good bit of preparation before any evening event.
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improved roads (our state highway was first paved in about 1936) 
and the radio helped open up the larger world to farm folks. For some, so 
did the telephone. For farm villages, the telephone was a reasonably inex-
pensive new tool. in the 1920s, the men of my village dug holes for poles 
and stretched copper wires to almost all the homes. A crippled woman 
served as the operator, with six or eight lines reaching out from the cen-
ter. These were necessarily party lines, with up to seven or eight families 
per line and a coded ring for each. The large telephones had batteries, a 
small magneto, and a crank to provide the low-voltage current needed 
to send the signals. until recently, i kept the old telephone my parents 
acquired in 1928. our village system had a connection point with neigh-
boring systems, and it was possible to make long-distance calls, although 
few used this expensive service. For reasons that are not clear, the com-
munity gave up the phone system in the early Depression and waited for 
more than thirty years to get phone lines from countywide systems.
one major task on farms was acquiring the fuel for heat and cook-
ing. one could buy coal, which was relatively inexpensive. The county 
supplied it for the two large stoves in the schoolhouse. For one year just 
before the war, my family bought coal for the heating stove but not for 
cooking. We did not like the odor or the dust. Thus, almost everyone 
heated and cooked with wood, since almost every farm had extensive 
woodlots. none of the local houses were insulated or had double-glazed 
windows, so the heat loss was immense (but the danger from carbon 
monoxide slight). Also, the stoves and fireplaces would not have worked 
if the houses had been tight, for outside air had to enter to provide oxy-
gen for combustion and to move air up the chimney. Most of the older 
homes, including the largest ones, dated from near the turn of the centu-
ry or earlier and had multiple fireplaces, both downstairs and up. Because 
no one had time to collect enough wood to supply all these fireplaces in 
the winter, very few people heated their bedrooms. instead, they used 
multiple blankets or quilts (almost all women quilted and sometimes 
gathered in the afternoons for quilting parties). in the winter months, 
people tended to congregate in front of a stove or fireplace in the dining 
room, next to the kitchen, and made a fire in the living room or parlor 
only when entertaining visitors. Most living rooms had at least one bed 
as well as chairs, particularly in small houses. Furniture was sparse.
Even with these strategies, a single home could use up to twenty ricks 
(a stack measuring eight by four feet and eighteen inches deep) in a year—
or much more with multiple stoves. Since the kitchen range was heated by 
a wood fire, firewood was used 365 days a year. Even in the terrible heat 
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of midsummer, wives had to cook the main, noontime meal in the kitchen 
on a hot range. it could be stifling. Families usually moved to a screened-in 
porch to eat. until electricity, there was no relief from the heat—not even 
overhead or exhaust fans. it must have been worse in the distant past, when 
houses did not even have screened windows to keep out insects.
Some new technologies helped lessen the burden of cutting so much 
wood. Dry wood made the best and safest fires, so it was best to cut wood 
a year before use. Green wood burned more slowly, provided less heat, 
and could quickly create tar in stovepipes or chimneys, with the risk of 
fire. The normal tools for procuring wood were the double-bit ax and 
the two-person crosscut saw. if sharp and well set (to clear itself ), such a 
saw in the hands of skilled operators could cut a foot-thick log in two or 
three minutes. A good ax could quickly remove the limbs. in a day, two 
people could cut up to two ricks of wood, but the work was extremely 
strenuous. By 1930, circular saws pulled by a stationary one- or two-
horsepower gasoline engine (one or two cylinders with a large flywheel) 
could cut up to twenty ricks a day, if supplied with enough small logs. 
These logs first had to be cut, trimmed, and dragged by horses to the site 
of the saw. All in all, such saws could reduce by half the work required to 
gather firewood. When cut into eighteen-inch blocks, the larger slices still 
had to be split by a single-bit splitting ax. For the cookstove, the pieces of 
wood could be no larger than two inches in diameter, which meant a lot 
of splitting. And to keep the wood dry, one needed a shed for it. Most farms 
had a woodshed that could hold a winter’s supply. Finally, carrying wood 
into the house was a daily chore almost always assigned to boys.
All these tasks may suggest that farm life was full of drudgery. i am 
sure some women felt that way at times. Men liked to boast of hard work 
and lament poor returns, even as they valued the independence of farm-
work (being their own boss, they said). But the total work output, mea-
sured not only by time but also by intensity of effort, was significantly less 
than a forty-hour workweek in a factory. The farm was confining because 
of the care of livestock, but the work was usually leisurely. As a matter of 
strict religious principles, no one worked on Sunday except for necessary 
chores and the cooking of meals. laundry on Monday was hard work, but 
the amount was slight by contemporary standards (one set of sheets per 
bed, two or three towels, and only one set of soiled clothes for each per-
son). A broom was used for most housecleaning. Children usually washed 
and dried the dishes. My mother, despite all she accomplished, always took 
an hour after lunch for a nap. My father never worked, or required me to 
work, beyond noon on Saturday, except during the harvest. Almost every-
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one attended church twice on Sunday, and everyone went to socials at the 
schoolhouse. Most important, life became easier with each passing year. 
The great concern at the turn of the century about the deficiencies of coun-
try life had led to significant improvements in almost all the cited prob-
lems—poor schools, low incomes, inadequate roads, poor health care, and 
an absence of cultural resources, such as libraries. note that these concerns 
involved country people, whatever their occupation, not just farm families. 
The two poorest families in my community did not farm.
By 1935, Tennessee had finally extended the school year to eight months 
for elementary schools and nine months for the new, mandated high 
schools. Around 1930, Greene County and neighboring Washington 
County began to run school buses to most rural communities. This 
meant that, for the first time, graduates of Bethesda Elementary School 
could live at home and attend high school. Such attendance was not yet 
mandated, and too many local students stopped their education at the 
eighth grade. But within the next decade, high school became the accept-
ed norm for almost all families, and by then, a few students even went on 
to college. My two-room school was, in a sense, primitive. By necessity, 
it was heated by stoves, had outdoor privies, and, until the end of the 
1930s, had no well for water (we carried it in buckets from a spring two-
tenths of a mile away; our water bucket and dipper are visible at the far 
right of figure 7). Except for one year, the school had two teachers, each 
Figure 7. Bethesda Elementary School, September 1936 (i am in the second row, 
fourth from the left). 
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with some college preparation. Each one had to teach four grades, and 
most were generally capable and conscientious and did a very good job. 
Their students who moved on to Fall Branch High School, in Washington 
County, were class valedictorians in four out of eight years.
Health care was a challenge. no physician lived close to our village. 
The nearest hospitals and pharmacies were in Greeneville and Kingsport, 
each seventeen miles away. Some people died, needlessly, because they 
did not go to a physician or a hospital until it was too late, if at all. My 
county did not have an adequate public health program until the new 
Deal period. By the time i entered school in 1935, a visiting public health 
nurse came at least once a year and began mandatory vaccinations for 
smallpox, typhoid, and diphtheria. no treatment existed for other child-
hood diseases such as measles, whooping cough, and mumps. Epidemics 
of each occurred periodically, with a few deaths. But with better roads 
and automobiles (for most families), trips to town and physicians’ visits 
(when necessary) slowly became the norm. By 1940, most farm families 
in our area had the same access to health care as did working families in 
cities. Even before this, we had one dentist in nearby Fall Branch.
My family was lucky to live on a state highway. in the early 1930s, it 
was already an all-season road, with plenty of gravel and daily grading. 
in about 1936, the county paved it, eliminating the stifling dust we suf-
fered each summer. By then, a Trailways Bus line began service between 
Greeneville and Kingsport, allowing us to flag a bus in front of our house. 
Also, a local company ran shift buses to Kingsport. Thus, our area was not 
isolated, and we had had daily rural free delivery since soon after the turn 
of the century. Before 1937, we ordered most clothing from Sears Roe-
buck and garden seed from Henry Fields in Shenandoah, iowa. As noted 
earlier, we even bought chicks by mail. Most families in our area received 
a daily newspaper by mail, either the Greeneville Sun or the Knoxville Journal. 
As our family income improved in the mid-1930s, we also subscribed to 
two farm journals, one or two women’s magazines (for my mother), and, 
in some years, periodicals such as Life, Look, or the Saturday Evening Post. Most 
influential in my life was the Progressive Farmer, a now famous magazine for 
southern farmers that tried to disseminate the most successful new farm-
ing methods to ordinary farmers. Thus, the cultural isolation was over for 
most of us, but some families who lived off the highway still suffered 
winter roads that were all but impassable.
The purchase of our first automobile in 1937 changed our lives dra-
matically. Before this, we rarely went to town. My mother would take the 
bus about once a month for necessary items such as hardware, medi-
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cines, clothing, and schoolbooks (this last was an intimidating burden 
for poor families, since the state mandated the purchase of books but did 
not pay for them). now, with a car, the whole family could go to town 
almost weekly. For the first time, we attended movies. By age twelve, i was 
able to get a library card at the Carnegie library in Greeneville. We went 
to town often enough for me to check out books for two-week intervals. 
Starved for reading material, i now read all the time—or whenever my 
parents or work schedules permitted. By then, i did not feel that living on 
a farm amounted to cultural deprivation.
in retrospect, the 1930s marked a major, enduring transition in 
American agriculture. life on the farm in 1930 was closer to that of 1830 
than 1960, so rapid were the changes already under way. unbeknownst 
to us at the time, much that we took for granted would quickly become 
antiquated. Soon there would be no horses, or none of the tools and skills 
that accompanied a horse-based agriculture. Soon it would become clear 
that our farming community did not have the soil quality or the econo-
mies of scale to compete in commercial agriculture. Soon agriculture 
ceased to be a major source of income for all but a handful of farmers.
Another change was almost as radical. Slowly, often without realizing 
the significance, local farmers began to buy more food in town and grow 
less on the farm. For those who did not sell milk, it was soon uneco-
nomical to keep a cow. After World War ii, the efficiency of production 
in almost every specialized area of agriculture and the efficiencies in the 
processing and marketing of foods made it cheaper to buy almost any 
type of food than to grow one’s own. Also, in a change i sometimes 
regret, fresh fruits and vegetables became available year-round, not just 
in season. Even cultivating certain garden vegetables was no longer cost-
effective, if one considered the amount of labor involved. Yet, either out 
of habit or as a hobby, most older families continued to grow vegetable 
gardens. Some still do. They were positive that store-bought vegetables 
lacked in flavor. But for new generations, the loss of flavor seemed a small 
price to pay for the convenience, particularly after the advent of frozen 
foods. Besides, commercial farmers have to commit all their time to the 
products they sell on the market. They are so efficient that Americans pay 
only about 8 percent of their income for food consumed at home (the 
growing amount consumed in restaurants adds another 5 percent). How 
we arrived at this point is the subject of the following chapters.
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3. A new Deal for Agriculture, 
1930 –1938
The Great Depression necessitated new farm policies. otherwise, up to 
half of America’s farmers would have suffered bankruptcy (one-fourth 
did), and the overall depression, destructive as it was, would have been 
much more severe. over eight years, during two presidential administra-
tions and four Congresses, the federal government, responding to a large 
array of interest groups and competing policy alternatives, matured a 
complex body of laws and administrative agencies to gain what everyone 
hoped would be fair and stable prices for almost all major agricultural 
products. Details have changed through the years, but aspects of every 
policy option undertaken in the 1930s have endured until the present, 
providing the political constraints and opportunities that allowed Ameri-
can agriculture to remain the most productive, and food prices to remain 
the lowest as a percentage of total spending, in the world. The human 
costs of this transition were enormous.
The new farm legislation extended the debates of the 1920s, with no 
completely new options either debated or accepted. Two presidents—
Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt—were the final arbiters of 
this legislation, but more often than not, the details were thrashed out in 
the Congress. Hoover was much involved in the details of farm legisla-
tion and had a personal agenda for agricultural reform, one that mainly 
involved governmental support for cooperative marketing. He fought but 
often failed to achieve his goals, and at times he reluctantly accepted 
bills that did not reflect his values or meet his objectives. Perhaps more 
insistently than any president in history, he tried to shape agricultural 
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policy. Even though he lost many of his battles, Hoover’s detailed input 
into farm policy meant that the eventual farm program as implemented 
by 1938 had his imprint on it.
Roosevelt was just as committed to the welfare of American farmers 
as Hoover. if anything, he had a deeper personal identification with their 
problems than did Hoover. What he did not have, and would never devel-
op, was a coherent set of values and principles to guide his policy inputs. 
He was open to many alternatives, sometimes even contradictory ones. 
Thus, whereas Hoover tried to focus and constrain farm policy, emphati-
cally rejecting many of the competing policy proposals of the 1920s, 
Roosevelt was, at one time or another, open to almost all strategies. For 
example, new Deal programs would include acreage or production con-
trols, export bounties, cooperative support, food aid, monetary inflation, 
land retirement and limited resettlement of displaced farmers, subsidized 
commodity loans, marketing contracts, and relief and rehabilitation pro-
grams for the poorest farmers.
First Fruits: hoover’s Farm BoarD
A new farm program began in 1929 with the Agricultural Marketing 
Act, by far the most significant legislation of that year. its implement-
ing agency was the Farm Board, the first of a long line of agricultural 
agencies with more than a dozen different names that tried to aid in the 
marketing of farm products. The Farm Board was originally supposed to 
use its $500 million revolving fund to create and integrate farm market-
ing cooperatives. The huge wheat crop in the summer of 1929 and the 
attendant decline in wheat prices, followed by the stock market crash 
in october, presaged a more general crash in the prices of several farm 
commodities in 1930. Although it was not clear at the time, the general 
economy, led by a volatile agricultural sector, was moving into the worst 
depression in American history.
in 1930 Congress faced pressing demands for new policies to sta-
bilize or raise farm prices. The new Farm Board had to use some of the 
seemingly minor provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Act to stabilize 
prices. over the next three years, or until the summer of 1933, debates 
over farm policy raged as farm prices continued to fall. A series of crises, 
each worse than the one before, was part of a collapsing world economy, 
with the nadir for farmers coming in 1932 and early 1933. in the midst 
of this gloom, the beleaguered Farm Board did all it could to keep prices 
as high as possible for major farm commodities, and for short periods it 
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was able to stabilize domestic prices above world levels. But it faced an 
impossible task and ended up spending nearly all its $500 million in a 
failed effort. in the process, it provided a rehearsal for several of the agri-
cultural programs of the new Deal.1
The stated aims of the Agricultural Marketing Act were to decrease 
speculation in agriculture, prevent waste and inefficiency in marketing, 
encourage farmers to join cooperative associations and thus gain leverage 
in the market, and aid farmers in preventing and controlling surpluses. 
The large revolving fund was intended to be used not as a direct subsidy 
to agriculture but as a source of low-interest loans to cooperatives, loans 
that they would repay in due time. if regional cooperatives in each major 
crop could combine into one national association, they would gain as 
much market power as large corporations. Farm Board loans could enable 
cooperatives to acquire new facilities, such as grain elevators or cotton 
warehouses; make advances to farmers at planting time; provide up-to-
date information about market conditions; and stabilize prices through-
out each crop cycle. To achieve this stability, the cooperatives could, on 
the recommendation of a commodity advisory committee for each crop, 
set up corporations to buy and store crops, with the goal being more 
profits, not subsidies to farmers.
To guide what Hoover saw as an impending agricultural revolution, 
the Farm Board was headed by Alexander legge. Seven additional direc-
tors represented the major agricultural industries: corn, wheat, tobacco, 
livestock, cotton, eastern fruits and vegetables, and California fruit. To 
a large extent, this board fulfilled its primary goal. Most of its staff and 
employees worked to bolster cooperatives and to help those cooperatives 
combine into one centralized association for each crop, or something 
close to a cartel (images of the later national Recovery Administration). 
The benefits, as everyone conceded, would come over the next several 
years. But almost as soon as the organizational work was under way, farm 
prices collapsed. This crisis soon absorbed the board’s attention. Without 
the Depression, the Farm Board might have achieved more of Hoover’s 
idealistic, associational goals.
Although no one initially conceived of the Farm Board as a tool for 
price manipulation or control by the federal government, it soon backed 
into that role. one central goal was price stabilization. The idea was sim-
ple: Farmers could rarely afford to hold their corn, wheat, cotton, or to-
bacco off the market during the harvest season, when prices were lowest. 
They needed the income to plant the next season’s crops. Few farmers 
had the facilities to store crops. Processors, either cooperatives or investor- 
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owned companies, did have the facilities and often gained higher prof-
its by holding crops until the off-season. if farmers joined in local and 
regional cooperatives, and these in turn held the stock of national mar-
keting associations, farmers could stabilize prices over the year and gain 
the greatest returns for their efforts. local cooperatives could offer low-
interest production loans to farmers, based on the security of their stored 
crops, or what amounted to a crop loan system owned and managed by 
the farmers themselves. With what seemed little risk, cooperatives could 
make crop loans for up to 80 or 90 percent of market price at the time 
of the loan. in most cases, the price would be higher at the time of op-
timal sale, with the gains going to the farmer (legally, the farmer repaid 
the loan and interest at this point and regained possession of the market 
crop).
Thus, beginning in 1930, crop loans, at first largely for wheat, be-
came an enduring and often misunderstood aspect of farm marketing. if 
farmers had the opportunity to loan their crops to a cooperative at a set 
loan rate (a percentage of the market price), they knew that, at the end 
of the season, they would almost inevitably gain a certain return on their 
crops. This loan rate would become, as everyone expected, a floor price, 
at least in the short term. unlike the nonrecourse loans offered today 
by the Commodity Credit Corporation, these were normal loans, in the 
sense that the farmers would have to repay the full amount of the loans, 
even if prices dropped below the loan rate. This seemed a very unlikely 
prospect, unless the whole agricultural economy collapsed. But that is 
exactly what happened in 1930, and the Farm Board had no statutory 
authority to absorb the losses suffered by cooperatives. Farmers were 
thus in debt to the very cooperatives they owned. The cooperatives, in 
turn, many of which had just been established with loans from the re-
volving fund, were in debt to the Farm Board. And in 1930, neither was 
in a position to meet its payments. Although not bound by law to rescue 
its debtors, the Farm Board was under intense pressure from farmers and 
from farm-state congressmen to do just that. using the only legislative 
remedies it had, the board began the long and complicated federal effort 
to control agricultural prices and, in the process, provide large subsidies 
to farmers.
As noted earlier, wheat farmers suffered declining prices during the 
summer of 1929, just before the stock market crash. The problem was an 
oversupply of wheat caused by a rapid expansion of wheat production 
in both the united States and other major wheat-producing countries, 
plus a record harvest in 1928 and a large carryover of surplus wheat in 
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the united States. This increase reflected the rapid shift to tractors and 
combines, which increased the number of acres planted each year in 
the Great Plains. However, bad weather in 1929 had caused a decrease 
in wheat production, which seemed to portend rising prices after the 
harvest. This seemed the perfect opportunity for the new Farm Board to 
do its thing and, in the process, gain the support of more farmers for 
these new marketing strategies. Wheat prices were at $1.30 a bushel in 
July 1929—not the price farmers had expected, but not alarmingly low. 
Wheat prices dropped from August to october, causing farmers to de-
spair. The Farm Board believed that short-term circumstances had caused 
the decline and that prices would soon recover. Thus, it took a gamble, 
one that had momentous consequences. it loaned funds to enable wheat 
cooperatives to support crop loans at 90 percent of the market price, or 
$1.18 a bushel. The cooperatives did this by supplementing more cau-
tious loans from private banks or the government-chartered intermediate 
Credit Banks. To be granted these loans, farmers had to market through 
the cooperatives. Recognizing the long-term problem of overproduction, 
the Farm Board also launched a major educational campaign to get farm-
ers to reduce their wheat acreage by 10 percent in 1930 and by 25 per-
cent over the next three years, a campaign that completely failed.
At least temporarily, the fixed loans stabilized wheat prices at or 
slightly above the loan rate, even in november and December 1929, after 
the stock market collapse. But by January 1930, the export market for 
wheat had dried up, and the cooperatives soon had millions of bushels 
of unsold wheat. Prices fell well below the loan rate. This meant that the 
cooperatives had to collect on the crop loans from farmers, or at least 
force farmers to meet new margin requirements—a situation similar 
to the margin calls in the stock market. Most beleaguered farmers and 
many local co-ops were in no position to survive such a credit crunch. 
it seemed as if the disaster of 1921 might repeat itself. The Farm Board 
felt responsible and sought a way to rescue its clients. it chose an option 
from the Agricultural Marketing Act. on February 11, 1930, it organized 
a Grain Stabilization Corporation that began buying wheat, both from 
farmers who still had it in storage and from local cooperatives, at a set 
price of $1.18, the loan rate.
This first stabilization effort clearly aided farmers, but otherwise, it 
was a disaster. The Farm Board did not want to reward private firms that 
held wheat, so it bought only in local markets. Since the price paid was 
soon 20 cents or more above world prices, private elevators and export 
merchants began shipping wheat back to local markets, leading the Farm 
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Board to purchase only from its own cooperatives. Many private deal-
ers lost tons of money, either in disposing of wheat or on futures con-
tracts. The whole market system entered a period of near chaos, which 
worsened an already dismal export market. Soon the Grain Stabilization 
Corporation owned millions of bushels of wheat that it could not sell at 
anything close to its cost. But, to be fair, no one had anticipated what was 
happening in the world economy. Everyone had expected an early recov-
ery of normal wheat prices and thus no long-term losses on the wheat 
bought. Farmers loved the Farm Board, but private grain dealers hated 
it. A governmental corporation using tax funds to stabilize farm prices 
at a noncompetitive level was, from their perspective, a form of social-
ism or communism. Hoover became their devil, but in most respects, he 
defended his Farm Board and, as usual, condemned the business interests 
that placed private profit above what was clearly in the public interest. 
By March, it was clear that the Grain Stabilization Corporation could not 
maintain the $1.18 support price, and it stopped buying wheat.
The Farm Board entered the market again in late spring and summer, 
but this time its loan rate was at only 80 percent of world prices. This 
temporarily stabilized wheat prices at about 81 cents. once again, the 
board had rescued farmers from disaster and seemed to avert a wide-
spread panic. Since this effort took place in the open market, it aided 
private buyers of grain as well as farmers. But the good news did not 
last for long. Despite a reduction in wheat production during the severe 
drought in the summer of 1930, prices collapsed again in 1931. By this 
time, the Farm Board had all but exhausted its revolving fund and did 
not resume stabilization purchases. By then, the stabilization corporation 
owned three-fourths of the wheat carried over into the summer of 1931. 
Without any authority to force farmers to reduce production, the board 
had to leave farmers to the mercy of the market. By 1932, wheat prices 
had fallen to 48 cents.
Beyond wheat, the Farm Board established only two other stabilization 
corporations—one for cotton and a regional one for California grapes. 
Cotton, unlike wheat, was completely dependent on exports, with more 
than half the cotton produced in the 1920s shipped abroad. Despite some 
competition from Egypt and india, southern cotton clothed the world. 
unlike wheat, the collapse of cotton prices did not precede the stock 
market crash, but quickly followed it. Cotton, as a nonfood crop, has an 
elastic demand, since people can postpone the purchase of textiles, and 
governments, short on foreign credit, can impose barriers to its import. 
Early in 1930 the Farm Board refused to set up a stabilization corpora-
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tion for cotton but used crop loans to try to keep prices above 16 cents a 
pound. it also tried, without success, to get cotton farmers to reduce the 
acres planted in 1930, although a summer drought in the lower Missis-
sippi valley did cut production below 1929 levels. nevertheless, cotton 
prices continued to fall in the spring of 1930, leading the Farm Board 
to form its second stabilization corporation in May. The buying of 1929 
cotton carryovers stabilized prices for while, to the benefit of farmers. But 
supplies of unsold cotton mounted in warehouses, and the Farm Board 
stopped buying cotton by the summer of 1930. Cotton prices continued 
to decline, reaching 7 cents a pound in December. The Cotton Stabiliza-
tion Corporation then resumed cotton purchases, leading to a brief rise 
in prices early in 1931, but by that time the Farm Board did not have 
the funds to make further purchases. By then, everyone realized that the 
central problem for both cotton and wheat, in a rapidly shrinking world 
market, was overproduction. Pleas to farmers did not work. in 1931, for 
example, cotton farmers had a banner year, and by the fall of 1931 the 
carryover of cotton roughly equaled the annual production. 
What could the Farm Board do to get farmers to reduce production in 
any crop? Several ideas floated about, but in only one case did the Farm 
Board succeed. This occurred in the small, regional grape industry of 
California. The Farm Board’s creation in 1929 seemed to offer a lifeline to 
what had once been one of the most successful farm cooperatives in the 
united States, the Sun Maid Raisin Growers Association. in the heady days 
just after World War i, it had overexpanded, offered generous production 
loans to its members, and accumulated large supplies of raisins. in 1929 
it faced bankruptcy. Equally desperate was the California Vineyardists’ As-
sociation, which represented the grape growers who, after Prohibition, 
sold fresh grapes and grape juice to a weak market. in August 1929 this 
association proposed that the Farm Board create a federal Grape Stabi-
lization Corporation to represent all the grape producers in California, 
whether they produced raisins, juice, or fresh grapes. in 1929 the Farm 
Board offered a loan but not a stabilization corporation. The loan paid 
part of the costs of making production loans to the Sun Maid cooperative 
and even financed the repurchase of Sun Maid bonds, but falling prices 
in 1930 doomed such rescue efforts.
in March 1930 Charles Teague, vice chairman of the Farm Board 
and the representative of California fruit growers, offered all the grape 
growers a unique package, one that skirted the limits of Farm Board au-
thority. The Farm Board would provide credit for a new Grape Control 
Board—something like a hybrid between a marketing cooperative and a 
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stabilization corporation. To gain Farm Board funding, the Grape Control 
Board would have to sign growers, responsible for 85 percent of all grape 
production, to ten-year contracts that required them to sell their grapes 
only through cooperatives affiliated with the control board. They also 
had to pay the control board an annual stabilization fee, collected at the 
time of sale, of $1.50 on each ton of fresh grapes and $5.25 on each ton 
of raisins, with the predicted $2.5 million yield used to buy up an an-
ticipated 250,000 tons of surplus grapes. These fees were closely related 
to an equalization fee proposed in the Mcnary-Haugen bills, or an early 
version of the processing tax established by the first Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act in 1933. All growers also had to pay $2 a ton to help retire the 
debts of Sun Maid. Most interesting, Teague argued that the best way to 
deal with the projected 250,000 tons of surplus grapes was to pay grow-
ers not to pick the grapes and leave them to rot in the fields (for this, they 
would eventually receive at least $10 a ton at a time when the average sale 
price was $59, a price made possible because of the reduced supply).
Despite problems, this stabilization plan was the only Farm Board 
initiative that dealt head-on with the problem of overproduction. it took 
a huge, fervent local campaign to get enough growers to sign the con-
tracts. Certifying the grapes withheld from production proved difficult, 
and some cheating undercut the plan for fresh grapes. Most critical, the 
surplus for the year soared to 770,000 tons. The control board held these 
grapes off the market to support higher prices, creating a potential prob-
lem for the following year. Fortunately (or unfortunately), poor weather 
and insect infestation almost ruined the 1931 crop, at least temporarily 
eliminating the problem of surpluses and low prices. Before this crop loss 
occurred, a local committee of the control board had decided to offer 
growers $5 an acre and $10 a ton (based on past levels of production) 
to destroy grapevines and not replant them for six years. The Farm Board 
liked the idea, but its attorneys pointed out that it had no statutory au-
thority to make loans that curtailed production. in many ways, the Grape 
Control Board in California presaged later new Deal initiatives.
By 1932, the Farm Board had used up its revolving fund and was al-
most helpless to prevent a further decline in farm prices. Chairman legge 
had resigned in March 1931, and the vice chair had resigned in June. By 
then, the board was barely able to keep the cooperatives afloat. At the 
same time, the federal farm credit agencies faced bankruptcy and had to 
tighten, not loosen, loan requirements. it was now clear that the only so-
lution to the farmers’ woes had to involve some means of controlling the 
supply of products offered on the market. Many proposals competed, and 
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many of these received support from the Hoover administration. For ex-
ample, the president supported credit subsidies that would allow foreign 
governments to buy surplus crops; this led to limited sales to Germany, 
China, and Brazil, but hardly enough to influence domestic prices. He 
also supported concerted efforts to get southern farmers to plow un-
der every other row of cotton in 1931, while the Farm Board tried to 
get state governors to convince farmers to plow under every third row. 
Some economists in the Wheat Belt urged the Farm Board to pay farm-
ers $2 an acre to withhold land from production, but this would have 
required new legislation from Congress, and the costs would have been 
prohibitive. Some southern states tried to take responsibility for produc-
tion controls. Mississippi, Texas, and oklahoma proposed mandated cuts 
of 40 percent of their cotton acreage if three-fourths of all cotton states 
would pass comparable laws. none did, and no one clarified how to en-
force such limits. Huey long in louisiana had the most radical proposal. 
He suggested that all cotton farmers cancel the 1932 crop, which would 
almost exactly wipe out the carryover and thus allow competition to re-
store fair prices. long wanted all the states to levy stiff fines on any farmer 
who planted a crop. His plan was unanimously approved in the louisiana 
legislature, but it would go into effect only if all the other cotton states 
agreed to do the same. only one other state passed a similar bill.
maturing a new Farm Program
During the tense legislative battles of 1932, Hoover increasingly linked 
the farm problem to that of overall economic recovery, which in turn 
depended on critical international cooperation. He supported credit ex-
pansion at home and higher tariffs to protect the domestic economy, ap-
proved funds to rescue the Farm loan Banks, backed a new loan program 
for cooperatives, and approved loans for agriculture from the new Re-
construction Finance Corporation (RFC). But by then, he was even more 
fearful of foreign dumping, direct relief, and, above all, several plans to 
gain monetary inflation (the old free silver issue), which would jeopar-
dize his efforts to achieve some form of international economic coopera-
tion. As the presidential election campaign approached, he seemed more 
rigid than ever, less willing to consider initiatives he might well have ac-
cepted in 1930. Burned by the failure of stabilization efforts, he wanted 
to eliminate the stabilization provision in the Agricultural Marketing Act. 
But in one area—production loans—Hoover reluctantly had to accept 
relief for farmers. 
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Both the very cautious intermediate Credit Banks and the coopera-
tives supported by the Farm Board made loans to farmers, but not high-
risk loans to farmers who had exhausted all their income from the sale 
of their crops and thus needed money for seed and fertilizer to begin the 
next crop cycle. By 1931, the proceeds from harvested crops rarely cov-
ered the cost of production, so most farmers were in need of this short-
term credit. Traditionally, they had secured such credit from neighbors, 
merchants, or local banks by signing a lien on the crop to be planted, 
but with falling prices and often unpaid mortgage debts, farmers were 
a high credit risk, and lending institutions were leery of making such 
loans. Desperate farmers pressured their congressmen to get the federal 
government to grant what everyone called “seed loans.” it had done so 
in the past after natural disasters, and after the drought of 1930, it had 
appropriated more funds than Hoover wanted for such loans as a form of 
drought relief. in 1932 a reluctant Hoover approved the use of RFC funds 
to offer seed loans to all farmers who could qualify, and he even more 
reluctantly approved a smaller amount to provide food and other neces-
sities for destitute farmers. Many farmers were never able to repay these 
loans, which thus amounted to a type of farm relief. The Department of 
Agriculture administered this loan program, with local Extension Service 
agents screening the applicants. Hoover also approved a new short-term 
lending program—twelve regional agricultural credit corporations—that 
had less stringent requirements than the intermediate Credit Banks but 
did not make seed loans.
By the election of 1932, it was obvious that when the new Congress 
convened in 1933 it would have to approve a newly packaged farm mar-
keting program. The plight of farmers and the clout of the farm bloc 
ensured this. At the same time, it was obvious that, after a decade of 
controversy, the new agricultural legislation would include no novel pro-
visions. Every conceivable approach to the crisis in farm prices had been 
represented in bills before Congress or in the actions of the Farm Board 
and farm credit agencies. Several credit initiatives would be consolidated 
in a new Farm Credit Administration. Several proposals to lease or pur-
chase submarginal land came to fruition in the land Policy Section of 
the new Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA). The equaliza-
tion fees in the Mcnary-Haugen bills would become a processing tax on 
foods and fibers. To the extent possible, the AAA would subsidize the sale 
of farm commodities abroad. The crop loan advances of the Farm Board 
and the work of the stabilization corporations would continue under one 
large stabilization and crop lending agency, the Commodity Credit Cor-
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poration (CCC), which was unique only by virtue of its greater generos-
ity to farmers. An amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act made 
it possible for the government to leave the gold standard and, for a year, 
dramatically inflate the currency, which was what the most radical farm 
reformers had wanted since the time of the free silver campaign. Seed 
loans would be expanded into a major relief and rehabilitation effort for 
less competitive farmers. Finally, the localized crop-reduction efforts of 
the Grape Control Board in California would expand nationwide into a 
new domestic allotment system, which became the centerpiece of the 
new Deal farm program.
Except among grape growers, the great unsolved problem in agricul-
ture in 1933 was overproduction. All groups suffered during the Depres-
sion, but farmers suffered more than producers in any other economic 
sector. in 1932 farm incomes were less than half what they had been in 
1929, land values had dropped by 40 percent, and the per capita income 
of farm families was down by at least two-thirds. it was in this context 
that Congress conducted an extended debate about new farm policies. 
none of the contending factions prevailed, leaving the new Roosevelt ad-
ministration to deal with these unresolved issues in 1933. However, the 
debates did give rise to a slowly evolving plan for a domestic allotment 
system that repackaged several older initiatives.
The two most popular agricultural reform proposals in the 1920s 
had involved either cooperative marketing or foreign dumping of Ameri-
can surpluses, or some combination of the two. Advocates of coopera-
tive marketing hoped to persuade farmers to cut production voluntarily 
whenever surpluses accumulated. Advocates of dumping hoped that 
it would be possible to maintain tariff-protected domestic prices well 
above world prices without forcing farmers to curtail production. But to 
gain this benefit, farmers would have to use some type of fee or tax on 
their domestic sales to pay for losses on crops that they had to dump on 
foreign markets. This led to the equalization fees in the various Mcnary-
Haugen bills. This two-price system remained popular among farmers 
as late as 1932, even though it was an unrealistic solution during a pe-
riod of rampant economic nationalism and drastic drops in foreign trade. 
As early as 1925, some agricultural economists had recommended that 
governmental programs, to ensure higher domestic prices, under the 
protection of tariff walls, should be conditional on contractual cuts in 
production on the part of farmers (the idea adopted in 1930 by Califor-
nia grape growers). This led some to advocate a system of domestic allot-
ments, whatever the means of allocating and enforcing them, but it was 
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clear that any such system would have to be, in some sense, voluntary. 
Also up for grabs was the type of compensation needed to gain farmers’ 
support for what they had long resisted—bureaucratic control over their 
production. By 1932, almost everyone agreed that some kind of process-
ing tax, levied on price-supported crops, would pay for the domestic 
allotment system. The problem in 1932 and 1933 involved what form 
these various measures would take.2
During the congressional debates of 1932, a well-planned crusade for 
production control through domestic allotments gained the support of a 
majority of farm organizations. Before the 1932 election, both presiden-
tial candidates offered rather vague commitments to a new farm program. 
The most influential backers of allotments, including farm economists 
Milburn l. Wilson and Mordecai Ezekiel, had hoped to gain Hoover’s 
support and thus make domestic allotments a part of the Farm Board. 
They failed. Hoover, who had earlier supported some system of voluntary 
acreage controls, decided against production controls. But Wilson and 
Ezekiel gained the backing of Rexford Tugwell, a member of Roosevelt’s 
so-called brain trust, and Henry A. Wallace, who would later become 
secretary of agriculture. They thus had direct access to Roosevelt, whose 
farm proposals were general and vague but clearly supportive of some 
type of domestic allotments. But Roosevelt was also open to several other 
possibilities for dealing with the agricultural crisis.
This meant that a new farm bill would be at the core of recovery leg-
islation passed in the new Democratic Congress after March 1933. This 
Agricultural Adjustment Act proved to be one of the most controversial 
new Deal bills. it was enacted on May 12 after two months of conten-
tious debate, well after some farmers had planted their crops. The law as 
passed was among the most complex ever enacted in the united States, 
and among the most influential. Some parts of it are still operative. it 
was an omnibus bill, in part because of a series of amendments that 
packed the bill with almost every conceivable method of aiding farmers. 
it went well beyond agricultural marketing. it included a mortgage relief 
measure, and its inflation amendment (the Thomas Amendment) revived 
the free silver issue. it made silver as well as gold acceptable for foreign 
debts, authorized the issuance of silver notes, and, most critical, allowed 
the president to alter the gold content of the dollar. Thus the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act became the means of implementing a completely new 
monetary policy, and the united States periodically changed the dollar 
price of gold as a means of inflating domestic prices and, not inciden-
tally, supplementing the tariff by blocking foreign imports. The cheap 
63A new Deal for Agriculture, 1930–1938
dollar lowered the price of American goods in foreign markets and raised 
the dollar price of imported goods, at least until foreign governments 
adopted similar tactics.3
the agriCultural aDjustment aCt oF 1933
The 1933 act established a new agency within the Department of Agri-
culture, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, which replaced the 
Farm Board. its first head was George Peek (of Mcnary-Haugen fame). 
The AAA had the authority to use multiple strategies to boost agricul-
tural prices and dispose of surpluses, many carried over from the Farm 
Board. The main financing provision of the act—a processing tax on all 
supported commodities—was, in effect, a sales tax on food. The revenue 
from this provision could be used to pay export subsidies, but because 
difficulties in foreign trade led to limited exports, dumping would have 
little effect on farm prices. in later years, various forms of subsidized ex-
ports would become a major aspect of American agricultural policy.
The two principal programs developed by the AAA were marketing 
agreements between farmers and processors and the domestic allotment 
system for selected commodities. only the largest commodities (cotton, 
wheat, and hogs in 1933, with tobacco and corn added in 1934) partici-
pated in the allotment system, and they have received the most attention. 
They also provided most of the lobbying support that led to the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act. But the vast majority of crops, including almost all 
perishable fruits and vegetables, as well as the large beef cattle industry, 
either rejected allotments or were never considered for participation be-
cause of the inherent attributes of their marketing. in 1933 growers of all 
but one specific variety of tobacco (used for cigar wrappers) agreed to 
accept domestic allotments for 1934 and signed contracts by the end of 
1933. For 1933 the AAA negotiated a marketing agreement with seven 
tobacco companies that raised tobacco prices to parity levels, with the 
tobacco companies absorbing the costs of increased prices.
For seven other largely regional crops, most without export markets, 
the only way to establish minimum prices was to negotiate agreements 
with processors. For these regional crops, particularly fruits and vegeta-
bles, the AAA licensed food processing companies and helped negotiate 
marketing agreements. in many cases, processors united to offer parity, or 
close to parity, for a set quantity of produce. Such price-fixing agreements 
were possible because of provisions in the national industrial Recovery 
Act of 1933 that suspended antitrust laws to allow the negotiation of 
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cartel-like industrial codes. in the case of food processors, the bill as-
signed code-making responsibility to the Department of Agriculture, not 
to the national Recovery Administration. This allowed processors, such 
as tobacco companies, to use fair competition rules or codes to justify 
unified prices far above former competitive levels. in some cases, farmers 
agreed to destroy, or not harvest, the portion of a crop that exceeded the 
amount called for in the marketing agreement. Because of constitutional 
concerns about industrial codes, most of these marketing agreements ex-
pired by 1935. new legislation allowed their replacement with market-
ing orders, which became the mode used to support milk prices.4
The act’s other major provision, the domestic allotment system, was 
the most publicized and most controversial program of the AAA. it lasted 
only three years, but it set enduring precedents. The complexity of the 
program, including different challenges and different controversies for 
different crops, defies any brief explication. The idea was that farmers of 
selected crops would contract to cut production by a designated percent-
age. The expectation was that, over time, this curtailment of production 
would raise commodity prices to parity level (the parity principle was 
written into the act). Meantime, those farmers who contracted to re-
duce their production would receive compensatory payments from the 
AAA. The amount of these payments would be set each year to bring the 
farmers’ total income up to the parity level. However, the amount of the 
payment was based not on actual production during the crop year but 
on average production in earlier years (usually a five-year average). This 
allowed farmers to get at least a part of their payments at the beginning of 
the crop cycle.  Also, when droughts ravaged the Midwest from 1933 to 
1936, farmers whose wheat and corn crops failed still received payments, 
or a type of crop insurance. A processing tax (really a sales tax) was as-
sessed on each commodity in the program to cover the costs. Since the 
program was completely voluntary, nonparticipating farmers gained a 
possible benefit from reduced surpluses, but they received no payments.
Such a program seemed, to many critics, almost impossible to admin-
ister. How could the AAA set quotas for each farmer? How could it verify 
farmers’ claims about acres cultivated or past yields and thus fairly assign 
quotas? Above all, how could it verify the fulfillment of the contracted re-
ductions? it seemed that nothing less than a huge bureaucracy would be 
able to monitor the work of millions of individual farmers. The solution 
was to have the farmers administer their own program. For any given 
crop, all the farmers who signed contracts made up what could be called 
an association. Working at first through county extension agents, the AAA 
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required these farmers to join local groups (in townships or county dis-
tricts) and elect from their number a local committee—the lowest ad-
ministrative level of the AAA. The farmers in each county also elected a 
three-member county committee. in this early system, a given county 
could have multiple committees tied to individual crops (for example, 
one committee for wheat, and another for tobacco).  The local commit-
tees determined the quota for each farmer, and the county committees 
determined the amount of production allocated to each area. Above the 
county committees were state committees. The AAA provided the neces-
sary clerical support for the program at the county level, where most of 
the action took place. There would soon be AAA offices in every farming 
county in America.
in theory, the local committee signed farmers to contracts, deter-
mined quotas, certified the accuracy of reports, and verified full compli-
ance with contracted reductions. The AAA paid local committeemen for 
the time they spent visiting individual farms and checking on compli-
ance. But in time, most of the actual work devolved to the clerical staff 
in the county offices, and even though, legally, the committees made all 
policy decisions, the full-time staff played a major role in guiding the 
committees and communicating policies to individual farmers. These lo-
cal AAA offices became the point of contact between almost all farmers 
and the national government. local committeemen retained the obliga-
tion, or the right, to monitor acreage allotments, but in almost all cases 
they hired other people to do this work. i surveyed the tobacco acreage 
in my district of Greene County for four years.
The maxim “from small acorns great oaks grow” was certainly ap-
plicable to the original assignment of domestic allotments. The quota 
established for each farmer participating in the program became known 
as the base acreage. The local committees, usually made up of the more 
successful or prominent farmers, used the two guidelines prescribed by 
the AAA—the amount of cultivated acres and past production records—
to establish this base. For example, if a given farmer cultivated fifty acres 
and in the past five years had grown an average of four acres of tobacco, 
his base might be three acres; a farmer with half as many acres and half as 
much production would have a base of one and a half acres (the goal be-
ing an overall reduction of acreage to match production with demand). 
Although sometimes guided by extension agents, and reflective of local 
class and racial norms, the local committees generally followed these 
guidelines and gained strong support from most farm operators.
Totally unanticipated by anyone at the time, this base acreage became 
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the foundation of an enduring aristocracy. Similar to primogeniture 
and entail laws in Europe, this procedure attached to land a special and 
valuable privilege. For many basic crops, success depended on gaining 
land with an established base. As late as 2007, farm payments of various 
types would be tied to base acres or base marketing quotas, and the lo-
cal committees were still the arbiters of the annual reallocation of these 
privileges. Clearly, those who gained a base in 1933 had a head start that 
endured generation after generation. And when they sold the land, the 
base shifted to the new owner.
The first year of the AAA was full of both confusion and controversy. 
its most notorious action in 1933 led to the plowing under of part of a 
growing cotton crop and the slaughtering of pigs and sows. in both cas-
es, the effort led to only a slight reduction in surpluses, but it quickly put 
money into the hands of the farmers who reduced their cotton and hog 
production. Except for very young pigs, which were used to make grease 
and fertilizer, the kill actually added 100,000 pounds of pork to govern-
ment relief efforts. Since corn farmers were not under contract for 1933 
(they received stabilizing crop loans in the fall of that year and signed 
acreage reduction contracts in 1934), the effort to improve pork prices 
was an indirect way of aiding corn farmers, many of whom fed their 
corn to hogs. Most wheat farmers contracted for a 15 percent reduction 
in the 1934 wheat crop, which turned out to be unnecessary because of 
a severe drought. in fact, the searing heat and droughts of the mid-1930s 
finally eliminated the surpluses carried over from the old Farm Board. 
Beef cattle owners voted against production controls, and poultry own-
ers, who were widely dispersed on almost all farms, were not part of the 
domestic allotment system.
The scandal over hogs led to a major and enduring food aid program. 
This was new, with the exception of some Farm Board wheat distributed 
through the Red Cross in 1932. i suspect that direct government pur-
chases of food and cotton during the Depression had a greater impact on 
agricultural prices than the acreage control programs did. in response to 
the bad publicity over dead hogs, the Roosevelt administration chartered 
the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation to buy and distribute all types 
of surplus commodities, almost three-fourths of which would be live-
stock. The AAA continued to buy hogs until the summer of 1934, and 
during that drought-ridden season it also bought 8 million beef cattle. 
An appropriation of $75 million in September 1933 allowed the pur-
chase, through the AAA, of processed milk products and several types of 
fruits and vegetables, some of which were distributed through the Fed-
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eral Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). To some extent, the Federal 
Surplus Relief Corporation’s stress on food needs did not match the sur-
plus removal goals of the AAA.
in 1935 that tension ended when the program shifted from an inde-
pendent corporation to the newly created Federal Surplus Commodities 
Corporation, located in the Department of Agriculture. From then on, 
the commodities purchased and distributed clearly reflected the goals of 
the AAA—surplus disposal and higher farm prices. Section 32 of a 1935 
amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act provided that one-third 
of all customs receipts would be used in support of agriculture—to facili-
tate exports, encourage domestic consumption, and reestablish farmers’ 
purchasing power. This became the major source of funds for food aid of 
all types and would remain so until the Food Stamp program in the Ken-
nedy administration (a few food stamps were also issued during the new 
Deal). The Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation used every possible 
means to dispose of surplus food, giving it to charitable institutions, 
county welfare agencies, schools, and needy families. Boxcars full of food 
were unloaded for county welfare workers to distribute. i remember in 
1937 when trucks rolled up to our rural school, delivering dozens of 
boxes and bags of food. We had no school lunch program, so we ate 
apples and oranges and endless amounts of prunes. We reluctantly drank 
some of the sour canned grapefruit juice at school and carried home rice 
and beans and canned foods, even though some of our homes had no 
pressing need for them. The “capture” of food aid by the Department of 
Agriculture proved politically invaluable in future years. it created a sec-
ond constituency for the department and its programs and often helped 
deflect criticism from its commodity programs, as it did during debates 
on a 2007 farm bill.5
The voluntary nature of the allotment system caused problems. it 
worked well for corn and wheat, for it allowed many small farmers, who 
largely consumed those grains on the farm, to opt out of the program. 
not so for the two largest nonfood crops—cotton and tobacco. Strictly 
speaking, neither fit any “domestic” allotment system, since they re-
mained predominantly export crops. noncontracting farmers could take 
advantage of higher prices without reducing acreage, undercutting its 
purpose. Thus, in two related acts (the Kerr Tobacco Act and the Bank-
head Cotton Act), Congress added new teeth to cotton and tobacco mar-
keting in 1934. under these laws, if two-thirds of farmers voted in favor 
of production restrictions, anyone who tried to sell a crop not grown 
on the allocated acres, or any crops sold by farmers who did not accept 
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the acreage restriction, incurred an all but prohibitive tax. in effect, the 
acreage limitations turned into a universal form of control. Such coercive 
rules were constitutional only because the farmers had to vote for such 
a program. From 1934 to the end of all tobacco price supports in 2004, 
burley tobacco growers voted for these tight controls every year, and light 
fire-cured growers in all but one year.
in the midst of the herculean efforts to set up the domestic allotment 
system and make payments to millions of farmers, the AAA struggled in-
ternally over its policies. Peek never liked production controls; he sparred 
with Secretary Wallace over his authority and did all he could to boost 
export subsidies. Roosevelt supported Wallace and thus had to ease Peek 
out of the AAA in late 1933. By then, another battle raged because of 
demands made by appointees in both a legal division and a division on 
consumer affairs and opposition to their demands by the directors of 
the main marketing divisions, who reflected the interests of commercial 
farmers. The lawyers, generally from urban areas and more politically 
radical, wanted to use the marketing agreements to gain more control 
over the processing businesses and to ensure that payments to south-
ern farmers did not discriminate against tenants and sharecroppers (who 
were often African American) either by displacing them or by not shar-
ing the payments with them. This battle raged through 1934 and 1935, 
until Wallace fired the radicals.
other new Deal Farm Programs
The AAA was not the only governmental agency to aid farmers in the De-
pression. A reorganized credit system for farmers was the most important 
of the non-AAA reforms. it included the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, 
which provided $200 million for rescue loans that allowed farmers up to 
five additional years to repay their mortgages and set a maximum of 4.5 
percent interest on old and new loans. it also provided $2 billion worth 
of guaranteed bonds to enable the Farm loan Banks to refinance loans 
and thus prevent massive foreclosures. in time, the banks would be able 
to retire all these bonds, with no loss to the federal government.
in the Farm Credit Act of 1933, the Roosevelt administration reorga-
nized the array of credit institutions inherited from the Hoover admin-
istration. The new Farm Credit Administration took over the seed loans 
from the Department of Agriculture and absorbed the local agricultural 
credit associations that had offered some of these loans. The act also es-
tablished a new Central Bank for Cooperatives, which assumed what little 
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was left of the Farm Board’s revolving fund. Twelve regional Production 
Credit Corporations received the necessary funds to revive the 4,000 
farm loan associations, which actually did the lending to farmers.
Although not recognized at the time, the most important new credit 
institution was the Commodity Credit Corporation. it was chartered un-
der the RFC in 1933, with an appropriation of $25 million to be used 
to aid farmers. in effect, it took over the crop loans made by coopera-
tives under the old Farm Board. it was at first an independent federal 
corporation, but it worked through the Department of Agriculture. The 
CCC loaned money on the basis of stored crops and at a set loan rate, 
which continued to be a type of minimum price for farm commodities. 
it was an important tool for stabilizing prices in late 1933, when farm 
prices softened and both southern and midwestern farmers were up in 
arms. As in the 1920s, farmers could redeem the loans and, after paying 
the interest charges, sell the crop at the market price. Alternatively, they 
could forfeit the loans without penalty, for these were nonrecourse loans 
(farmers did not have to pay for any losses). if the CCC profited from the 
eventual sale, as it often did in the early 1930s, it had to share the gain 
with the farmers.6
one much-discussed but heretofore unimplemented method of re-
ducing agricultural surpluses was the federal lease or purchase of farm-
lands, thus removing them from production. in a small way, the new 
Deal embraced this strategy. in 1933, under the authority of the national 
industrial Recovery Act, the Public Works Administration committed $25 
million for the purchase of submarginal land. FERA did the purchasing, 
but a new land Policy Section in the AAA, headed by farm economist 
lewis C. Gray, actually selected the farmland. FERA, working through 
Rural Rehabilitation Corporations in each state, was responsible for re-
settling the displaced farmers. The original grant expired in the summer 
of 1935, but by then Gray had used most of it to option or buy almost 
6 million acres. A large part of this purchased land became the basis of 
a state park system. However, the withdrawal of this relatively unpro-
ductive land did not have a major impact on agricultural production; in 
fact, it accounted for less than a third of the funds used by the Bureau of 
Reclamation to develop new irrigated lands in the West. By 1935, Gray 
sought an additional $50 million to expand the program but never re-
ceived nearly that much. He also tried to coordinate land purchases by 
several governmental agencies (for expanded national forests or parks or 
for dam construction), but only a part of this involved farmland. Yet, this 
small start set enduring precedents, and land leasing became an impor-
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tant technique of production control after World War ii (this includes the 
present Conservation Reserve).7
As one would expect, this land purchase program, and the insuffi-
cient effort to resettle displaced farmers, faced concerted resistance from 
both farmers and local governments. The program was part of a much 
more ambitious effort by economists in the Department of Agriculture 
to establish a more rational use of land in the united States, or what they 
referred to as land-use planning. For them, the domestic allotment plan 
was a temporary measure; a planned allocation of land resources was the 
long-term goal. in spite of excellent surveys of American farmland, esti-
mates of the optimal use of land in each region of the country, and even 
the formation of local planning committees in most rural counties, noth-
ing substantial came from the effort, which Congress eliminated during 
World War ii. Such planning implied the massive purchase of farmland, 
the leasing of land, or some type of zoning to control private land use. 
Congress was not about to grant such authority, even if it were consti-
tutional. Also lurking within this type of planning was the acceptance 
by farm economists that modern agriculture, with its rapid technologi-
cal advances, would displace a large proportion of existing farmers, al-
though in 1935 no one anticipated the magnitude of this displacement 
in the decades after 1945.8
Another aspect of new Deal agricultural policy involved help for the 
losers in agriculture. This affected the increasingly noncompetitive small 
farmers and the large number of tenants and sharecroppers who, by the 
very effect of new Deal agricultural policies, would lose their farms or 
their jobs. For two years a battle raged in the AAA over the plight of share-
croppers in the South, who often did not share equally in AAA payments 
and, if African American, had no role in the local committees. Advocates 
for these losers lost the administrative battles, and the AAA became an 
agency that supported successful or, in its own language, “progressive” 
farmers. But this does not mean that those who developed the AAA pro-
grams were insensitive to the losers. often, the opposite was true. Mil-
burn l. Wilson, the most important architect of the domestic allotment 
system, supported programs to aid people at the bottom. He personally 
headed a small subsistence homesteads program that built communities 
that combined subsistence plots with part-time industrial employment. 
implicit in this program was the fact that large numbers of rural people 
had no future in commercial agriculture. But the care of displaced or 
unemployed farmers, including those resettled under the land purchase 
program, was basically a relief effort. it did not help revive a vital agri-
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cultural sector. Efforts within the early AAA to force landlords to main-
tain all their tenants or sharecroppers failed. Many of these were already 
redundant.9
FERA, through its state-based Rural Rehabilitation Corporations, tried 
to bring relief to destitute farm families. it had various strategies, includ-
ing direct aid, but it tried to go beyond the dole by offering small reha-
bilitation loans to less than creditworthy farmers, some of whom were 
never able to repay. These loans resembled the seed loans of the 1920s, 
but they covered a range of needs beyond seed or fertilizer. Perhaps more 
important, but more intrusive, was the detailed supervision of the farm-
ing operations of FERA’s clients. The Rural Rehabilitation Corporations 
in many states also tried more ambitious and experimental programs, 
including the establishment of resettlement communities on repurchased 
farmland. Because farm families lived on small plots, and community 
cooperative enterprises were rarely profitable, these clients were never 
able to repay even half the cost of such communities. in 1935 both the 
rehabilitation efforts and the community building moved to a new Re-
settlement Administration headed by Rexford Tugwell. in 1936, after the 
resignation of the controversial Tugwell, the Resettlement Administration 
shifted to the Department of Agriculture and became the Farm Security 
Administration. it assumed one new task—to supervise a program that 
involved low-interest loans to carefully screened young tenant farmers 
to allow them to buy farms. These efforts to improve the lot of small or 
marginal farmers and to help as many as possible succeed in agriculture 
worked at cross-purposes with the AAA and its efforts to reduce sur-
pluses. At the end of  World War ii, Congress abolished the Farm Security 
Administration; stopped funding its more daring programs, including a 
few fully cooperative or communal colonies; and converted its successor, 
the Farmers’ Home Administration, into largely a lending agency that 
continued to focus on small farmers.
Two other agencies, with no connection to the Department of Agri-
culture or to the AAA, provided vital benefits to farmers. The first was the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). it had its origins in the Muscle Shoals 
project begun during World War i in northern Alabama. That project’s 
primary mission was to construct what became the Wilson Dam and to 
use part of its electrical output to manufacture synthetic nitrates for mu-
nitions. After the war Congress fought intense battles over the fate of this 
project, with some factions advocating the sale of electrical energy. But 
southern farmers yearned for inexpensive nitrate fertilizers and wanted 
fertilizer production to be one goal of the project, whether it remained 
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public or became private. Thus, the act that created the TVA provided for 
a fertilizer facility at Muscle Shoals. This became the united States’ first 
major research and development center for fertilizer. The TVA not only 
developed new fertilizers but also established experimental farms in the 
valley to teach farmers how best to use fertilizer.  The TVA thus augmented 
the already large research and development programs in the Department 
of Agriculture.10
At the same time, the TVA helped form rural cooperatives to distribute 
cheap electrical energy. its subsidized loans to such cooperatives demon-
strated one way to bring electricity to farmers who lived far from urban 
centers. in 1936, to extend such efforts beyond the Tennessee Valley, Con-
gress established the Rural Electrification Administration, which funded 
rural electrical cooperatives all over the country. By World War ii, its ef-
fort to electrify all American farms was less than halfway completed, but 
by less than a decade after the war, electrical lines had reached all but the 
most remote farms in the united States, amounting to a revolution that 
was almost as important as the adoption of tractors.
soil Conservation anD the agriCultural 
aDjustment aCt oF 1938
Soil conservation became a national obsession in the 1930s, the decade 
of the great dust storms. The South had suffered the most from water 
erosion, with red, denuded hillsides and deep gullies widespread in the 
Piedmont and upper South. The leading advocate of erosion control was 
Hugh H. Bennett, who headed a small Soil Erosion Service in the De-
partment of the interior in the early 1930s. His service used its funds 
to demonstrate erosion control techniques, such as contours and ter-
races, on selected farms. Fortunately, Franklin Roosevelt wanted to be an 
even greater conservation president than his cousin Theodore. He thus 
supported the Soil Conservation Act of 1935, which established the Soil 
Conservation Service to replace the Soil Erosion Service. it would later 
move to the Department of Agriculture and was recently renamed the 
natural Resources Conservation Service. The Soil Conservation Service 
was a research and demonstration agency; it did surveys, issued educa-
tional literature, set up local demonstrations, developed and leased tools 
and machinery to farmers, and proposed local legislation. With state co-
operation, it set up more than 3,000 soil demonstration districts, most at 
the county level. After 1954, it would oversee a major watershed protec-
tion program.11
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Most of the funding for erosion control came from other federal de-
partments or from the states. The Civilian Conservation Corps funded and 
built many of the local projects, some of which were on private farms. 
But the first major direct subsidy for farmers came in another 1935 law, 
the first Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. This act provided 
for grants to states to support erosion control and other conservation 
measures on farms. The aid was available only to those farmers who par-
ticipated in the production control programs. This was a powerful in-
ducement for farmers to sign contracts with the AAA.
The original domestic allotment plan did not guarantee any level of 
prices for farm products. The payments to farmers, usually made before 
harvest time, were based on average yields over the prior five years. Also, 
to the despair of many economists in the AAA, nothing in the plan re-
quired farmers to improve their farm practices or protect the land from 
erosion. This lack was remedied in part by the 1935 Soil Conservation 
and Domestic Allotment Act. in an unexpected way, this act also came in 
handy in early 1936 when the Supreme Court, in the famous Butler case, 
declared the processing tax unconstitutional on two grounds. First, it was 
not a true tax but merely a way to take money from one class of citizens 
and give it to another. Second, the government used the so-called tax 
to coerce the behavior of farmers and regulate agricultural production, 
a power reserved to the states. This claim was based on the prevailing 
and narrow interpretation of the interstate commerce clause. Contrary to 
most textbook accounts, the Court annulled only one small section of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, but it was a crucial section, for the process-
ing tax funded all the payments to farmers and all the export subsidies 
used to dump surpluses abroad. The Court’s decision did not affect any 
marketing agreements that did not involve a processing tax; nor did it 
preclude land purchases, emergency mortgage relief, food aid, inflation-
ary measures, or a small production control program for cane and beet 
sugar that was not funded by the tax. Most important, it did not do away 
with the AAA and its state, county, and community committees.
By January 1936, many farmers had already received payments for 
the 1936 crop; others looked forward to promised payments. Facing in-
tense pressure from farmers and farm organizations, Congress appropri-
ated funds to fulfill these contracts. This took care of the constitutional 
objection to an illegal tax. But it did not dispose of the Court’s objec-
tion to federally mandated production controls, an issue at the heart of 
a series of Supreme Court decisions involving the reach of the interstate 
commerce clause. To solve this problem, Congress, in only two months’ 
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time, approved a hastily drafted second Soil Conservation and Domestic 
Allotment Act. To circumvent the Court’s interpretation of the interstate 
commerce clause, the act provided that the states could, if they so de-
sired, request conservation funds from the federal government; establish 
state agencies to receive such funds; and, consistent with rules set by the 
Department of Agriculture, distribute these funds as payments to farmers 
who contracted to accept production controls and to implement certain 
conservation practices on their farms. of course, all the states so request-
ed, and each set up an agency (these varied) to receive and account for 
the funds. in every case, the states distributed the funds through the state, 
county, and local AAA committees.
in many ways, this constituted an improvement over the early allot-
ment system. Since it now funded payments to farmers from general tax 
revenue, it ended the regressive sales tax on food. it required farmers, 
each year, to sign a conservation plan under which they agreed to cut the 
production of soil-depleting crops (those already under production con-
trols) and replace them with soil-conserving crops or other conservation 
uses. For most farmers, this requirement was not onerous, for they could 
simply convert land withdrawn from crop production into legumes or 
pasture, plant trees on eroded hillsides, or build ponds to hold runoff 
water. Most farmers were scarcely aware that anything had changed, but 
the adoption of conservation plans had an effect over time, for farmers 
had to become aware of soil problems and new ways of controlling ero-
sion. Since conservation practices were farmwide and not tied to any one 
crop, the AAA in 1936 changed its organization from divisions tied to 
individual crops to one based on regional divisions. it thus worked out 
a single contract with each farmer for one or more crops. The new act 
was supposed to remain in effect for only two years, but Congress kept 
extending it. in fact, the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 
1936, though often amended, remained the basis of most federal conser-
vation subsidies for farmers until 1985.12
The final major agricultural policy change came in 1938, with the 
second Agricultural Adjustment Act. Though large and complex, it gener-
ally sought to consolidate farm policy. it did not abolish the first Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act but amended it, nor did it cancel the payments 
made under the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. 
For five crops—corn, wheat, rice, cotton, and tobacco—all involved in 
interstate commerce, it established a new, formalized, and enduring non-
recourse loan plan. Decisions by the Supreme Court in 1937 so broad-
ened the reach of the interstate commerce clause as to make this second 
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Agricultural Adjustment Act possible. only farmers who accepted pro-
duction controls were eligible for such loans. if two-thirds of the farmers 
in each of these crops voted in favor of production controls, all farmers in 
the main production regions for that crop had to either accept marketing 
quotas or pay a large penalty. in effect, this act extended the compulsory 
features of the tobacco and cotton programs established by special leg-
islation in 1934. The act allowed, but did not mandate, additional par-
ity payments to farmers if the secretary of agriculture desired them and 
Congress appropriated the funds.
in good crop years, with surpluses and falling prices, most farmers 
loaned their crops to the CCC and never redeemed the loans during the 
nine months they covered. if the CCC profited on future sales of forfeited 
commodities, it had to distribute the gains to the farmers who had for-
feited their loans. This was a good deal for farmers in any eventuality. 
Most farmers never understood the technicalities of the loan program 
and simply believed that, at times, the government bought their crops. in 
1939 and 1940 the new loan program led to soaring surpluses of corn 
and wheat, with growing storage costs. only the high demand during 
World War ii solved this surplus problem. The new loan plan, and thus 
price supports for basic, storable commodities, would remain in effect 
(with many modifications) until 1996, and in a sense, it still continues 
today (see chapter 6). Farmers also continued to receive payments for 
conservation practices, in addition to these new price supports.
in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Congress stressed the 
benefits of crop storage, or what Henry Wallace had long celebrated as an 
“ever normal granary.” But one suspects that this was a political cover for 
the CCC and its nonrecourse loans. Since 1954, only adverse weather 
or unexpected increases in foreign demand have temporarily eased the 
problems of overproduction. The 1938 act also tried to spare a few 
farmers from some of the insecurities of floods, droughts, hail, or dis-
ease epidemics by including the first quite limited federal crop insurance 
program.13
This completes the survey of major agricultural legislation from 1930 
to 1938. in no period of American history has the federal government 
undertaken so many initiatives or inaugurated so many programs to aid 
one economic sector. Farmers received payments for cutting production 
and subsidies to carry out necessary conservation practices; they received 
price supports for five basic commodities and crop insurance as a form 
of disaster relief. in fact, the sheer number of new programs still confuses 
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most historians, just as they confused even the legislators who approved 
them and the farmers who benefited from them. The long-term effects 
of these programs continue to invite controversy. one effect, however, 
was clear. Although farmers led the way into the Great Depression, those 
eligible for the new farm commodity programs were the first producers 
to regain anything close to pre-1929 prices. Prices rose to parity level 
in 1935 and exceeded that level in 1937, meaning only that the prices 
farmers paid for inputs were equal to or less than crop prices. Because of 
the overall effect of the continuing depression, farm incomes remained 
below 1929 levels.
in spite of the confusing array of programs, one factor remained con-
stant, and this is significant. All production controls, all payments for 
compliance, and all price support programs were based on levels of pro-
duction. This would remain true from the 1930s to the present. large 
farmers accepted the same percentage decrease in acres or marketing 
quotas as small farmers did, and all payments were based on units of 
past production. Even policies keyed to farm income rather than com-
modity prices were based on prior levels of production and thus helped 
sustain the gap between large and small farmers. Production controls 
made it more difficult for small farmers to compete with larger ones, and 
larger and more efficient farmers gained the greatest benefits from farm 
policies. in the long run, the most enduring benefits of price-raising 
subsidies were an increase in the value of farmland and an even greater 
importance for base acres. These results made entry into farming more 
and more expensive.14 one long-term effect of this product-based system 
was a tendency for small, less competitive farmers to leave agriculture, 
often selling their land to more commercially successful neighbors. At 
the same time, the large and expanding Department of Agriculture, de-
spite internal battles, continued to cater to its prime constituency—the 
most affluent and capable farmers. Programs that responded to the needs 
of small farmers, or to the declining number of tenants, were unable to 
compete effectively for funds and, in the case of the Farm Security Ad-
ministration, succumbed in the face of congressional hostility.
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4. World War ii and its Aftermath
A Family Report
like World War i, the Second World War meant higher prices for almost 
all farm products. A high demand for food crops, based largely on events 
in Europe, quickly used up all the surpluses held by the Commodity 
Credit Corporation. The acreage controls and price supports of the 1938 
Agricultural Adjustment Act were largely unneeded. Enforced acreage 
controls remained only for tobacco. Agricultural prices remained at or 
above parity, and net farm income soared. Although the federal govern-
ment did not place controls on farm prices, it enforced rigid price con-
trols on all consumer goods. Food rationing prevented severe shortages. 
These controls indirectly limited what farmers received and prevented 
a speculative bubble in rural America. Thus, the value of farmland rose 
only moderately during the war. Yet the war brought enormous change 
to rural America and reinforced trends already under way that would al-
low a steady and rapid growth in farm productivity and, more important 
in the long run, opportunities for off-farm employment for members of 
farm households.
wartime Changes in my village
i was twelve years old in 1941, old enough to participate in most farm-
work. i helped milk the four or five cows that allowed our family to sell 
milk in Greeneville, our only assured biweekly income from the farm. 
i helped set out tobacco plants in May, hoed and wormed the growing 
plants, and participated in the cutting and barning of tobacco in August. 
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By the next year, i was able to drive horses and guide a three-foot cultiva-
tor through the rows of corn and tobacco. By 1943, i was almost grown 
and considered myself a full hand on the farm, and thus i often worked 
for other farmers for the standard $1 a day (the standard did not go up 
during the war). in September 1943 i entered high school and began 
four years of course work in vocational agriculture. in 1944, as my first 
farm project to meet these course requirements, i rented our one acre of 
tobacco from my father and took responsibility for the three or four acres 
of corn we grew for use on the farm. i also worked, as a matter of course, 
in making hay for winter feed for our cows. Briefly, i was a farmer and 
looked forward to a career in agriculture.
Since my father worked at Eastman Kodak in Kingsport, he had little 
time for extra farmwork. During the war he often had to work overtime, 
so my mother and i largely ran the farm, with my father lending a hand 
at harvest time. My father had taken his factory job in 1936, but for three 
years he continued to run the farm on a reduced scale. He grew the full 
tobacco allotment, as did all the local farmers with off-farm employment. 
By 1937, we grew only enough corn to feed our chickens and hogs, and 
by then we had stopped growing wheat. in 1937, with a sharp downturn 
in the economy, Eastman Kodak placed most employees on part-time 
hours, which meant more time for my father to work on the farm. But in 
1939, with full employment restored and a new house to live in, my fa-
ther sold his horses and largely gave up farmwork. For the next two years, 
we had a sharecropper living in our old house. He and his family did all 
the farmwork except for milking the cows, which my mother would 
not relinquish. But the farm was not large enough to provide a decent 
income for the renter, and when the war began he found outside work. 
This meant that i had an opportunity to take over much of the farmwork 
and earn some good money. By the time i graduated from high school in 
May 1947, i had slightly more than $2,000 in the bank, almost all from 
my share of the tobacco crop. it may not seem like very much today, but 
at the time it was exceptional (comparable to at least $22,000 today). i 
used it, plus what i earned doing summer work, to pay my way through 
college.
An observer would not have noticed many overt changes in the lo-
cal farm economy during the war. one or two large farmers had bought 
tractors just before the war. A few lucky farmers along the state highway 
(including our family) gained electricity in 1940. This was a tremendous 
boon for my mother, both in our home and in the routine of milking 
the cows and cooling the milk to strain into cans for the daily milk truck. 
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But the vast majority of local farmers did not get electricity until after 
the war (nationally, only 35 percent of farms were electrified by 1941). 
Since food was so important to the war effort, some young men on larger 
farms received deferments, but those who did were often stigmatized. 
Few applied. one who did was a high school student who helped his 
widowed mother operate a large farm. He was essential to keeping the 
farm productive, since extra farm labor was almost nonexistent. High 
school students were released from class to help pick beans on one lo-
cal farm. Most village sharecroppers quit farming and took defense jobs. 
Almost none of them returned to farming, and sharecropping virtually 
came to an end with the war.
Despite the number of men in the military and those who flocked 
to city jobs (reducing local farm labor by at least half ), the level of farm 
production in our village did not decline during the war. in fact, i suspect 
it went up slightly, along with prices and net income. How could this 
be? First, the remaining farmworkers, both men and women, worked 
more hours. The amount of redundant farm labor on small farms was 
now clear. in 1942, with no sharecropper, my father went back to farm-
ing until i took over two years later. He bought one horse, even though 
two were normally needed for most farm tasks. He found a rare one-
horse wagon and a small one-horse turning plow. We made do with this 
for tobacco and a small field of corn. For the main plowing, we hired a 
neighbor who had a tractor. But the point is, we maintained about the 
same level of output, and with my father’s factory job, our family income 
was higher than ever.  The annual income from the farm—primarily from 
tobacco, milk, and foods consumed at home—amounted to less than 
$1,200. That might be enough for a family of four to survive on, but it 
was far less than what most families expected in the way of consumption. 
nonetheless, the farm income added to the outside wages, and the value 
of the farm steadily increased. Eventually, this part-time farming—or, in 
time, hobby farming—would become the dominant form of agriculture 
in our village.
new tools played only a small role in sustaining local agricultural 
production in the war years. The government allowed a limited number 
of tractors to be produced during the war, and a few local farmers bought 
small tractors and the new tools for them, particularly Ford-Ferguson 
tractors. Because of their power and speed, tractors increased productiv-
ity, but their greatest impact resulted from their displacement of horses 
(which had consumed up to a fourth of the product) and the gradual 
shift to fossil fuel as the source of horsepower. Agricultural research was 
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beginning to have a major impact, with almost all local farmers convert-
ing to hybrid corn. Kentucky and Tennessee experiment stations con-
tinued to develop new and more productive varieties of burley tobacco. 
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) had demonstrated the benefits of 
new fertilizer formulas on county farms, and wartime incomes allowed 
farmers to use more balanced fertilizers (nitrogen was the critical new 
ingredient) on their crops, particularly tobacco. Hybrid corn varieties, 
aided by the nitrogen in fertilizers, raised yields from about twenty-five 
to more than forty bushels an acre. When grown only for farm use, corn 
required both less work and less acreage, leaving more land for hay and 
pasture. nationally, farm full-factor productivity rose by more than 2 
percent a year during the war; productivity per hour of work rose even 
faster. now, in a labor-scarce environment, local farmers had every reason 
to adopt all the latest tools and chemicals, and to help them do this, they 
could rely on years of agricultural extension and vocational education. 
As a student of vocational education, i tried to incorporate all the latest 
information on our farm and encouraged its use on several other local 
farms, some owned by relatives.
Postwar transFormations
Prosperity during the war did little to assuage a deep anxiety felt by local 
farmers. What would happen when the war ended? Many remembered 
the price collapse in 1921. Everyone remembered the Great Depression 
and had scant hope of avoiding another one when postwar spending 
abated. Farmers did a good job of communicating these fears to their 
congressmen. in 1942, as a gesture to farmers and as a way to main-
tain or increase farm production, Congress guaranteed price supports 
for twenty farm commodities at 90 percent of parity for two years af-
ter the legal end of hostilities (this would be 1946) or until the 1948 
crop year. Such a guarantee was not really necessary, for the devastated 
agriculture in much of Europe would take up to a decade to recover. 
in 1948 Congress extended the 90 percent guarantee until 1949 and 
voted for flexible supports after that year, with a 75 percent guarantee in 
“normal” years. When prices softened in 1949, for the first time since 
1940, farmers became scared and pressured Congress for higher support 
levels. An ever-willing Congress gave in and maintained the 90 percent 
support level for another year.  Then, with the increased demand caused 
by the Korean War, it continued this level of support until 1953 and then 
finally extended it to 1954. Thus, contrary to farmers’ expectations, they 
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faced no major decline in prices until a decade after the war. in fact, the 
90 percent of parity actually increased farmers’ incomes compared with 
those in most other industries. By 1954, the years of high demand rela-
tive to production were over, and from that time to about 2005 (with 
the exception of the mid-1970s), farm production outran demand, and 
problems of surpluses and support prices remained at the center of agri-
culture policy making.
in our village, the number of farms actually increased during and im-
mediately after the war. This was contrary to national trends but reflected 
a local pattern. in most parts of the country, nineteenth-century farms 
typically included large woodlots and thus had room for expanded culti-
vation through the clearing of new ground. Although some farm consoli-
dation took place, the usual pattern was a division of farmlands among 
heirs at the death of an owner. Thus, when Grandfather Conkin died in 
1918, his will mandated the division of his large 150-acre farm into 
three roughly 50-acre farms, one each for his daughter and two sons. 
Just before the war, two large farms that adjoined ours went through 
similar divisions. The more developed farm, just up the road from our 
house, eventually ended up in six different parcels, none of which was 
large enough to provide a profitable farming income. on the other side, 
the only son of the owner kept the farmland intact, and until recently 
it supported a grade A dairy operation. But, typical of the postwar pe-
riod, various members of that family took off-farm employment. The 
only other large adjoining farm—to the south—remained in the posses-
sion of a surviving daughter until after the war but was not intensively 
farmed. She then sold it in two parcels, one of which was large enough 
for full-time farming in the immediate postwar years. The owner of that 
parcel was one of the most skilled tobacco farmers in the area, but his 
family income was low in comparison to that of the few very large farm-
ers or that of most local families in which the heads of household worked 
off-farm.
My family kept the farm operating near its prewar level for only a 
few years after the war. i grew tobacco through 1947, and my mother 
continued selling milk well into the 1950s. in most years we grew a small 
corn crop, and we had to put up hay for the cows. But most of our thirty 
acres of cultivable land was now in pasture. in the summer of 1947, just 
before my first year in college, i gained a job with the county office of 
the old Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), by then named 
the Production and Marketing Association (PMA), and today called the 
Farm Service Agency. For four summers i measured (that is, surveyed 
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with a chain) the tobacco acreage of slightly more than 300 allotment 
holders in our county district and, in most years, an average of 100 farms 
in adjoining districts. i was paid by the farm, and since most of the farms 
in our district were small, with allotments averaging just over an acre, 
i made good money. My sister also spent two summers working in the 
PMA office in Greeneville, mainly helping with the office work for the to-
bacco program. During my time with the PMA, i gained firsthand knowl-
edge of the farming methods and problems in our district. i also became 
an expert in almost all aspects of burley tobacco culture.
in one sense, not much had changed in this district during the war, 
and this would be the case until well into the 1950s. only two or three 
farms were larger than 200 acres, and none had a tobacco allotment 
of more than 3.5 acres. At least half had allotments under 1 acre, with 
a few as small as 0.2 acre. This was the result of the fragmentation of 
farms through inheritance or the sell-off by owners. in this period, the 
average price of burley tobacco was around 45 cents per pound. A su-
perb farmer might grow 2,000 pounds on an acre, but the average was 
less than 1,500. only a few rare farmers received as much as $900 for 
an acre (gross income, not net), which still required about forty-five 
days of labor. Even discounting the value of labor expended, the costs 
were considerable—fertilizer, insecticides, maintenance of tools. Yet no 
other crop was nearly as profitable on an acre-to-acre basis, and tobacco 
remained the principal money crop in our county. As late as 1948, the 
average net farm income was still under $1,000. unskilled factory wages 
held at around 50 cents an hour during the war and rose only slowly af-
terward. My father earned an annual income of just over $1,000 at East-
man Kodak. Thus, on large farms with 3 acres of tobacco allotment, the 
net income from tobacco and possibly a small dairy operation could still 
compare favorably to urban jobs. But in my part of the county, almost no 
farmers had the land, tools, and allotments to do this well.
During my visits to farmers in this northern district of Greene Coun-
ty, i found only about fifteen or twenty really profitable farms. up to 
half the farms were operated by men who, like my father, had full-time 
off-farm jobs. They all grew the allotted tobacco but increasingly shifted 
most of their cultivable land to pasture for dairy cows (the old pattern) 
or, increasingly, to beef cows (the wave of the future for almost all hobby 
farmers). With the small size of local farms, the only path to incomes 
above the national median was a combination of tobacco and an up-
to-date dairy farm. This meant securing a permit to sell grade A milk 
from the local dairy association, which was not easy. Another possible 
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path to success was new in our area. When i stopped growing tobacco 
in 1948, my father gave up farming altogether and rented the tobacco 
crop to a young man who lived two miles away, just over the Washing-
ton County line. He worked the land on shares, but this arrangement 
reflected the new pattern of sharecropping. He was already developing 
a large dairy operation (still the largest in our area) and rented available 
land on several scattered farms. He and a crew of workers came periodi-
cally, in trucks or on a tractor, to tend our tobacco patch. These workers 
were local young men who lacked a high school education and had few 
employment opportunities. Forty years later they would almost all be 
replaced by migrant workers, mostly Hispanics.
The fact that a young farmer rented land so far from his home base 
reflected the unique situation of tobacco farming. He was able to rent 
land close to his own farm for extra pasture or hay fields, but few small 
farmers would give up their tobacco patches. And until 1971, the burley 
tobacco allotment was tied to land. From 1934 through 1971, burley 
tobacco growers, largely in Kentucky and Tennessee, voted overwhelm-
ingly in periodic elections to accept acreage controls and, with them, 
price supports. The allotment on each farm was based on acreage and past 
production records. This allotment was a valuable asset that increased the 
value of a farm (if sold, the allotment went with the land). in order to 
market a crop, one had to have a certificate from the county AAA (or its 
successors) attesting that the amount grown that year did not exceed the 
allotted amount. legally, the elected county committeemen had to certify 
acreage, which meant doing the actual measurements. The fact that few 
of them chose to do so explains my job for four summers.
i visited each farm. The farmer, or an agent, had to be present and 
help move the chains used in the survey. i was not supposed to figure the 
acreage or tell the farmer how much he had. My job was simply to draw 
a diagram of the field, with all the measurements. in most cases, however, 
i could easily calculate the acreage and told the farmer what he wanted 
to know. What i failed to communicate to all but the most sophisticated 
farmers was that they would be better off if they planted a bit more than 
the allotted acreage. if the PMA office determined that a farmer was not 
within the limits of his allotment, it sent a letter stating the amount of 
the overage and sent a permanent employee of the county office to the 
farm to supervise the destruction of the excess crop. it cost a mere $3 to 
do this, and it allowed farmers to destroy the poorest parts of their fields, 
including areas drowned out by too much rain. This process ensured that 
farmers grew the full amount allowed. in all too many cases, farmers 
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came in well under the allotment, and they were usually pleased by that 
fact, as if planting too much would have been a crime. i could not per-
suade most farmers to get a prior survey of a prospective field to ensure 
they planted the absolute maximum. 
Along with the elite few, at least a hundred full-time farmers in our 
district still tried to make a living on the farm after World War ii. Many 
of these were older men, moving toward retirement. A majority held 
on to the old ways. Few owned tractors before 1950. Those far off the 
main roads did not get electricity until after 1950. Tobacco and grade B 
milk provided most of their cash income. They still depended on home 
provenance. in most cases, the next generation would not remain on 
these farms. Those who inherited all or part of the land usually worked at 
outside jobs and moved from crop farming (with the possible exception 
of a tobacco patch) to hay and pasture. in other words, agriculture as a 
full-time occupation was doomed in hilly, northern Greene County. This 
fact became obvious only in hindsight and invited a degree of sadness.
But an important point is that the land remained. Almost all of it re-
mained agricultural, in the sense that it produced goods for market and 
some income for owners, although in most cases the farm operated at a 
loss if one fairly assigned a value to the labor expended. in a few hilly ar-
eas, formerly cultivated land relapsed into young forests—a pattern that 
had prevailed in much of new England a century earlier. But this deser-
tion of agriculture was not the rule. indeed, up to half the young people 
left the farms and moved to nearby cities, where they found employ-
ment. But the other half, now within easy commuting distance of factory 
jobs, preferred a hybrid way of life. ironically, the household income 
of families classified as farm operators by the Department of Agricul-
ture steadily increased, even as the average net farm income declined. in 
fact, the household income of small or hobby farmers usually exceeded 
that of full-time farmers who continued to operate the best farms in 
the area. Because of its location, my village, only seventeen miles from 
highly industrialized Kingsport and almost the same distance from rap-
idly industrializing Greeneville and Johnson City, led the way in the most 
critical change in rural America—the gradual development of a single 
labor market embracing both urban and rural areas, accompanied by a 
complex array of lifestyle choices.
Home provenance gradually declined after the war—less so for the 
older, traditional farmers who kept their milk cows, chickens, hogs, large 
garden plots, orchards, and cellars full of canned vegetables and fruits, 
and more so for the few highly commercial and more specialized farmers 
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and for part-time or hobby farmers. This shift reflected a desire for less 
arduous labor, higher incomes, and external shifts in the food system. i 
will use my family as an example of these shifts.
Through World War ii, federal policy encouraged home sustenance, 
including victory gardens in urban backyards. Farm wives were given 
extra sugar rations for canning. Meat rationing supported homegrown 
pork, eggs, and broilers. But by the end of the war, the incentives for 
home production steadily lessened. Even during the war, my parents 
went to town almost weekly for shopping and took advantage of the low-
er food prices in emerging supermarkets versus the local country stores. 
Rapid advances in the processing, packaging, and transportation of foods 
gradually lowered the cost of fresh as well as canned or packaged foods. 
Home refrigerators allowed longer storage of fresh produce and meats. 
But the most important change was in the price of store-bought foods 
relative to income levels. This was a result of the increasing efficiency and 
productivity of commercial agriculture. Also important was the wider ar-
ray of choices in terms of types of food and their off-season availability, 
as well as the health benefits of turning away from a diet overly depen-
dent on pork and lard.
At the end of World War ii, my mother stopped raising chickens. 
Soon most local families did the same. The revolution in poultry produc-
tion was just beginning (a hundredfold increase in labor productivity 
in modern broiler factories). Thus, it was soon much easier to buy eggs 
and broilers than to raise them, not to mention being less expensive if 
one considered the labor expended. By 1950, nationally, the percentage 
of farms with chickens had declined from 95 percent in 1900 to 78 per-
cent (today it is less than 1 percent). My mother continued to milk cows 
and sell grade B milk into the mid-1950s. Most full-time farmers also 
sold milk. But soon, almost no one kept a milk cow just for home con-
sumption. nationally, milk cows on farms had declined from more than 
80 percent in 1900 to 68 percent in 1950 (today it is only 8 percent). 
Keeping a cow was simply not worth the time and effort, and people 
increasingly preferred homogenized and pasteurized milk, particularly 
for children. By the 1960s, fewer and fewer families continued the low-
volume sale of grade B milk, and the number of dairy cows declined as 
small or hobby farmers switched to beef cows, as did my father in the 
late 1950s. At about the same time, my parents stopped raising hogs. By 
1980, perhaps no more than a dozen local families still butchered hogs 
each fall or, more commonly, paid professional butcher shops to kill the 
hogs and process the meat for them. With this shift, meat consumption 
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changed to a mixture of beef, chicken, and pork, all bought at the super-
markets in Greeneville and Kingsport.
locally, most families continued to grow vegetable gardens, but few 
maintained home orchards, except for some low-maintenance summer 
apple varieties (by 1992, only 92,000 farmers in the united States grew 
apples). My grandparents, who continued to care for a large home or-
chard until they retired and sold their farm in 1955, had adapted to the 
new demands of successful orchard crops. They carefully pruned trees, 
grafted new varieties onto rootstock, and, most important, maintained 
a regular regimen of spraying to control insects and diseases. in earlier 
days, neither insects nor diseases had been much of a problem, in part 
because of older varieties, and in part because insects had been scarcer 
before the advent of new types of agricultural chemicals. Almost no other 
families in the area were willing to go to all the effort, and most of them 
bought their fruit from the few orchards clustered in the foothills of the 
nearby mountains or from supermarkets that increasingly sold fruit, off-
season, from as far away as California.
Although vegetable gardens remained popular, food preservation 
quickly changed after the war.  Two local developments secured this shift: 
the electrification of almost all homes, and the advent of frozen foods. 
The local TVA distributor had extended electric lines to all the homes in 
our village by 1950. This meant that everyone could have a refrigerator 
and a stand-alone freezer. The change came quickly. in 1945, as the war 
wound down, our high school agriculture classes began a major project 
to build a community cannery and, in the process, hone our skills in 
carpentry, bricklaying, plumbing, and wiring for electricity. We built a 
state-of-the-art facility with a large boiler, two large pressure-cooker vats, 
and tables and tools for food preparation. our expectation was that farm-
ers for miles around would bring fruit, vegetables, and even meat to the 
cannery, where, for a small price, they could buy metal cans like those 
used by food companies. The high steam pressure assured the safety of 
the contents of the filled cans. unfortunately, use of the facility slackened 
after only two or three years. Frozen foods largely took the place of all the 
glass jars that had once filled root cellars and basements. For a few items, 
such as tomatoes and tomato juice, home canning remained popular, but 
not for long. Because home freezing was never as successful in retaining 
the flavor and structure of vegetables as the flash freezing of commercial 
food companies, the shift to store-bought frozen foods also increased 
each year.
Electricity reduced home labor in several other areas. it allowed the 
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use of many household appliances, as well as pumps to bring well or 
spring water into homes. This meant that farm families who could af-
ford it built bathrooms and retired the traditional outdoor privy. it also 
allowed the installation of electric heat. TVA electrical rates were among 
the lowest in the nation, and after the war, the local distributor launched 
a crusade to get farmers to heat with electricity. My family gladly fol-
lowed this advice and, for the first time, could give up the long process of 
gathering firewood. The electric range also meant that housewives could 
prepare summer meals without the stifling heat of a woodstove and also 
enjoy the cooling effect of electric fans (it would be the 1980s before 
many local people bought air conditioners). Thus, in not much more 
than a decade, most local families had reduced the amount of work dedi-
cated to home sustenance by at least 80 percent—few or no morning 
and afternoon chores (feeding, milking, gathering eggs, slopping hogs), 
no wood cutting for fuel, little canning or preserving of meats and veg-
etables. in 1935 farmers in the united States gained about 15 percent of 
their income from goods consumed at home (i would estimate that in 
my village this number was closer to 20 percent), and this percentage 
may have gone up during World War ii. Today, it is less than 1 percent 
nationally. Although the gradual shift to beef cattle still required plenty 
of hay for winter feed and some daily chores in the coldest weather, the 
quick adoption of mobile hay balers after the war drastically reduced the 
work required to get hay into the barns.
From 1950 to 1970, American agriculture grew at an astonishing rate 
(described in the next chapter). These two decades marked the apex of a 
sectoral revolution. one result was the reduction of the agricultural labor 
force by about one-half. Another was the rapid consolidation of farms, 
with almost all the productivity growth taking place on larger farms. 
For the most part, the story of farming in my home community in east 
Tennessee is a story of those who were unable or unwilling to join in 
this revolution and thus moved to the margins of American agriculture. 
By 1970, only five farms out of the seventy or so that had been present 
in our village in 1940 came close to providing a median income for the 
farm operator, and each of these produced grade A milk. only about 
ten other less productive farms continued with full-time operators until 
1970. one large farm, owned by a Kingsport businessman, had a full-
time manager during these years. Beyond that, it is hard to estimate how 
many other farms survived until 1970, because the answer depends on 
how one defines a farm. By lease or purchase, about forty former farms 
were effectively consolidated into larger productive units (most for hay 
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and pasture). But at the same time, the continuing division of farms into 
smaller and smaller units meant that the number of people who owned 
farms (defined as at least ten acres with some annual sales) increased. 
unlike in the past, ownership of farmland did not correlate closely with 
farm management or employment.
Government policy had a major role in the structure of local agri-
culture. This was true because of the continuing importance of burley 
tobacco. Acreage controls and price supports continued through 1970. 
Farmers could increase their tobacco acreage only by buying farmland 
with an established quota or when the local committees redistributed 
small amounts of acreage that had been dropped from tobacco produc-
tion. As more and more farm owners worked off the farm in Kingsport 
or Greeneville, they either continued to grow their ever-shrinking to-
bacco patches or rented them to neighbors. They already had the need-
ed infrastructure, such as a tobacco barn. By Department of Agriculture 
rules, the tobacco had to be grown on the farm that had the allotment, 
resulting in an absurdly fragmented crop, with the average allotment in 
our area dropping to less than one acre. Because of health reasons, the 
market for tobacco fell almost every year, and thus patches became small-
er and smaller. Despite this shrinkage, the production never declined by 
the same proportion, since farmers had every possible incentive to grow 
more on less land (good soil, more fertilizer, more insecticides), and they 
succeeded. From 1950 to 1971, the average yield of burley tobacco rose 
from 1,350 to 2,400 pounds per acre, with maximum yields as high as 
3,000 pounds. Thus, even as the amount of cultivated acres declined with 
each passing year in our community, almost every farm still produced 
tobacco.
This system came to an end in 1971, by a vote of burley tobacco 
growers. The new tobacco program involved marketing quotas based on 
pounds, not acres. More significant, these quotas could be sold to other 
growers in the county at whatever price one could negotiate. Since the 
offering price for poundage was only a small percentage (around 20 
percent) of the value of the harvested crop, it was still in the best inter-
est of some farmers to grow their own tobacco or rent it to neighbors. 
However, many farmers with tiny allotments stopped growing tobacco 
and gained what they could from the sale of their allotment. in some ar-
eas of the county, a few farmers bought enough poundage to plant ten or 
more acres of tobacco, using temporary laborers for the harvest. in other 
words, the new system allowed a gradual consolidation of tobacco grow-
ing on a few large, specialized farms. When Congress ended marketing 
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controls for tobacco in 2004 and compensated farmers who lost their al-
lotments, almost all tobacco growing shifted to relatively few large farms. 
in a final major structural change, the old auction system and the large 
tobacco warehouses gave way to direct contracts between tobacco com-
panies and growers, or a type of vertical integration that began to blur 
the lines between growers and processors. Thus, tobacco’s century-long 
reign as the main cash crop in our community ended. it is rare today to 
see even one tobacco field anywhere near our village.
With the shift away from tobacco, crop agriculture all but ended in 
our area of the county, unless one counts hay as a crop. With beef cattle 
dominating, grass hays such as fescue were sufficient for winter feeding. 
Fescue is coarser and less nutritious but more hardy than timothy or or-
chard grass. unlike legumes, which became less popular after the shift 
away from dairying, fescue requires little care year after year, except for 
fertilizer and lime. Even by 1970, despite the surviving tobacco patches 
on the most fertile and usually noneroding land, the countryside was 
now mainly green, and the runoff of flooding rains was almost clear 
of silt. Environmentally, the community had improved dramatically. no 
one cultivated the steeper hillsides. old ditches recovered slowly from 
past mistakes. But, on the negative side, the manure and urine from 
grazing beef cattle, which waded in and drank from the valley creeks, 
created enough water pollution to kill off most fish. Spring-fed streams, 
whose water we often drank when i was a boy, were now full of deadly 
bacteria.
Except for one dairy farm that borders our community, only two or 
three families are fully dependent on farm income today. Almost every-
one has off-farm employment of some type or is retired. The beef cows 
present on every hillside may or may not belong to the owner of the 
land. But the cow owners who rent the pasture are most often part-time 
farmers. in fact, it is difficult to develop criteria that would enable one 
to count the number of farms in our community. But it is important to 
note that our community straddles a state highway, is well located for city 
employment, and never had any large, well-situated farms. in a sense, it 
has become a far-out bedroom community of Kingsport, where at least 
half the local workers are employed.
State Highway 93 roughly parallels the creek and valley that make up 
the heart of the Bethesda community. Those who attended the Bethesda 
church and had a sense of belonging to the community lived on each 
side of this highway for a distance of more than three miles. in the mid-
1930s approximately twenty homes were along this section of the road, 
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or about a fifth of the total number of homes in our community. The oth-
ers lived on seven side roads, most of which were only recently paved, 
that fed into the main highway. of those twenty families, sixteen were 
headed by full-time farmers. Today, there are more than seventy-five 
homes on both sides of the same stretch of highway. of the fifty-five 
additional families, approximately forty-five live on lots of less than five 
acres. But at least eleven plots in excess of ten acres, some farmed by 
absentee owners, have split off from larger farms. Thus, by Department 
of Agriculture criteria, the number of farms may have actually increased 
along with this suburbanization. Even the number of farm operators may 
have increased (definitions are unclear here), even as the number of full-
time operators has dropped to near zero. Admittedly, on the roads farther 
away from the highway, the increase in homes has been slower, but even 
there the decline in full-time farmers has been comparable.
This pattern was widespread in the upper South, particularly in Ten-
nessee and north Carolina: an increase in landowners, a decrease in full-
time or profitable farming, and strip housing developments along major 
roads. What one sees as one flies over the former farming areas of the 
Piedmont or in my area of east Tennessee is a complex urban-rural mix, 
or what i call a “rurban” pattern. After World War ii, this area became 
the largest manufacturing belt in the country. But the manufacturing was 
located mainly in small towns, with workers driving in from what had 
once been open countryside but was now experiencing a steady growth 
in population. By choice, many former farmers chose to remain on the 
land and keep a hand in agriculture, if only to grow a large garden and 
pasture a dozen beef cattle. This was a lifestyle choice, and one that was 
not necessarily economically rational. They might sell a few lots along 
the road but keep the back acres in pasture. Many city people yearned 
for acres in the country, including professionals, and they gladly farmed 
their land at a loss each year (and received a tax deduction). For them, 
farming was a hobby. But full-time farming was not an economic option 
for most people in our village. To earn a median income from farming 
required an increasing amount of land, and because of its location near 
manufacturing and service jobs, that land was becoming more and more 
expensive. The capital investment required was simply too high, except 
for more remote land or for prime agricultural land, which was scarce in 
our area of Greene County.
The gradual transition from full-time to part-time farming in my 
home village was not a story of economic stress or failure or an example 
of rural decline. Because of employment opportunities in nearby towns, 
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the household income of almost all the remaining part-time farmers rose 
with each passing decade. The farms contributed little to this income 
but clearly provided nonmonetary rewards. i am sure that most present 
residents, who did not live through the transition, suffer no sense of loss. 
But their complacency should not conceal what was indeed lost for those 
who, like my father, had to accept factory employment, not willingly 
but because of economic necessity. The key word is employment. The main 
concern was status and self-identity. What my father always lamented was 
a loss of independence, of an entrepreneurial status. in his own words, 
he was no longer his own boss, able to control the timing and tempo of 
work. He continued to tend his beef cattle as a way to retain some sense 
of a past proprietary role and looked forward to retirement, when he 
could at least play at being a full-time farmer. 
suCCessFul Farming in Pennsylvania
My sister would end up on a profitable farm not in Greene County or 
even in Tennessee, but in York County, Pennsylvania. Her story illustrates 
the requirements and the costs of competing successfully in the new ag-
riculture. A high school classmate of mine, John W. Hunt, moved to Penn-
sylvania with his parents in 1947. He would later marry my sister lois, 
his high school sweetheart. The reasons for the Hunts’ move from their 
farm in Washington County, Tennessee, were complex, but among them 
was the inexpensive land in York County just after the war. John’s father 
had worked on a family farm but had not owned it. He supplemented his 
farm income by running a milk truck. He followed other families from 
our area who had already moved to Pennsylvania Dutch country, actually 
buying a 260-acre farm from one such family. of course, he had to go 
into debt to make the purchase, but in a few years, rapidly rising land 
values had increased the value of his farm by at least 50 percent. He was 
lucky in terms of the timing. i first visited the Hunt family, and their farm, 
in the summer of 1950. Here is what i observed.
The farmhouse and a large part of the land were in the borough of 
Seven Valleys, about eight miles southwest of  York, with some of the land 
stretching into two other townships. The land straddled the south branch 
of Codorus Creek, which was large enough to qualify as a small river by 
most definitions. More than ninety acres of the land was in the floodplain 
of this creek; half of it too low lying for cultivation, but it made good 
pasture. Some of the sloping meadows were cultivable and assured good 
yields of corn and small grains. A large, hilly woodlot was to the north; 
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to the south, across the road, were more gently sloping fields suitable for 
all types of crops. The two-story, ten-room brick house dated from before 
the Civil War but, because of its age, required a good bit of maintenance. 
it was on a main road, or what would later become a state highway. The 
classic Pennsylvania Dutch barn was equally ancient and was one of the 
largest in the area. it measured 40 by 100 feet and had a rock wall base 
surrounding all the stables, with the back wall fully underground. Huge 
beams, some more than 40 feet long, supported the main barn above, 
with two large doors at ground level. The high roof, the shingled walls, 
and the numerous vents and windows allowed the storage of enough 
hay for 100 cows, plus all types of farm machinery. A silo at one corner 
held more feed.  A large, slatted corncrib was close by. A small creek ran 
through the barn lot. An annex to the barn consisted of a milk shed, with 
stanchions for about 20 cows and a small hayloft overhead.
The Hunt family was thus blessed with what promised to be a profit-
able farm, one that was larger than most of the neighboring farms owned 
by older German families. The Hunts established a mixed farming opera-
tion. They briefly experimented with truck crops—peas and tomatoes—
for a nearby cannery but found that the hand labor required for tomatoes 
was harder than that for tobacco back in Tennessee. From the beginning 
they also grew corn, wheat, and hay, and for a few years they kept hogs 
both for home use and for sale. They sold part of their corn crop and all 
of their wheat, and they baled and sold straw. But the main cash crop, as 
it was for most of their neighbors, was milk from a herd of twenty or so 
cows. John, the older son, soon established a milk route to supplement 
the farm income. The farm, so close to York, had electricity but lacked in-
door plumbing. it was, in this respect, comparable to the farm the family 
had left in Tennessee. When they moved in 1947 they brought their Ford 
tractor with them and would soon buy additional and updated harvest-
ing equipment. They used portable electric milkers and still strained the 
milk into the standard ten-gallon cans, but they had chilled water for the 
cooling.
in the 1950s, as the agricultural revolution took off, the Hunts contin-
ued to operate what became primarily a dairy farm. They had to upgrade 
operations to meet higher sanitary standards set by dairy associations in 
both the Philadelphia and new York districts. This meant an improved 
milk house, with a stainless-steel tank for cooling, and rigid rules for 
cleaning the milkers and caring for the cows. in 1956 John was drafted 
into the army; he had received a deferment during the Korean War be-
cause of his vital work on the farm. in 1957 John’s father died suddenly 
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of a heart attack at a relatively young age, and John was able to get an 
early discharge and come home to take over management of the farm. To 
add to his burdens, his mother died of breast cancer not long after. it was 
at this point that he resumed his earlier courtship of my sister, who was 
then secretary to the vice president for patents of  Tennessee Eastman in 
Kingsport. lois had graduated from East Tennessee Teachers College with 
a joint degree in home economics and business. They married in early 
1959 and settled down on the farm in Pennsylvania. John had already 
made the difficult decision to go into debt and buy the two-thirds of the 
estate owned by his brother and sister. Thus, the couple made a commit-
ment to a career in an increasingly specialized and capitalized agriculture 
in what had long been a very healthy farm economy, particularly in lan-
caster and York counties. John would remain a full-time farmer until his 
early death, from cancer, in 1994. For more than a decade my sister was, 
in a sense, the business manager of the farm, keeping all the records and 
ensuring that the farm took advantage of all the benefits offered by the 
federal government, as well as being a homemaker and eventually the 
mother of four children.
Despite all the advantages of a large, well-located, and fertile farm, it 
was still difficult to earn the income needed for a large family. The only 
answer was to grow by buying more land, purchasing the latest and best 
machinery, and, above all, increasing the dairy herd—the largest source 
of income. in 1964 John and lois had an opportunity that was too good 
to pass up. The owner of an adjoining dairy farm decided to sell his land, 
in part because he was of retirement age and his farm was too small to 
provide a good living. it joined most of the southern boundary of the 
Hunt farm and had been a part of their home farm in the years before 
the Civil War. land values were already rising at a rapid pace, so investing 
in the farm seemed likely to be profitable, but the immediate problem 
was how to pay for it. John and lois folded their older mortgage into a 
new one and began making regular payments. The new farm gave them 
a second house and an older but quite useful barn. They now had almost 
400 acres of very valuable land.
Above all, the new land enabled John to expand his dairy farm to 
around seventy cows, considered a midsized dairy (locally, a large dairy). 
The additional land was mainly on sloping hillsides, with little meadow 
or pasture. But the contoured fields, some with terraces funded largely 
by federal grants, approximately doubled the amount of cropland. John 
also built a new milk barn at the same time he bought the neighboring 
farm. The new barn had stanchions for forty cows (John later regretted 
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not opting for a milking parlor instead) and a pipe system that took the 
milk directly from the milkers to a new and larger stainless-steel cooling 
tank. it had a reverse system that, after milking, automatically cleansed 
the lines. The workload far exceeded the capabilities of one person, but 
the second house enabled John to employ and provide housing for a full-
time assistant, who did half the milking for a share of the gross income 
from the milk. 
By 1974, the Hunt dairy farm was the largest taxable property in 
the borough of Seven Valleys. But even 400 acres was not enough land. 
it did not fully utilize and thus justify the expensive equipment, which 
included a large truck, three or four tractors, a chopper for silage, eleva-
tors, manure spreaders, several wagons, special mowing machines that 
crushed the stems of hay, special balers that tossed the bales into a wagon 
attached behind, various plows and disks, a special corn planter for no-
till corn, and, most expensive, a combine with heads for both corn and 
small grains. The transition in agriculture, the mandate to grow or die, 
led many nearby farmers to give up. Some sold out, but many sold only 
some land and earned extra money by leasing what was left to farmers 
like John who had the equipment to cultivate it, usually for corn or pos-
sibly soybeans. Thus, by the 1980s, in some years John was leasing as 
many acres for corn as he cultivated at home. He also did custom work 
for smaller farmers, particularly combining. But in a rapidly industrializ-
ing and growing York County, land values began to soar. Thus, land along 
major roads, with huge developmental possibilities, became so valuable 
and the taxes so high that farming income provided nothing even close 
to a competitive return on the committed capital. Fortunately, the state 
and county maintained a special, lower assessment value for agricultural 
land, which allowed some farmers to survive. But by the time John died, 
he could have sold his farm and equipment, invested the money con-
servatively, and still increased his annual income. Such was the fate of 
agriculture in almost all metropolitan areas (in counties that were part of 
a statistical metropolitan area).
in 1974, at the peak of his dairy operation, John decided to give it up 
and sold his cows. They had provided him with a reliable income, but the 
work—including twice-a-day milking—was very demanding. He was 
having trouble with his knees from years of kneeling to wash the udders 
of his Holsteins (a milking parlor with a pit might have prevented this). 
But even with 400 acres, it was difficult to earn a living from other types 
of farming. Thus, my sister resumed her office work, eventually becoming 
secretary to the president of the American Chain Company in York. Her 
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off-farm employment became an important supplement to the family in-
come. in some years John bought young beef cattle and fed them off for 
market. This feeding operation could be profitable in one cycle, a loser in 
the next. John also intensively cultivated his land, rotating fields among 
corn, winter wheat, soybeans, and hay (crop rotation remained the norm 
in the hilly fields of  York County). He cultivated up to 200 acres of corn 
at home and in rented fields. like most farmers, in some years he hedged 
his returns by selling the corn before he even grew it, sometimes gaining 
on the futures market. He continued to use the old-fashioned rectangular 
bales for both hay and straw rather than the new huge, rolled bales. The 
extra labor paid off because of the large market for timothy hay and bed-
ding straw among the many horse farms in southeastern Pennsylvania. 
in some years, straw sold for as much as hay and brought in as much 
income as the wheat itself. John’s income was not large, but with lois’s 
salary to count on, the family lived well. His was among the largest lo-
cal farming operations and was more profitable than most of the Amish 
and Mennonite farms just east of his. Meanwhile, the 400 acres increased 
in value each year, so his wealth grew much more rapidly than did his 
income. Also growing were the trees in his extended woodlots, with the 
value of timber being an often overlooked asset.
in almost all respects, my sister and brother-in-law were in a posi-
tion to maximize the opportunities in one of the first great agricultural 
areas in America. John had studied agriculture in high school, avidly read 
a bundle of farm journals, and effectively adapted the newest tools and 
techniques, including the multiple chemicals (particularly herbicides) 
now required in agriculture. My sister was an excellent financial man-
ager; she reported all their income to the iRS but also took advantage 
of all the tax breaks offered to farmers (such as shortened depreciation 
schedules) and all the government payments they were entitled to. Yet, 
even with all these advantages, their annual net income from farming 
(not including capital appreciation on the land) was well below the me-
dian income for that area of Pennsylvania. only lois’s off-farm income 
pushed their household income above that median. Given these realities, 
it is understandable that every year, somewhere in the Seven Valleys area, 
John attended the farm auctions held when traditional dairy farmers with 
less land and fewer skills had to give up. The squeeze was on, and John’s 
survival was a notable achievement. Today, two of his sons continue to 
farm, concentrating on corn, wheat, hay, and beef cows. Both also have 
full-time jobs in the York area.
At the time John gave up his dairy operation, a revolution was under 
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way in dairy farming—one that he was aware of and troubled by. He 
considered the possibilities of what most called “confinement” dairying, 
which involved keeping the cows in barns or on small lots, off pasture, 
and bringing all their food to them, including grass, silage, and ground 
feed. With this system, one could buy all the necessary feed and keep 
large dairy herds on small plots of land near large cities, as was happen-
ing in California. By the time of John’s death in 1994, his type of dairy 
operation was already becoming a bit of an anachronism. Yet in his area 
of Pennsylvania, it has survived.
According to the Farm Census of 2002, more than 25,000 of the 92,000 
dairy farms in the united States had between 50 and 100 cows, or the 
size of the Hunt farm. The average acreage of these now “small” farms 
ranged from 260 to 499 acres, and the median value of the milk sold was 
well over $100,000 a year. But these small dairy operations contained 
less than 20 percent of all dairy cows and an even smaller share of total 
milk production. i believe that many of these formerly large, but now 
comparatively small, dairy farms will survive. They are the backbone of 
the farm economy in many counties, particularly in Vermont, Wisconsin, 
and Minnesota. They have strong local support. Concern for such small 
operations is also present in Congress, as reflected in a new program in 
the 2002 farm bill—special market loss payments to dairy farms with 
fewer than approximately 132 cows when grade A milk prices fall below 
the established Boston class i level. But one qualification is in order: such 
dairy farms simply cannot provide the income needed by a family that as-
pires to anything close to the average per capita consumption that is now 
standard in the united States. Thus, such farms will coexist with nonfarm 
employment by at least some family members.
Today, the degree of concentration and the scale of dairy farming 
are moving toward that which dominates in the raising of poultry and 
hogs. in 2002, 2,902 dairy farms had more than 500 cows, and almost 
all had annual sales of more than $1 million. The average herd size for 
farms with more than $1 million in sales was 1,500 cows. in total, these 
farms accounted for more than 45 percent of all milk cows in the united 
States. This trend toward the consolidation of farms and increase in scale 
is happening all over the united States in almost all areas of farming. in 
the next chapter, i explain not only what has happened but also some of 
the necessary conditions for an unprecedented agricultural revolution.
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5. Dimensions of an 
Agricultural Revolution
if one defines an industrial revolution as a dramatic increase (at least 
50 percent) in full-sector productivity during a single generation, then 
American agriculture has attained the most important industrial revolu-
tion in American history. Just like manufacturing or services, agriculture 
includes many distinct industries (or crops). Shifts in production have 
not always been synchronized among these industries, with some crops 
lagging behind others. For example, cotton, and with it the South as a 
whole, lagged behind the rest of the united States, at least until the 1950s. 
But after 1950, very few crops failed to experience an almost unbeliev-
able burst of productivity gains, with the largest gain in almost every case 
in production per unit of labor (less so, but still large, for inputs of land 
and capital). Dates are a bit arbitrary, but in no other twenty-year period 
were the agricultural gains quite so dramatic as they were from 1950 to 
1970. Change was so rapid that almost no one was able to measure, or 
comprehend, what was happening.
By most estimates, some based on thin evidence in the nineteenth 
century, the annual growth in full-factor productivity in agriculture rose, 
on average, about 1 percent a year in the century before 1935. All econo-
mists agree that, in about 1935, but clearly by 1940, this annual growth 
rate at least doubled and remained this high until 2000. And all econo-
mists agree that labor productivity was more rapid than returns on land 
or capital. What economists have not agreed on is the exact rate of this 
accelerated full-factor growth. For a heterogeneous agriculture, a defini-
tive answer may be impossible. The late Bruce l. Gardner clarified many 
of the problems involved in making such an estimate and concluded that 
98 a revolution Down on the Farm
the full-factor rate was around 2 percent. Economist Sally H. Clark, in the 
most robust estimate of full-factor growth, places it at 3 percent from 
1935 until the mid-1980s. This growth was more rapid than in any other 
economic sector and more rapid than that in all but two of the twenty 
largest manufacturing industries. She believes that the rate of growth for 
labor productivity was a hefty 4.5 percent, a truly revolutionary surge 
unrivaled by any other sector or major industry. What is amazing is the 
long-term endurance of this growth. Since 1950, labor productivity per 
hour of work in the nonfarm sectors has increased 2.5-fold; in agricul-
ture, 7-fold. in one generation, from 1950 to 1970, the workforce in 
agriculture declined by roughly half, while the value of the total product 
increased by approximately 40 percent.1
Even these numbers understate the pace of change. With each pass-
ing year, the output of small farmers (most with off-farm employment), 
who constituted more than half the 2.9 million farmers in 1970, produced 
an ever smaller proportion of the total output.  This trend continued, so that 
by 2002, only 322,625 farms produced 89 percent of all output (this is 
based on the value of what was produced, not on the pounds, bushels, or 
tons). But it is important to note that at least 425,000 principal or second-
ary operators managed these farms and that such large farms employed 
almost two-thirds of all farm laborers, most on a part-time basis.2
The gain in efficiency, based on labor input, was almost unbelievable 
in some crops. in 1900 it took 147 hours of human labor to grow 100 
bushels of wheat. By 1950 this had shrunk to only 14, and by 1990 to only 
6. For corn, the number of hours per 100 bushels shrank from 147 hours 
in 1900 to 16 in 1950 and to 3 in 1990; for cotton, from 248 hours per 
bale in 1900 to 100 in 1950 ( just as the new mechanical cotton picker 
began spreading to more and more farms) and to only 5 in 1990.  The la-
bor required to harvest 10 tons of hay fell from 65 hours in 1950 to only 
11 in 1990. in some livestock operations, the increase in efficiency was 
even greater, with chickens leading the way. in 1929 it took 85 hours of 
work to produce 1,000 pounds of broilers; by 1980 it took less than 1 hour. 
Comparable gains are now taking place for hogs. Based on Department of 
Agriculture estimates, the output per worker on American farms grew by 
68 percent in the 1950s and by 82 percent in the 1960s. output per farm 
rose tenfold from 1935 to 1997 for field crops (note that this reflects farm 
consolidation, and thus fewer farms with each passing year), and the rate 
was much faster for poultry and hogs. Such gains could not be duplicated 
for all crops, including tobacco and many fruits and vegetables.3
Almost as dramatic was the surge of the yield per acre for cultivated 
crops, which was a necessity for the productivity gains achieved since 
1950. The yield for corn, our largest national crop, rose from around 
25 bushels per acre in 1900 to 40 bushels by 1950, with the impact of 
hybridization; it doubled to 80 bushels by 1970, with the dramatic ef-
fect of herbicides, and exceeded 120 bushels an acre by 2000. The wheat 
yield rose from about 19 bushels in 1950 to 36 bushels in 1970. Cot-
ton, which yielded around 270 pounds per acre in the five years before 
1950, nearly doubled to 513 by 1972. From 1950 to 1970, annual milk 
production per cow almost doubled.
The size of farms gradually rose, although in many cases the total 
acreage reflected both owned and rented acres. in 2002 the average size 
of each farm was 441 acres, with the average value of what it produced at 
$97,000 (a number sharply reduced by small farms). in only one major 
area—poultry—does farm size not correlate at all with productivity and 
income, although the same phenomenon is increasingly true for hogs and 
dairy cows. For example, in 2002, 2,453 farms of less than 10 acres had an-
nual poultry sales of more than $50,000, but only one farm of similar size 
had comparable income from corn. in 2002 just fewer than 100,000 farms 
had as much as 1,000 acres; 19,000 had more than 2,000 acres. These very 
large farms produced 40 percent of the total agricultural product.4
How does one account for such a surge in productivity and scale? 
Most economists believe that past investment in research, development, 
and education were indirect causes. Human capital may have been all 
important. But given at least a minority of highly skilled farmers, i be-
lieve that rapid changes in four areas provided the necessary conditions 
for this long-term trend in growth: machinery, electrification, chemical 
inputs, and plant and animal breeding. By necessary conditions, i sim-
ply mean that without one of these four conditions the pace of growth 
would have been much slower. Governmental agricultural policies had 
to provide an institutional framework for this growth. How much such 
policies abetted, or possibly inhibited, this growth is the topic of the 
next chapter. it is important to note that many of the factors supporting 
productivity growth in the united States were soon present in most parts 
of the world. The agricultural revolution was a global phenomenon, al-
though nowhere else was the pace of change so rapid.
the great new maChines
new or improved tools were essential elements of growth. After World 
War ii and the devastation of Europe, American companies dominated the 
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market for farm implements. The competition was intense, and the pace 
of innovation unprecedented. The result was a level of technological so-
phistication undreamed of in the past. Without such technological prow-
ess, neither the united States nor the world as a whole could feed the 6.5 
billion people now on the earth. Hundreds of new machines increased 
labor output in every crop. American farms soon became so capital inten-
sive that the cost of entry into farming discouraged most aspirants. What 
provided the energy to run all the machines was the burning of hydro-
carbons, most from fossil fuels. The new tools required more specialized 
skills from farm operators, exponentially increased the amount of land 
needed for efficient farms, and widened the gap between highly efficient 
and specialized farmers and those who could not compete. Farming, at 
the highest level of output, is arguably our most demanding profession.
in the immediate pre–World War ii era, the most important techno-
logical innovation clearly was the tractor. But only after 1950 did tractors, 
or self-propelled harvesting machines, fully displace horses. By then, 
the modern tractor had matured. only refinements and added size and 
power have marked the last fifty years. By 1945, either bankruptcies or 
mergers had reduced the number of farm tractor producers to only seven 
domestic companies: international Harvester, John Deere, Case, Ford, 
Allis-Chalmers, oliver, and Minneapolis Moline. A Canadian company, 
Massey-Harris, offered strong competition, while Caterpillar dominated 
the market for crawler-type tractors. Subsequent mergers have reduced 
this number to only four domestic companies, but they are now chal-
lenged by a much larger number of foreign brands.
Today, tractors, many with eight wheels and four-wheel drive, pro-
vide almost all the energy required for soil preparation and planting of 
all major crops, for all haying operations, for almost all types of hauling, 
and, until herbicides eliminated most of this work, for the cultivation of 
crops. The number of tractors increased from around 3 million in 1950 
to a peak of 4.7 million in 1970; since then, the expansion has been in 
tractors’ size and power, not their number. Tractors, particularly on small 
farms, still pull and power harvesting equipment, but on large farms they 
have largely given way to self-propelled harvesters. And it was in the har-
vesting of crops that the most important postwar innovations occurred. 
Just after the war, pick-up balers and barn elevators cut in half the 
work of haying, while after 1970, the use of huge, round bales allowed 
one person to harvest a hay crop, since one could safely leave these bales 
out in the weather. Various vegetable harvesting machines, such as those 
used for lettuce and spinach, all but merge harvesting and processing. 
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Some of these huge machines can clean the vegetables and even pack 
them into boxes in the field. Although some crops, such as burley to-
bacco and certain vegetables, still defy machine harvesting, in almost all 
cases harvesting is now facilitated by machines, resulting in an enormous 
reduction in human labor and a huge shift from labor to capital inputs. 
Some machines harvest root crops, such as potatoes and sugar beets. 
Cherry pickers speed the harvest of fruits, while tree shakers help har-
vest nut crops. A type of small combine even harvests tender vegetables 
such as snap beans or peas or captures cranberries from their flooded 
bogs. Mechanical tomato harvesters pick most tomatoes (these are usu-
ally green and not very flavorful) and depend on new varieties that set 
tomatoes at one time. in almost all cases, machine harvesting has all but 
mandated a shift in scale toward larger and larger operations. it did not 
lead to a shift away from family-owned farms but to farms that, among 
major producers of field crops, routinely average more than 1,000 acres.
By far, the two most significant harvesting machines are the combine 
and the mechanical cotton picker. Both had their greatest impact in the 
period from 1950 to 1970. The combine was an old tool by 1950 (see 
chapter 1). it had revolutionized wheat production in the West and on 
the Great Plains, where it perfectly fit the short-stem grain that was usu-
ally very dry when mature. By World War ii, a few combines were used 
on the farms of the eastern united States, but they were usually smaller 
than their western counterparts. in the humid East it was not easy to get 
tall wheat or other small grains ripe and dry enough for the combine 
without the risk of falling and even rotting. After the war, new drying 
equipment in grain elevators helped relieve this problem, with farmers 
deducting the cost of drying from the price they received for the grain. 
Also, smaller eastern farmers wished to retain their straw, which was not 
easy with combines until the perfection of pick-up balers after World 
War ii. Thus, it was only after 1945 that the combine replaced the binder 
and the threshing machine in all grain-producing regions. until then, 
most combines had been pulled by tractors, as some still are on small 
farms. But even the smallest of these machines were very expensive and 
not cost-effective on small farms. This left two alternatives for grain farm-
ers—increase the scale of production by buying or renting more land, or 
hire custom operators to do the combining. Both occurred.
Two innovations dramatically increased the role of combines. one 
was the development and marketing of self-propelled combines. The first 
self-propelled combines were used in Argentina and Australia as early as 
the mid-1920s. Just before World War ii, a Canadian company, Massey-
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Harris, developed a new self-propelled combine. it shipped 500 to the 
Great Plains in 1944 and, with great publicity, formed a harvest brigade 
to do custom combining from Texas to Saskatchewan. By the end of the 
war, almost all manufacturers introduced self-propelled versions that 
were larger and more efficient than tractor-drawn models. instead of a 
trailing cutter bar, which had to be offset from the tractor (otherwise, the 
tractor would trample the grain), the cutter bar was now centered on the 
front of self-propelled combines, allowing grain heads as wide as thirty-
six feet (see figure 8). 
The second major development was the introduction of combine 
heads that would strip and shell corn. The self-propelled combine was 
perfectly adapted for this purpose, but the technological requirements 
were intimidating. like for small grains, elevators had to develop ways to 
dry shelled corn, for in some years it was almost impossible to have fully 
dry corn by harvest time. John Deere first produced corn heads for one of 
its self-propelled combines in 1953 and began marketing them the next 
year. over the next five years these were perfected and became increas-
ingly common on large farms (the heads were very expensive). By 1965, 
combines shelled more than half of all corn; by 1970, they shelled almost 
all of it in the Corn Belt. Today, the largest combines have heads for up to 
twelve rows and can shell more than 500 bushels an hour (see figure 9). 
Figure 8. Contemporary John Deere combine with small-grain head. ( John Deere)
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They replaced the earlier machines that only harvested corn ears, leav-
ing shelling as an extra step. With the perfected combine, all the major 
grains at the time of harvest went into large pools held in elevators. no 
one owned any particular grain; farmers claimed only a certain number 
of bushels in the pool. Specialized combines can harvest almost all seed 
crops. By changing screens to fit the size of the seeds, they can harvest 
most varieties of grass seed, soybeans, sorghum, and sunflowers.5
Given the versatility of combines, they are clearly the supreme imple-
ments in contemporary agriculture. no other machine, with the pos-
sible exception of the mechanical cotton picker, has displaced so many 
farmworkers, so lowered the unit cost of crops, and so directly affected 
the structure of farming in America. Their level of technological sophis-
tication is almost beyond belief. For example, recent self-propelled com-
bines, with their luxurious, air-conditioned cabins and airplane-like array 
of gauges, can provide a detailed nutrient map of every field harvested. 
Sensors record the minute-by-minute flow of grain into the bin, while a 
global positioning system (GPS) records the exact coordinates that match 
the flow data. This allows a farmer to so program his drills as to increase 
the flow of fertilizer to lean areas during the next planting season.
The largest combines cost more than $250,000. no small farmers can 
afford such a machine unless they do extensive custom work on dozens 
Figure 9. John Deere combine with corn head. ( John Deere)
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of neighboring farms. Even small, tractor-pulled combines, which are 
still on the market, are too expensive for the limited time they are needed 
on a 300-acre farm. Thus, in the eastern united States, the usual pattern 
is for a few large farmers to buy combines and use them for custom 
combining on nearby small farms. in the major Wheat Belt of the Great 
Plains, the dominant pattern is custom combining, or a throwback to the 
pattern of the old threshing machine. Gangs of large, self-propelled com-
bines follow the wheat harvest from Texas to north Dakota each summer. 
A wheat farmer does not need to have any direct contact with his land. 
The owners of custom machinery can, in one operation, prepare the soil 
and drill the wheat. Thus a wheat farmer with 10,000 acres in nebraska 
might live in omaha and never even see his wheat fields. in this case, 
growing wheat is comparable to a high-risk investment, but the risk is 
considerably reduced by various government programs.
Another harvesting machine, though not so widespread in use, had 
an even greater regional impact than the combine. A machine that could 
harvest cotton revolutionized the American South and slowly restruc-
tured the cotton-growing industry. After a hundred years of experimen-
tation, a few inventors had developed nearly successful machine pickers 
before the Great Depression. These first machines, available by the 1930s, 
stripped the bolls from the plants and then separated out the lint. Such 
“strippers” were well adapted only for the short, very dry cotton plants 
of Texas and oklahoma, where some are still used. Elsewhere, farmers 
needed machines that could pull the lint from the bolls, or what would 
be known as spindle machines. in Memphis, John and Daniel Rust had 
working spindle machines by 1936 and demonstrated them on nearby 
Mississippi farms in 1942. Their old Red picker of 1943 is now exhib-
ited in the Smithsonian (see figure 10). in 1944 one of their machines 
harvested all the cotton on one large farm. Wartime restrictions allowed 
only limited commercial manufacture, with international Harvester sell-
ing about 1,000 machines during the war. These machines, which used 
wetted spindles and, later, burred spindles to pull the lint from the cotton 
boll, attracted both bountiful publicity and fear. it seemed as if the whole 
plantation system might be at risk, and both owners and sharecroppers 
were concerned. international Harvester began a large commercial pro-
duction of one-row pickers in a plant near Memphis in 1947, while John 
Deere introduced a two-row picker in 1950.
in 1950 the new machines began gradually to replace the long, te-
dious hand labor involved in the cotton harvest. The first machines had 
some critical limitations. They collected so much trash (up to 250 pounds 
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per bale) that few existing gins could accept the dirty bales. Also, the 
early machines left at least 15 percent of the cotton in the fields. Thus, 
wholesale adoption of the new pickers required several parallel improve-
ments—more efficient pickers, new gins with more elaborate cleaning 
devices, pre- and postemergent herbicides to reduce weeds, defoliants to 
strip the plants of leaves just before harvest, and new varieties of cotton 
that were taller and matured more uniformly. it is not surprising that the 
new machine had its first major impact in California, where irrigated cot-
ton was a new crop. Half the California cotton was harvested by machine 
as early as 1951. nationally, only 10 percent of cotton was harvested by 
machine as late as 1957, but almost half by 1960. The greatest lag in use 
was on the smaller farms of the Southeast, where the crop was already in 
steep decline. But by 1971 the revolution was just about over, with more 
than 90 percent of cotton picked by machine. For no other crop were the 
two decades from 1950 to 1970 so critical.6
Cotton pickers experienced the same shift in size and power as did 
combines. Self-propelled from the beginning, the machines grew in size 
with each decade. Today, some machines can pick six or eight rows, and 
a few, adapted for close-row planting, can harvest twelve. The cabs of 
pickers resemble those of combines, and GPS technology is beginning to 
Figure 10. old Red, a 1943 international Harvester cotton picker, one of the first 
successful models. (national Museum of American History, a gift of Producers Cot-
ton oil Company)
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allow the same type of field mapping. Complementing the picker is a new 
technique of getting the cotton to gins. More than 90 percent of cotton 
is now emptied from the bins of pickers into long, trucklike containers 
called modules, in which special tamping devices compact the cotton 
into tight, weather-resistant, truck-size bales that can be left in the field 
for days before tractor trailers haul them to the gin.
Structurally, the picker helped concentrate the Cotton Belt in the more 
expansive farms of the Mississippi Delta, the plains of central Texas, and 
the irrigated fields of the San Joaquin Valley of California. it was never 
useful on small cotton farms and in small fields. Thus small farmers either 
stopped growing cotton or sold out to larger farmers. in the Piedmont, 
few cotton farms survived except in parts of Georgia. in the 1930s around 
a million farmers grew cotton. By 1950, just as mechanical pickers began 
to have a wide impact, the number of cotton farms was down to just over 
300,000. By 1974, when almost all cotton was picked by machine, the 
number was 80,000. in 2002 the number of cotton farms had shrunk to 
fewer than 25,000, with only 11,000 large farms producing 85 percent 
of the total. in much of the South, soybeans have all but replaced cotton, 
which has faced intense foreign competition and suffered from the use 
of synthetic fibers.7
Gradually, the mechanized cotton industry eroded the old sharecrop-
ping system of the South, even as it drove small farmers out of business. 
new Deal farm policies and wartime labor scarcities in the north had 
already lured more than 3 million migrants from the South to the north 
between 1930 and 1950, before the cotton picker had much impact. Ap-
proximately 2 million of these migrants were black, and almost all were 
from rural areas. From 1950 to 1970, in the midst of the technological 
revolution in cotton, more than 4 million southerners migrated, half of 
them black. This was the greatest internal migration in American history. 
These migrants in the 1950–1970 period often left not because they were 
pushed out by farm owners but because of the pull of northern jobs and, 
for blacks, greater equality. The push and pull were always interactive, 
but the end result was a transformed and much more efficient southern 
agriculture and a rapid reduction of farm labor in the South, with almost 
all blacks leaving agriculture (only 30,000 black farm operators today). 
Even among historians, the images associated with this migration vary 
immensely. on one hand, there are those, like Pete Daniel, who portray 
the migrants as victims of a modern enclosure movement facilitated by 
federal agricultural policies; on the other hand are those who rejoice 
at the liberation of former small farmers and sharecroppers from pov-
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erty, drudgery, and, for blacks, discrimination. Either way, in no other 
crop has the impact of new agricultural technology been so powerful, 
or the effects on American society so dramatic. Since 1950, the percent-
age gains in farm production have been greatest in the South, which has 
steadily narrowed the formerly large gap in production and income. Thus 
the rapid convergence of southern agriculture with national norms after 
1950 was a major aspect of an industrial revolution, with all its benefits 
and all its human costs.8
eleCtriFiCation
The second major requirement for an agricultural revolution was elec-
trification. only 11 percent of farms had electricity in 1935. The rural 
electrification program helped raise this to around 35 percent by World 
War ii. The subsidized expansion after the war was very rapid, with 85 
percent of farms electrified by 1950 and 97 percent by 1960. Rural tele-
phones, which lagged behind electricity, gained federal subsidies in 1949 
and, by 1964, were present on 76 percent of farms. For the major field 
crops, electricity might not seem very important, except in the critical 
area of irrigation. Electric motors replaced the windmill, powering the 
pumps for deep wells and providing the water pressure for huge spray-
type irrigation. in the barn, electricity did far more than provide lighting; 
it powered elevators for hay bales or for silage, grinders for sharpening 
tools, air compressors, and many different shop tools.
it was among livestock farmers that electricity proved most revolu-
tionary. The greatest productivity gains in modern agricultural history 
would be inconceivable without electricity to warm and cool the caged 
animals, power the automated provision of food and water, and pro-
vide lighting in what amount to poultry and hog factories. Electricity is 
also at the heart of modern dairy farming. it pumps the water, powers 
the suction milkers, cools the stainless-steel tanks, ventilates the holding 
barns and milking parlors, heats the water for the sanitary cleansing of 
lines and milkers, pulls the manure out of holding barns, and automati-
cally dispenses feed (as it does in large beef-feeding operations). in the 
farmhouse, which has always been part of the total production enter-
prise, electrical appliances reduced the work of wives or servants, helped 
displace many domestic workers, and, through the radio, television, and 
now indispensable computer, provided the necessary market information 
for farmers. Record keeping is a vital part of farm operations, as is careful 
tax planning, all facilitated by a well-equipped farm office.
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ChemiCal inPuts 
new chemicals provided the third necessary condition for an agricul-
tural revolution. This is a complex subject and involves five categories of 
chemicals: fertilizers, insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, and medica-
tions. of the five, fertilizers and herbicides had the greatest impact on 
the production of crops, with medications presently having the most 
profound, but often highly controversial, impact on livestock.
Fertilizers
Plants depend on soil nutrients. Some new soils have an abundance of 
nutrients based on their original chemical composition supplemented 
by the past decay of plant materials. But sooner or later, heavy cropping 
exhausts most of these stored nutrients, and soil ceases to be productive. 
Even ancient farmers understood this reality and worked out methods of 
coping with it. one was a rotation pattern that allowed land to lay fallow 
(at rest from soil-depleting, heavy-foliage crops) for one or more crop 
seasons. This allowed wild vegetation to grow, decay, and add organic 
matter and nutrients to the soil. Equally important, farmers spread ma-
nure on fields to add nutrients, and they sometimes plowed under lush 
vegetation as a type of green manure. They buried seaweed or fish in hills 
to nourish crops and learned the value of ground-up bones. By the eigh-
teenth century they realized that legumes enriched the soil (they store 
nitrates in airtight nodules on roots) and grew clover for that purpose. 
They also knew that the application of marl (a type of very alkaline soil) 
to some fields could increase the yield. it made the soil “sweet,” as they 
said, which meant that the calcium carbonate in the marl reduced soil 
acidity. Today, lime serves this purpose.
By 1880, with a maturation of the soil sciences, humans were able 
to test and evaluate the nutrients in soil and seek more effective ways 
of increasing its fertility. Soil scientists, in both universities and fertil-
izer companies, slowly established analytic standards for determining 
the nutrients in synthetic fertilizers. By then, farmers were buying larger 
amounts of such fertilizers, which contained mostly phosphates and pot-
ash with very limited amounts of nitrogen, the most expensive of the 
three main nutrients. The earth contains only small deposits of nitrates, 
located largely in nitrate-rich minerals in Chile or in hardened guano 
deposits in Peru. The process of creating coke also yields small amounts 
of nitrate. until World War i, no one had developed an inexpensive means 
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of extracting nitrates from atmospheric nitrogen. The most common 
technique involved a cyanamide process that required huge amounts of 
electricity to gain the free hydrogen needed to create nitrates for both 
munitions and fertilizer.
Although all soil nutrients have a chemical profile, and the nutri-
ents absorbed by plants are always inorganic in form, the word chemical 
usually denotes fertilizers with ingredients that humans have somehow 
transformed from their natural state. Thus, i refer to them as synthetic 
fertilizers. Historians usually trace the origins of synthetic fertilizers to 
1840, when an English chemist discovered that the phosphorus in animal 
bones, when treated with a solution of sulfuric acid, yielded the types of 
phosphate that plants could quickly utilize (he called it superphosphate). 
He gained a patent and began selling phosphate fertilizer in 1842. By 
1850, such phosphates, made from bones, were on sale in the united 
States, but their use was very limited until 1867, when large deposits of 
phosphate rock were discovered in South Carolina.
As it turned out, the united States had (and still has) large deposits 
of phosphate ore. Beginning in 1867, phosphate factories in Charleston 
began using sulfuric acid to convert the rock phosphate into superphos-
phate. later, the mining of phosphate ore shifted to other states, notably 
Florida and Tennessee. The largest market for such synthetic fertilizer was 
in the Southeast, where soils were severely depleted of nutrients. By 1880, 
some companies were marketing fertilizer with not only phosphates but 
also potash imported from Germany and small amounts of nitrates, most 
imported from Chile and Peru.
Another important ingredient in commercial fertilizers is potassium, 
in the form of potash (largely potassium chloride). Many soils, particu-
larly clay soils, are naturally rich in potash. Thus, heavily cropped soils 
often run out of phosphorus and nitrogen before potash. Appropriately, 
potash is the least critical of the top three nutrients and is usually listed 
last on standard content labels (nitrogen–phosphorus–potash). Potash 
was the first valuable industrial chemical exploited in colonial America, 
and the first patent issued in the united States was for a new method 
of refining crude potash. But such potash was too expensive to use as a 
fertilizer until after the Civil War and the development of potash mines 
in Europe (it is plentiful in dry lake beds or in deposits from long-since 
evaporated seas). originally, potash was a direct product of wood ashes, 
which America had in plentitude. Farmers soaked wood ashes in water to 
dissolve the potassium carbonate, creating lye. By the eighteenth century, 
lye, along with fat, was the basis of soap making and was also used in 
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making glass, hominy, and gunpowder. Most farms had an ash pit, which 
allowed trickling rainwater to create the lye needed for household use. 
When lye water evaporates, the residue is a form of crude potash, which 
can be refined into a purer, white powder by heating in a kiln. Although 
farmers could not afford this early product for their fields, they knew the 
value of ashes, which they often applied to crops. Also, they recognized 
the increased yield gained from the ashes of trees burned to create new 
soil. More than 90 percent of potash from mines is now made into fertil-
izer, with some mines in the united States but even more in Canada.9
nitrogen depletion long remained the most intractable fertility prob-
lem for farmers. nitrogen is vital for plant growth, particularly for grasses, 
yet it does not remain in the soil for long periods because of rapid leach-
ing by rainwater. The intense heat of lightning in thunderstorms adds 
nitrates to rainwater, but not nearly enough for depleted soils. Manure is 
a good source, but no farmer could collect enough for all his fields. ni-
trogen in organic form is available from bones and from plant material, 
such as cotton seed. organic decay in fallow fields creates slow-release 
nitrates. it was largely the nitrogen problem that made it impossible to 
grow crops year after year on the same land, except for rare soils with 
deep organic content. Fortunately, in the united States, the rich alluvial 
soils of the Midwest had enough organic content and enough nitrogen to 
produce crops for up to a century without fertilizer, but even those soils 
were eventually depleted. When i was a boy, local farmers desperately 
needed more manure than their livestock provided, or more clover than 
they could plow under in the spring. Too often they passed up more ex-
pensive fertilizers that included nitrogen and purchased an inexpensive 
0–10– 4 fertilizer with no nitrogen, resulting in poor yields of corn. They 
too often piled all their manure on their small but vital tobacco patches. 
For the garden, or occasionally for tobacco, they bought five-pound bags 
of Chilean nitrates, or what they called nitrate of soda. After the Depres-
sion, the increased availability of affordable nitrogen fertilizer helped 
launch the agricultural revolution. We enjoyed a nitrogen bonanza.
in 1913 Fritz Haber in Germany discovered a new process for con-
verting the nitrogen in the atmosphere, which is inert and not available 
for plants, into ammonia (nH
3
). Plants can directly absorb the nitrogen 
in ammonia, making it a valuable fertilizer. The process required a ma-
jor source of free hydrogen, which was almost always methane (nH
4
)
, 
the main ingredient in natural gas. The first use of this process was for 
munitions. During World War i, the federal government constructed the 
large Wilson Dam at Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River in northern 
111Dimensions of an Agricultural Revolution
Alabama. its purpose was to gain the power needed to create nitrates, pri-
marily for explosives needed in the war, but with a secondary purpose of 
producing affordable nitrate fertilizers for the impoverished South. The 
fertilizer proposals bogged down in the 1920s with the battle over public 
versus private operation of the Muscle Shoals project, but by then, a few 
commercial fertilizer companies were using the Haber process.10
in 1933, with the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 
the advocates of public ownership won out. Muscle Shoals became the 
site of fertilizer research, development, and demonstration in the na-
tional Fertilizer Development Center. in the Depression years, the TVA 
concentrated on developing new and better phosphate fertilizers, or what 
it called triple superphosphates. During World War ii it produced am-
monium nitrate for munitions and started selling it to farmers in 1943. 
At the end of the war, ammonium nitrate (still widely used) was the first 
major nitrate fertilizer widely available to farmers. The TVA became the 
main research and development center for fertilizer, in most cases offer-
ing its findings to private companies. it helped develop granulated forms 
of fertilizer for easier application, developed a very concentrated liquid 
form of nitrogen (anhydrous ammonia), and created a blend of phos-
phate and nitrogen (ammonium polyphosphate).11 For years, the united 
States led the world in nitrate production, but no more. The soaring price 
of natural gas has led to the importation of most nitrate fertilizer, as well 
as most potash. But the united States still exports phosphates.
By 1950 farmers were rapidly increasing their use of nitrates. in many 
cases, farmers used too many nitrates or used them at the wrong time, 
with major pollution problems as a consequence. Because of rapid leach-
ing, nitrates remain in the ground for short periods. The most efficient 
use requires an application at the time of rapid plant growth. Thus, many 
farmers applied ammonium nitrate or anhydrous ammonia to growing 
crops, which they referred to as a side dressing. Because of precise mea-
surements of soil nutrients, present-day farmers have often been able to 
reduce the amount of fertilizer used, with major benefits to the environ-
ment. Despite such calibrated use, they now face rapidly rising fertilizer 
costs, most tied to the surge in the prices of oil and natural gas.
After World War ii, all successful farmers used both lime and fertilizer 
in the quantities needed to maximize yields. Soil testing allowed a cali-
brated use, with some farmers pushing the use even beyond diminishing 
returns. The great surge of use came before 1980, not since. From the 
war until 1980, fertilizer use expanded by around 4.5 percent each year, 
and this on a slightly declining amount of soil under cultivation. Most 
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dramatic was the increase in nitrogen, from 2.7 million tons in 1960 to 
11.4 million in 1980.12
This meant that, for the first time in human history, the average farm-
er could grow crops on the same fields year after year. Previously, this 
had been possible only on fields that flooded annually, such as in the 
nile Valley.  The soil has become not the primary source of nutrients but 
a storage bin to receive nutrients from the outside. in this sense, modern 
farmers have finally solved many of the problems of soil exhaustion and 
made most crop rotation a thing of the past, although most corn farmers 
still rotate corn and soybeans. But note that such continuous cropping can 
deplete the organic content of soil, increase plant diseases, and thus lower 
the productivity of soils. Recycling the plant litter each year is only a partial 
answer. This form of chemical agriculture has other problems, including 
environmental ones. Yet synthetic fertilizers are essential for the level of 
production needed to feed the earth’s presently inflated population.
Insecticides and Fungicides
in some locations and for some crops (such as cotton during the boll 
weevil invasion, or corn after the importation of the corn borer), insect 
infestations are a greater threat than soil exhaustion. More than 700 in-
sects can do serious damage to American crops, fruits, and forests. The 
use of insecticides dates back to Roman times or earlier. Humans learned 
how to repel insects with mud baths or the fumes of burning sulfur. By 
the nineteenth century, several readily available insecticides—sulfur, to-
bacco juice, soapy water, vinegar, lye, and turpentine—worked for some 
insects. For enclosed areas, cyanide gas killed most insects. By the twenti-
eth century, three natural insecticides—one inorganic (arsenic) and two 
derived from plants (rotenone and pyrethrum)—were widely used. i can 
remember spraying both arsenic and rotenone on our garden crops dur-
ing the Depression. Both had risks. Arsenic was deadly to animals, includ-
ing humans, and rotenone to fish. in fact, a major use of rotenone today 
is to clear ponds of unwanted fish. Some inorganic insecticides remain in 
use, such as sulfur for mites and chiggers and boric acid for cockroaches. 
Some of the older, plant-derived insecticides, such as the pyrethroids, are 
now widely used on field crops.
A revolution in insecticide research began during World War ii, lead-
ing to hundreds of synthetic (that is, human created) insecticides, al-
though many are derived from existing organic substances. The different 
families of insecticides are grouped according to the base chemicals used, 
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such as chlorine, carbon, phosphate, nicotine, sulfur, and carbonic acid. 
The most famous insecticides were the early chlorinated hydrocarbons, 
led by DDT. in all but one respect (it proved deadly for some species of 
birds), it was the best insecticide ever developed—inexpensive, broad 
spectrum, and with no apparent threat to humans. Through mosquito 
control, it saved millions of lives. Although banned in most countries, 
DDT is still widely used for malaria control in Africa. Another insecti-
cide in the same family, chlordane, offered almost perfect control over 
ants and termites but was eventually banned because of its threat to 
humans.
Another major class of insecticides has a phosphorus base. This 
class of chemicals includes sarin, a deadly nerve gas. Today, almost 
all organophosphates are banned. The one exception is Malathion, a 
broad-spectrum insecticide still used for garden and fruit crops. Some 
derivatives of nicotine are used as systemics (absorbed by the roots of 
plants) and for the treatment of turf, rice, and potatoes. one of the most 
widely used insecticides today—Sevin—is derived from carbonic acid. 
organic sulfur compounds are used as miticides. The list goes on and 
on, but in almost every class of insecticide, a majority are now banned 
as unsafe for humans or for desirable insects, such as honeybees. it is 
remotely possible that insecticides or other farm chemicals caused the 
colony collapse disorder that in 2008 threatened the main pollinator of 
most fruit and vegetable crops. in other cases, insects developed resis-
tance to certain insecticides. Thus new insecticides appear almost every 
year, including a recent introduction that controls caterpillars by minute 
quantities. Despite the risks, insecticides, whether synthetic or natural, 
are indispensable in modern agriculture, both to maintain the volume 
of production and to meet the cosmetic standards of consumers (no one 
wants to find a worm in an apple or an ear of corn).
These synthetic insecticides are not the only means of controlling 
insects, but in many cases they are the cheapest and most effective. Some 
bacterial insecticides are widely used, such as Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis), a 
naturally occurring soil pathogen. it is sold as a powder or a spray and 
is very effective against the larval stages of moths, mosquitoes, and black 
flies. it is now incorporated in genetically modified corn to provide built-
in insect resistance. one variant is even effective against the boll weevil. it 
is not toxic to humans, birds, or animals, but it is expensive. Another bac-
teria that also occurs in some soils is Bacillus popillae, which causes a milky 
spore disease in Japanese beetles. However, the cost of application is very 
high, and gaining the necessary level of concentration is always difficult. 
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other options include pheromones, which are effective in luring some 
insects into traps. Some oil sprays and insecticidal soaps protect against 
certain insects or diseases on fruit trees and vegetables. Alternatively, one 
can use “friendly” insects to control pests, as when i buy boxes of lady-
bugs to control aphids on my tomatoes. 
organic farmers make use of all these nonsynthetic forms of control, 
but at present, it is not possible to control most insects on large fields 
at an acceptable cost without synthetic insecticides, which are short-lived 
and in most cases pose no overt threat to human health if one follows all 
the proper precautions. This is a big “if,” because too many home owners 
and even professional farmers ignore the rules. Everyone who buys fresh 
food today will inevitably consume some residue from insecticides, even as 
they benefit enormously from the abundant food supply insecticides make 
possible. Also, the long-term effects of insecticides on humans may not be 
known for decades or longer, as indicated by a recent finding that certain 
inherited problems caused by DDT appear only in the third generation.
Fungal diseases are not as ubiquitous as insects, but they can pose 
the greatest threat to crops and to human welfare. Human history has 
been vitally affected by fungi, such as the potato blight in nineteenth-
century ireland. Most crops and many trees are subject to attack from 
mold, rust, scale, blight, mildew, yeast infection, scab, and smut. Most 
gardeners are familiar with the fungus problem: roses suffer from black 
spot, tomatoes from blight, and apple trees from cedar rust. At present, 
the most active threat to American crops is from Asian soybean rust. in 
the past, both wheat and corn have faced deadly fungal attacks that placed 
the whole crop in jeopardy. This has led to a twofold counterattack—the 
development of resistant plant varieties, and the development and use of 
fungicides, which can be very expensive when whole crops are threat-
ened. Because diseases can quickly become resistant to a given fungicide, 
chemical companies develop new ones every year. Today, we have more 
than 300 listed fungicides in the united States. Most have trade names, 
and some are very dangerous to humans if not handled with great care. 
Fungicides have become very specialized, with some aimed at a single 
disease or a single crop. in many cases, because of the high cost, farmers 
tolerate a certain level of infection before they resort to fungicides. Also, 
the pace of plant research is such that resistant varieties are available for 
most diseases. note that fungi are not responsible for all plant diseases, 
such as those tied to nematodes, bacteria, or viruses. in the case of viral 
diseases, no treatment is available except rotation. Thus my cantaloupes 
die of fusarium wilt every summer.
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Herbicides
unlike insecticides and fungicides, no organic herbicides were on the 
market before World War ii. Yet few discoveries have so changed agricul-
ture. it all began with chemicals to kill broad-leaved plants (this includes 
many crops, such as cotton, soybeans, and tobacco). For about a decade, 
only two existed: 2,4-D and the closely related 2,4,5-T. The latter was 
Agent orange of Vietnam infamy, an often deadly gas not because of 
the herbicide but because of a contaminant in its manufacture—dioxin 
(since eliminated). otherwise, these herbicides were safe for humans 
in all but very high concentrations and remain in use today. Continued 
research led to whole families of herbicides with different, often highly 
specialized purposes. Some are useful in water; others kill various grasses. 
Some work as preemergents, such as those used in yard fertilizer to pre-
vent crabgrass.13
in crop agriculture, herbicides were revolutionary for one reason: 
they all but eliminated the need to cultivate row crops. This meant an 
enormous saving of human labor and a dramatic increase in production 
per acre. For corn, herbicides raised production more than had hybrid-
ization. Farmers could now reduce the width of corn rows from three 
feet or more to as little as twenty inches, in some cases almost doubling 
production. With the introduction of preemergents in the 1980s, cotton 
farmers could do the same. Thus, by 1982, American farmers used herbi-
cides on 95 percent of corn and 93 percent of cotton. 
in the 1980s new nonselective, or universal, herbicides (they kill 
all plant life) made possible what is called no-till cultivation. instead of 
plowing and harrowing the fields, one simply applied a universal herbi-
cide at a safe period before planting, leaving a cover of dead vegetation. 
no-till has been almost universally adopted in some regions of the coun-
try, particularly for row crops. in certain river basins it has become a near 
necessity to meet erosion or pollution standards, often with Department 
of Agriculture subsidies available to help make the transition. in one final 
strategy, Monsanto scientists are now genetically modifying soybeans to 
make the plants immune to the most popular nonselective herbicide—its 
own Roundup.
no-till required new and, in some cases, expensive planters of vary-
ing design. My brother-in-law used a no-till corn planter with a deep, 
single-foot plow, like one used for subsoiling, to break through the 
hardpan created by years of normal plowing. Following this were two 
disks that created the furrow for seeds and two funnels for fertilizer, fol-
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lowed by a covering wheel. in the hilly Palouse of  Washington, wheat 
farmers developed a heavy drill with enough weight to allow the row- 
creating disks to penetrate the stubble. These costly machines require a 
huge, eight-wheeled diesel tractor to pull them. Corn farmers can now 
plant in one operation and, other than the follow-up application of a 
selective herbicide, do nothing more until they combine the corn in the 
fall. no-till does not necessarily increase production, but it saves labor, 
protects against erosion, and, in critical watersheds, lessens the chemical 
runoff. Because it delays the drying of the soil in the spring, no-till is not 
practical in some northern states, where farmers often substitute low-till 
methods (with disks or chiseling plows) or ridge-type cultivation.14 
Herbicides pose some dangers. They can cause problems when broad-
cast from the air, for even minute particles can damage nearby crops. 
When used to control vegetation along roads and railroads, they dramati-
cally reduce wildlife habitat, as Rachel Carson emphasized. Thus, great 
care is needed in their application. in order to purchase some herbicides, 
farmers must obtain a license, which is issued only after they attend 
courses on methods of safe application. 
Antibiotics and Steroids
A final category of chemicals relates almost entirely to livestock. Antibi-
otics and hormones have become both important and controversial. Just 
after World War ii, penicillin, considered a miracle drug in military med-
icine, became the first great antibiotic. Even as humans benefited from 
its use, veterinarians began prescribing it for farm animals, with great 
success. Such therapeutic uses of penicillin and other antibiotics became 
routine. Many farmers learned how to store and use these drugs with-
out having to call a vet. Antibiotics had a significant impact on livestock 
health and productivity. Chronic diseases, such as mastitis and pink eye 
in cattle, were finally curable. Without antibiotics, the hog and chicken 
operations of today would have been impossible. Chicken coops hous-
ing up to 20,000 birds, and narrow boxes or cages holding up to 4,000 
hogs, create high stress levels and invite epidemics.15
it was the nontherapeutic use of both antibiotics and hormones that 
created decades of continuing controversy. Both clearly enhanced growth 
and thus led to dramatic gains in meat and milk production. Farmers 
began routinely mixing antibiotics with animal feed not to treat any ill-
ness but to prevent infections and, even more important, to stimulate 
growth or allow a more efficient use of feed. The growth-enhancing ef-
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fect of antibiotics for healthy animals was a surprise, and one that has 
not been fully explained. Somehow, a steady diet of low-level antibiotics 
kills harmful bacteria in the stomachs of cattle, hogs, and chickens and 
thus makes the digestive process more effective. By the 1980s, the use of 
such antibiotics had become standard practice in poultry and hogs and, 
in some cases, feedlot beef cattle. 
By some estimates, up to 70 percent of all antibiotics in America are 
consumed by livestock. The u.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
has approved all the antibiotics in use (up to twenty-five in all). The 
drugs, which are administered in very low concentrations, must be 
withdrawn from animal feed well before slaughter, and the FDA has 
set strict standards for antibiotic residues and has mandated tests to en-
sure compliance. Even so, this practice is now under attack in all meat- 
producing countries. Concerns largely involve the possible development 
of antibiotic-resistant strains of disease-causing organisms, as well as is-
sues of animal welfare. Most of the debates center on poultry and the pos-
sibility that humans might be infected with resistant strains of Salmonella 
from chickens.
By 2002, the tide had clearly turned against drugged chickens. The 
major chicken producers, including Tyson and Perdue, announced the 
end of the use of antibiotics for growth enhancement, with a bit of hedg-
ing about their use for disease prevention. in 2007 a carefully crafted bill 
in Congress sought to ban most growth-enhancing antibiotics, a step 
already taken in European countries. McDonald’s led the way among 
fast-food companies in rejecting drug-treated chickens. Meanwhile, the 
widespread agitation helped create a rapidly growing market for drug-
free chickens. Animal welfare issues helped boost the sale of free-range 
chickens. Thus, even though antibiotics helped make large chicken fac-
tories possible and increased the birds’ weight gain by up to 10 per-
cent, they never really revolutionized this industry, although their role 
in controlling diseases remains critical. Since hog factories use the same 
antibiotics, they face the same pressures to drop them. For cattle produc-
ers, who never used antibiotics routinely, the controversy largely involves 
growth-enhancing hormones.16 
in the case of beef cattle, hormone use has not aroused the concern of 
most consumers (an early use of hormones in chickens was subsequently 
banned). But critics have raised enough concerns to create a growing 
market for organic beef or at least beef without any hormones. in large 
cattle feeding lots, sex hormones or, more often, synthetic derivatives 
(beginning in 1951 with stilbestrol, a synthetic estrogen) are routinely 
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implanted in the animals’ ears in the form of small pellets. The preferred 
drug today is Trenbolone. The result is comparable to steroid use by hu-
mans. The hormones bulk up the muscles of cattle and thus increase the 
amount of lean meat by 15 percent or more. Since European countries 
have banned such hormones, one effect of their use has been a loss of 
some export markets. The hormones increase, very slightly, the level of 
sex hormones in the resulting meat, but this apparently poses no risk to 
humans. Some critics disagree with this benign judgment, and a growing 
segment of consumers has expressed concern. To outlaw such hormones 
would be a major blow to large beef producers and would also deny 
American consumers the type of lean beef they now prefer.
Dairy farmers have their own special chemical—recombinant bovine 
growth hormone (rBGH)—but they may have to give it up. Here the 
controversy has been intense and often marked by more heat than light. 
Monsanto, which developed and patented rBGH, is also responsible for 
the development of genetically modified field crops. Because this hor-
mone occurs naturally in all cows, Monsanto claims that it is not danger-
ous. in the past, small amounts of the hormone had been taken from the 
bodies of slaughtered cows and used to stimulate milk production in spe-
cial situations. But this source was so limited as to preclude general use. 
Monsanto scientists found a way to use recombinant DnA to produce 
large quantities of rBGH, using the same techniques that had led to a syn-
thetic form of insulin. in 1993, in one of the most controversial decisions 
it ever rendered, the FDA approved the use of rBGH (Monsanto called it 
Postlac) for milk cows. Monsanto correctly argued that the hormone was 
chemically similar to what cows produce themselves. The added quanti-
ties stimulate lactation and thus increase the milk produced by a given 
cow by up to 15 percent. For large dairy operations, this could mean the 
difference between profits and losses. Thus, 30 to 50 percent of all milk 
cows (the estimates vary widely) were on Postlac by 2007. Because of the 
cost, it is not widely used by small dairy farmers.
The controversy over Postlac first climaxed after its introduction in 
1993. The one critical issue was whether the milk was safe for humans. 
like any drug, rBGH posed some risks for the cows. it increased the in-
cidence of mastitis, the leading udder disease in milk cows, partly as a 
consequence of the increase in lactation. For this reason alone, European 
countries and Canada refused to approve its use. one consequence of 
an increased level of BGH in the blood is an increase in another growth 
hormone, insulin growth factor (iGF-1). Whereas BGH is distinctly dif-
ferent from human growth hormone, iGF is almost identical in both spe-
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cies. Thus, milk containing BGH could increase human iGF, although the 
amount would be very small. is this dangerous? Many activists insisted 
that it might be, and they gained support from concerned scientists. The 
controversy seemed to lessen in the years after 1994, only to revive again 
after 2002, and as i write, it is still ongoing. images of a monopolistic 
company, inflated costs for patented medicines, huge dairy farmers driv-
ing smaller ones out of business, and the array of new genetically modi-
fied food products added to the emotional level of the debate.
Monsanto fought to protect its image and its profits. it sued a small 
new England cooperative that advertised no BGH in its milk. Monsanto 
argued that this claim constituted false advertising, since all milk had 
BGH, not just that from cows given Postlac. it won, and the cooperative 
had to note on subsequent ads that there was no evidence of any differ-
ence between milk with natural BGH and that with rBGH. After this deci-
sion, companies that wanted to emphasize the absence of this synthetic 
hormone had to use careful and somewhat evasive language. Yet the op-
position to rBGH grew, and organic dairies flourished. The tide seemed 
to turn decisively in 2007 when both the Safeway grocery chain and 
Starbucks coffee shops announced at least partial bans on rBGH milk. it 
seems likely that other companies will join the crusade, and dairy farm-
ers may have to abandon the use of rBGH to preserve their market. Some 
cooperatives and some local dairies have already made the shift. Whether 
the FDA will withdraw its approval is more doubtful.
Plant anD animal BreeDing
A final necessary condition for the agricultural revolution also involves 
genetics, in the sense of selective breeding of new varieties of crops and 
livestock. The largest breakthrough was hybrid corn, which was devel-
oped in the 1920s and gradually accepted by farmers in the 1930s. it is 
arguably the most important plant-breeding innovation in the united 
States.
The development of hybrid corn goes back to 1907. Two scientists 
began experiments that involved the crossing of two strains of inbred 
corn. They proved that such crosses led to greater vigor. The emerging 
ears of corn are pollinated by pollen from the tassels of its own or nearby 
stalks (or, on a windy day, quite distant stalks). This results in a diverse 
genetic mix in any open-pollinated corn. Some have referred to such 
corn as a medley of past unplanned hybridizations. By isolating a single 
stalk of corn and allowing only self-pollination, one can reduce the ge-
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netic diversity. By continuing to self-pollinate over several generations, 
one can isolate certain desired traits that were hidden in the larger gene 
pool. However, such inbreeding, and the loss of alleles and thus genet-
ic diversity, almost always leads to less vigorous plants. The first hybrid 
corn resulted from the crossing of two selected inbred strains, which in 
some cases led to a desirable outcome—the preservation of desired traits 
combined with renewed vigor. Donald Jones, the one person largely re-
sponsible for the development of hybrid corn, took this a step further. At 
his Connecticut experiment station, Jones crossed two of these hybrids, 
creating a double-cross hybrid. The inbred lines that produce a desired 
hybrid are a valuable commodity and are eligible for patent protection. 
Since hybrid varieties do not breed true, those who own such patents 
have a valuable commercial product. Seed companies thus gained a mo-
nopoly on hybrid seed corn. For years, hybrid seed production required 
a good bit of hand labor, as workers had to cut off the tops of the female 
plants. Today, a form of cytoplasmic DnA, bred into female plants, ren-
ders them sterile, eliminating the need for topping. 
As early as 1922, Secretary of Agriculture Henry C. Wallace supported 
hybrid research in his Bureau of Plant investigations. Soon, several ex-
periment stations were involved in hybrid research. Back in iowa, Henry 
A. Wallace, the son of Henry C. and editor of an influential agricultural 
periodical, carried out hybrid research on his own and in 1925 formed a 
new company to sell hybrid seed—the Hi-Bred Corn Company. in 1925 
the first private farmer planted his fields with hybrid corn. on fertile soil, 
the early hybrids increased production from 10 to 15 percent. At first, 
farmers were slow to adopt the hybrids. Some tried to save seed and lost 
all benefits. others, with poor soil, did not gain larger yields. But gradu-
ally, during the Great Depression, a majority of Corn Belt farmers began 
buying the more expensive seed (78 percent used it by 1949). The one 
deterrent to boosted yields turned out to be low levels of soil nitrogen, 
which was cured by the revolution in nitrate production after the war, 
as described earlier. one of the desired traits bred into hybrid seed was 
a stronger stalk, which, by design, facilitated the machine harvesting of 
corn, also described earlier (only 10 percent of corn was harvested by 
machines in 1938).17
After the success with corn, hybridization spread to most vegetable 
crops. in addition, plant breeders, working in federal experiment stations 
or in seed companies, continued to select desirable traits generation after 
generation, leading to the introduction of new varieties every year. in 
some cases, the goal was disease resistance, as well as a heavier yield or 
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better shipping qualities; all too rarely was improved flavor the objective. 
Such improvements also occurred in all orchard crops.
These rapid genetic improvements in major crops had an impressive 
international influence. in 1941 the Rockefeller Foundation established a 
new research center near Mexico City (it still exists) to seek improvements 
in corn and wheat varieties, particularly those suited to underdeveloped 
countries. This research soon expanded to other crops, such as rice. nor-
man Borlaug, who developed high-yielding wheat varieties at this center, 
received the nobel Prize for his achievements. The spread of such new 
varieties, along with the upsurge in the use of fertilizers and chemicals, 
had a major impact not only in Mexico but also in other subtropical or 
tropical countries, particularly in northern india. Soon, almost everyone 
was referring to a “green revolution.” Contrary to Borlaug’s hopes, the 
greatest impact occurred among large, highly capitalized farmers, not 
among the small peasant farmers who could not afford the capital inputs 
necessary for the best use of the new crop varieties.
The gains in livestock breeding were as impressive as those for crops. 
The greatest improvement was in milk output, which more than doubled 
from 1950 to the present. Shifting consumer demands (such as for leaner 
hogs and lower-fat milk) led to shifts in favored breeds and, in many cas-
es, a trend toward one or two dominant breeds in each livestock group. 
For example, Holsteins, larger and heavier milkers but with less butter-
fat, have won out over Jerseys and Guernseys among dairy cows, while 
Angus seems headed toward domination among beef breeds. The single 
greatest innovation in animal breeding has been artificial insemination, 
which allows a relatively few selected males to generate thousands of off-
spring. Perhaps next in importance has been the development of detailed 
production records. in the future we will gain detailed DnA profiles of 
breeding stock. Before World War ii the emphasis was on pure breeds, 
but once the breeds were well established, the goal for most farmers was 
not breed purity but the highest level of production, which sometimes 
favored mixed breeds. in beef cattle, this has led to the importation of 
European breeds and Brahman cattle from india.
This completes a summary of four major developments that helped en-
sure the rapid growth in American agriculture after World War ii. Al-
though the growth was most revolutionary between 1950 and 1970, 
the level of productivity has not slowed to any appreciable extent since 
1970. But the pace of change has slowed in several areas. The number 
of farms has remained relatively stable, and so has the number of farm 
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operators. The amount of land in cultivation is stable or declining slightly. 
in farm machinery, no innovations have matched the self-propelled com-
bines and cotton pickers that matured in the 1950s and 1960s. Structur-
ally, despite widespread opinions to the contrary, American agriculture is 
still dominated by family-owned farms, although in some cases families 
form partnerships or corporations in which the family retains majority 
ownership. in fact, from 1997 to 2002, the number of investor-owned 
farms declined. nothing suggests any change in ownership patterns in 
the near future.
Yet, in the early twenty-first century, several trends reveal an increas-
ingly closer tie between farmers and the agricultural businesses that pro-
cess, transport, and sell their products. At times, the boundary between 
the farmer and the processor has blurred. More and more vertical inte-
grations have developed in several crop and livestock areas, with poultry 
leading the way.  This has steadily diminished the managerial role of farm 
owners and operators, even as it has lessened their risks. When farmers 
contract with a company to raise a certain number of chicks (supplied by 
the company) according to certain specifications and to sell them when 
mature at a negotiated price, the farmer is as close to being a company 
employee as an independent operator. in many vegetable and fruit crops, 
and increasingly in tobacco, contract farming is well established and is 
growing in almost all areas. This means that the family farm survives, but 
with a drastic shift in what that means. 
one other new development—genetically modified crops and even 
livestock—may or may not be as revolutionary as earlier innovations. if 
such crops continue to gain acceptance from farmers and from skeptical 
consumers, farmers will become even more dependent on seed suppli-
ers. At present, more than 40 percent of American corn includes Bt to 
control insects, and herbicide-resistant soybeans are becoming the norm. 
Thus, genetically modified crops may launch a second green revolution, 
in the sense that they may increase output, eliminate the need for many 
pesticides, and increase food’s nutritional value. These changes are very 
controversial, particularly outside the united States. As yet unidentified 
dangers may limit their expansion. But it is at least possible that new leaps 
in productivity lie ahead.
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6. Surpluses and Payments
Federal Agricultural Policy, 1954 –2008
in many respects, the agricultural revolution after World War ii was a 
blessing. Consumers were able to spend a steadily decreasing share of in-
come on food and fiber. The diversion of workers from agriculture freed 
up labor for manufacturing and services, leading to a higher growth rate 
in the overall economy and to a level of consumption undreamed of in 
the human past. one of the best indicators of a nation’s overall prosper-
ity is the percentage of workers required to feed a population—more 
workers in agriculture usually mean a lower standard of living, unless a 
large share of that product is profitably exported. But as in any revolution, 
there were losers, including many who were forced to leave farming and 
make a difficult adjustment to some other occupation. Even the winners, 
those who continued to farm more efficiently with each passing year, did 
not always gain a fair return for what they contributed to the nation as a 
whole. This leads to the thorny issue of farm prices and farm incomes.
ProDuCtion Controls anD PriCe suPPorts
The statutory authority for federal involvement in the marketing of farm 
crops remained in place through the Korean War. With a few exceptions, 
such as tobacco, the acreage controls, price supports, and marketing 
agreements were unneeded until at least 1948, and for most crops not 
until the end of the Korean War. A devastated Europe and Japan ensured a 
strong demand for American farm goods until a gradual recovery began 
in the early 1950s. By then, an unprecedented surge in production was 
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taking place on American farms. From 1954 to 1972 farmers consistently 
produced more crops than they could sell. Surplus became a ubiquitous 
term and concern in these years, as Congress struggled to find an answer 
to the “farm problem.”
in a productivity revolution, it is always difficult to generate enough 
demand to absorb an avalanche of goods. This is most true of food, where 
demand is inelastic. until the end of the Korean War, exports and the 
baby boom kept demand in line with supplies, with the exception of 
feed grains in some years. The rate of population growth continued 
through the 1960s, but it could not match the growth rate in agricul-
ture. A more important factor in causing price instability was shifts in 
foreign demand.
one may ask, as economists do, Why not let the “market” control 
prices and the allocation of labor and capital to a given sector or indus-
try? of course, in a strict sense, the term market is a bit of a mystification, 
for there is no market actor making decisions, but only various individu-
als or groups exchanging labor and goods. They can safely do this only in 
a polity that protects property ownership, ensures the fulfillment of con-
tracts, enforces rules to uphold the common welfare, and uses taxes to 
provide necessary public goods such as law enforcement, defense against 
foreign enemies, education of children, and protection of the environ-
ment. Within this context, one may argue that the best agricultural policy 
is to let individuals decide what to produce, just as other individuals de-
cide what farm products they want and are willing to pay for. if too many 
farmers grow corn, prices will certainly fall, given the inelasticity of the 
demand for corn. low prices will encourage farmers to grow less corn, 
shift to other crops, or even give up on agriculture altogether and take up 
another occupation. Prices will rise as corn production slows, and over 
time, the interaction of supply and demand will lead to an equilibrium 
in which corn prices and the number of corn farmers remain close to a 
“rational” or “market-determined” level, with optimal benefits to society 
as a whole.
until the new Deal, federal agricultural policy generally adhered 
to such a market model. in fact, agriculture in many respects remained 
closer to this ideal than did other sectors of the economy. it had no mo-
nopolies or restraints on trade. More than in any other sector, agriculture 
was made up of millions of individual producers competing with one 
another. As the most basic economic sector, the one most vitally involved 
with human welfare, agriculture had received plenty of support from state 
and federal governments, but without any direct control over agricultural 
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marketing. it had seemed to be in the national interest to open up public 
land at low cost, provide free homesteads, take over the costs of agricul-
tural research and development, provide credit opportunities, and facili-
tate cooperative marketing, yet without exerting any direct control over 
farm management or farm marketing. To justify this infrastructural aid, 
one could cite the long history of tariff protection for manufacturing, 
large land grants to railroads, and limited liability rights for corporations. 
unlike the corporate enterprise that was dominant in manufacturing, 
millions of farmers could not coordinate policies or exert much control 
over marketing and prices, except by using their tremendous political 
clout to gain desired policies from Washington.
The new Deal commodity programs reflected a response to depres-
sion. it was not clear that such emergency legislation would fit the post-
war economy. in fact, farmers as well as legislators hoped that something 
close to a free market would be possible. Farmers wanted the freedom 
to grow what they wanted. Consumers wanted low prices for food. The 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 remained the basis for all types of 
production controls and price supports, but Congress amended it almost 
every year. its primary policy, whatever the implementing details, en-
dured at least until 1996. To control production of the major storable 
commodities, it allowed the federal government, working through the 
committee system in each county, to establish either voluntary acreage 
allotments for specified crops or mandatory acreage or marketing quo-
tas, based on past levels of production. The voluntary acreage allotments 
meant that a farmer could sign up or contract to set aside a specific num-
ber of acres for a controlled crop. if he adhered to his contract, as certified 
by a local committee, he was eligible for a nonrecourse loan at a set price 
level, usually expressed as a percentage of parity. Those farmers who did 
not sign up for acreage limits were usually ineligible for such loans and 
thus had to sell at market prices. However, they were free to plant and sell 
all they wanted, an option that often appealed to very large and efficient 
farmers or those who opposed the government commodity programs 
and campaigned for a free market in agriculture. in a sense, the price sup-
port was a bribe to get farmers to produce less during periods of surplus 
and declining prices. note that in almost all cases, the price supports 
meant prices above the international level, which required routine tariff 
protection for American farmers.
The mandatory quota system applied only to crops in which a two-
thirds majority of farmers voted in favor of it. This was the only system 
ever used for the two major types of tobacco, for peanuts and rice in most 
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years, and for wheat from 1954 to 1961. The market for soybeans soared 
by the 1960s, but this exportable crop was in such high demand that only 
stabilizing crop loans (at a rate well below competitive price levels) were 
offered before the farm bill of 1985. Most perishable vegetables and fruits, 
as well as livestock, did not fit a price-support system based on nonresource 
loans. notably, the farmers who diverted acres from controlled crops were 
always prohibited from shifting these acres to fruits and vegetables.
Farm PoliCy in the truman anD 
eisenhower aDministrations
Farm policy became a hot issue in the Truman administration. The of-
ten bitter debates led to no major policy changes but offered an early 
rehearsal for later programs. Early in World War ii, to encourage farmers 
to produce as much as possible for the war effort, Congress so modified 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (by the Steagall Amendment) as 
to guarantee farmers 90 percent of parity on not only five basic, storable 
commodities (corn, wheat, rice, cotton, and tobacco) but also on thir-
teen other perishable products, including milk, hogs, soybeans, peanuts, 
chickens, eggs, potatoes, and sweet potatoes. This price support was to 
remain in effect until two years after the official end of hostilities, which 
turned out to be the end of 1948. in only one case did this commitment 
increase farm income, because almost all agricultural prices remained 
above parity levels until 1949. The exception was potatoes. Higher levels 
of production and decreasing demand (the age of fast food and french 
fries had not yet arrived) led to huge surpluses just after the end of the 
war. Since potatoes cannot be stored for an extended period, the Com-
modity Credit Corporation (CCC) had to buy the surplus and pay farmers 
90 percent of parity. in three years it lost $80 million on rotting potatoes, 
some of which it burned. With postwar inflation and rising food costs, 
consumers considered this a major scandal. it was an early warning of 
what would happen to many crops in the 1950s, but after 1948 crop 
loans were at least rarely available for perishable crops.
in 1947 Congress began extended debates on what to do about the 
support programs after the expiration of the Steagall Amendment. With-
out a full consensus, it first voted to extend the 90 percent guarantee 
until the end of 1949. But with broad support from all major farm or-
ganizations, and seemingly from the Truman administration, it voted to 
begin a program of flexible price supports for the major storable crops in 
1950, with the range of support from 60 to 90 percent of parity. When 
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surpluses developed, the support level would drop. it was assumed that 
this would lead to a decrease in production. To gain the nonrecourse 
loans, farmers would have to accept production limits. only the flexibil-
ity feature was new. For perishable crops, Congress approved, at least in 
principle, production payments to farmers who grew certain crops such 
as potatoes. These payments would amount to direct subsidies, since tax-
payers rather than consumers would have to provide the funds. This was 
not completely new, for grade B milk producers—primarily for butter, 
cheese, and dried milk—had sold surpluses directly to the government 
during the 1930s. 
Many farmers accepted the idea of flexible supports, but not most 
cotton farmers. By 1949, as prices weakened and crops such as corn faced 
surpluses, most farmers clearly wanted the security of fixed supports. 
Even though President Truman had signed the bill providing for flexible 
supports, it was clear by the 1948 election that it would be politically ex-
pedient to amend the existing law. Secretary of Agriculture Charles Bran-
nan finally worked out what seemed, to many, a radical new policy for 
commodity programs. ultimately, after bitter debate, Congress in 1949 
and again in 1950 rejected the Brannan Plan and simply extended the 90 
percent parity through 1950, with new, flexible supports to be gradu-
ally phased in over three years. Before the new plan could go into effect, 
the Korean War began, and demand for agricultural commodities quickly 
soared. Congress responded by continuing the existing 90 percent parity 
through 1954. At that point, the Eisenhower administration, guided by 
Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Bensen, finally implemented a flexible 
support scheme, which proved to be very unpopular with farmers.
What made the Brannan Plan so controversial? What he proposed, in 
retrospect, does not seem as new or revolutionary as critics claimed at 
the time. He wanted to update the base period for determining parity 
(previously 1910 to 1914) to the ten years from 1939 to 1948. As a bid 
for farmer support, he asked for a continued crop loan program at 100 
percent of parity for corn, wheat, cotton, and tobacco, conditional on 
conservation practices and acceptance of acreage or marketing controls 
whenever needed. He asked for direct production payments for produc-
ers of milk, eggs, chickens, hogs, beef cattle, and lambs. These payments 
would make up the difference between market prices and prices that 
assured a fair or parity income to producers, or what would later be 
called target prices. He did not base eligibility for such payments on any 
required reductions in production but only on support for conservation 
measures. note that these payments would be funded by taxpayers, and 
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they would allow prices for these vital foods to reflect the interaction of 
demand and supply, or what promised to be lower food prices for con-
sumers facing a rapid increase in most other prices. Finally, he wanted a 
cap on the amount of commodities eligible for payments of any type; for 
most crops, this was the amount that would have sold for about $25,000 
(approximately $200,000 in 2007 dollars), or roughly caps on bene-
fits for 2 percent of all farmers. He hoped such caps would impede the 
growth of large industrial farms and thus help preserve family farms. He 
offered no special aid to threatened small farmers but hoped to imple-
ment some program for them in the near future.
The Brannan Plan involved a carefully developed program to appeal to 
both farmers and consumers. What was unclear was the probable cost to 
taxpayers. Resistance focused on cost, the shift of benefits from consum-
ers to taxpayers, the emphasis on farm income rather than commodity 
prices, and the limits on payments. in the years of anticommunist agita-
tion, a developing cold war, and intense political partisanship, the details 
of the proposal were no more important than the ideological and class 
issues. Brannan, a former official in the Farm Security Administration 
and a close friend of James G. Patton, president of the national Farm-
ers union, seemed too far to the left politically. During the fight over 
the Brannan Plan, the American Farm Bureau, the largest organization of 
farmers, opposed the plan and came to despise Brannan. in retrospect, it 
is clear that the plan would have cost more than the public was willing to 
pay, offered farmers too much in the way of special protection and direct 
subsidization, and included too few strategies to reduce production. But 
it is important to note that as early as the Kennedy administration, sup-
port for farmers shifted from an artificially high cost for commodities to 
direct subsidies from taxpayers. Even today, target prices and deficiency 
payments have echoes of the Brannan Plan.1
The clash over farm policy revived at the end of the Korean War. But 
never again did farm bills attract as much public interest as the Bran-
nan Plan had, when even high school debate teams made this a popular 
topic. Year after year the controversy raged over the level of support (a 
percentage of older parity formulas or new target prices), which crops to 
include, and how to fund the costs of storage and recoup the loss from 
forced sales.
With wartime supports due to expire in 1954, the Eisenhower ad-
ministration tried to move back toward a free market for agriculture. in 
this effort, it had the support of the Farm Bureau. in a major farm bill 
in 1954, set to take effect in 1955, Congress enacted a flexible price 
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support plan. For 1955, for most storable commodities except tobacco 
(rigid acreage controls allowed it to retain 90 percent of parity, with no 
major expense to taxpayers), the support price could range from 82.5 to 
90 percent, and in the following years from 75 to 90 percent. Perishable 
crops did not receive any loans, and only wool growers would receive 
production payments. These flexible supports quickly became unpopular 
among farmers, as surpluses mounted and prices remained well below 
90 percent of parity. Government warehouses were soon overflowing 
with stored commodities (at the highest level in history by 1960). low 
loan rates (often only 75 percent of parity) failed to slow production. As 
an added strategy for quickly reducing surpluses, Congress and the Eisen-
hower administration opted in 1956 for a program that harkened back to 
the land purchase program of the 1930s—an Acreage Reserve Program 
(popularly called the Soil Bank) that lasted for only three years, during 
the crop years 1956 to 1958.2
The Soil Bank allowed farmers in six major crops then under acreage 
control and price supports to sign contracts to take some, or in 1958 up 
to all, acres in a given crop out of production for a year. This land had 
to remain idle. They received what the government calculated to be the 
net income they would have gained from cropping the land—a generous 
offer. For example, they received, on average, $40 to $44 for each acre 
of corn land retired, with the actual amount based on location and past 
production records. By 1957, farmers idled more than 21 million acres, 
or around 2 percent of all crop- and pastureland in the country. in the 
final year, 1958, participating farmers could not expand the acres planted 
in other crops, a policy that caused many to drop out of the program. The 
Soil Bank undoubtedly lowered production, but productivity improve-
ments in agriculture were so rapid that overall yields continued to rise in 
all but one year. This, plus farmer opposition, doomed the program. in 
some cases, the leasing of land to the government facilitated the move-
ment of marginal farmers out of agriculture.
A second program, the Conservation Reserve, combined conserva-
tion with land retirement. Farmers could enter into contracts to retire 
cultivated land, whatever the former crop, for three to ten years. if the 
contract included tree planting, it could extend to fifteen years. Farmers 
received a low rent for the land and extra payments for various con-
servation measures (tree planting, holding dams, wildlife protection). A 
farmer could lease all his land (this turned out to be the favorite tactic 
after 1959, when a total lease gained a special bonus), but after 1958 
the total annual rent on any farm could not exceed $5,000. This reserve 
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eventually included more than 28 million acres, but most of the retired 
land had been marginal farmland. Thus, the program did little to reduce 
crop surpluses. The government offered the last contracts in 1960. only 
in 1985 did Congress reenact a modified version of this program, in this 
case only for highly erodible land.
ultimately, the Eisenhower administration found no acceptable solu-
tion to the problem of surpluses and low prices. in part, this was because 
many large, efficient farmers did not participate in the voluntary loan 
program. Even those who did, and thus reduced their acreage by up to 
20 percent, compensated by raising more crops on their remaining land. 
Thus, the main commodity programs raised prices above world market 
levels, which hurt consumers, yet failed to please farmers. in 1959 the 
Department of Agriculture dropped all production controls over corn and 
set the loan rate at the market level. Production soared. So did surpluses. 
Prices plummeted.
managing surPluses During a ProDuCtivity revolution
in 1961 the Kennedy administration began a new program that eventu-
ally applied to almost all storable crops. For feed grains (primarily corn, 
but also a rapidly growing amount of grain sorghum), it revived acre-
age controls, required that farmers devote diverted acres to conserva-
tion practices, and set the loan rate (the price support level) close to 
the market rate. To compensate farmers for this low level of support, the 
government offered all contracting farmers acreage diversion payments. 
in a typical year, if a farmer diverted 20 percent of his normal corn acres 
(based on the level of production for the last two years), he could receive 
half the normal income from the unplanted acres. in some years, for a 
40 percent reduction, he could receive 60 percent of normal income. 
Small farmers with fewer than 25 acres could divert their whole crop 
and receive 50 percent of normal income. This popular program enticed 
most corn farmers to sign voluntary contracts. note that this shift had 
important consequences. it came close to keeping corn supplies in bal-
ance with demand. More important, it allowed the market price of corn 
to remain low, a valuable benefit to consumers and, in particular, to beef 
and hog producers. Yet it did not lower the income of farmers below 
previous levels because of the generous diversion payments. The cost of 
these payments came not from consumers but from taxpayers. Within 
five years, the amount of crops in storage dropped to one-fifth the level 
of the mid-1950s. 
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For the two major export crops, wheat and cotton, the new system 
was much more complicated. in 1961 both were subject to mandated pro-
duction controls and eligible for crop loans. This remained true for cotton, 
but wheat farmers, in a well-publicized referendum, rejected any mandato-
ry controls in 1963. However, most wheat farmers signed up for voluntary 
crop reductions the next year. These contracts involved low loan rates, but 
the farmers received two levels of diversion payments, based on the pro-
portion sold in the domestic market (higher) and that exported (lower). 
Tobacco, as always, remained under its tightly controlled acreage or market-
ing quotas, with loan rates and prices closely aligned. The CCC continued 
to support the price of grade B dairy products by direct purchase on behalf 
of both domestic and foreign food aid programs, but the rate of support 
was generally well below parity. note that the new approach (low loan 
rates and diversion payments to maintain farm income at close to parity) 
was still based on production records, not need. This entailed large diver-
sion payments to the largest and most efficient farmers. it also provided an 
incentive for farmers to maximize production on their nondiverted acres, 
to use more fertilizers and pesticides, and to increase their base acreage by 
lease or land purchases, thus forcing small farmers out of the market. Dur-
ing the nixon administration in 1971, in an attempt to deal with equity 
issues, Congress limited total diversion payments to each farm operator to 
$55,000, the first of a series of caps that never worked as intended because 
of various clever strategies to circumvent them.3
in 1969 most farm prices, led by wheat, began to rise. Within two 
years, American farmers moved into a rare period of high exports and 
surging prices, in the midst of an inflationary crisis. A major grain deal 
with the Soviet union in 1972 quickly used up accumulated surpluses, 
and wheat prices were soon at record levels. By 1974 the CCC had al-
most no crops in storage. in 1974–1975 this boom reached a climax. 
People everywhere were concerned about what they believed would be 
a severe and enduring world food crisis. Most acreage and support pro-
grams were no longer needed. in fact, wheat stocks fell so low that the 
government resorted to incentives to increase production. Happy farmers 
borrowed money, bought new machinery, expanded landholdings, and 
looked forward to a decade of prosperity. And even though prices lev-
eled off and then declined after 1975, the collapse was less severe than 
in 1921. Farmers were better organized, however, and in 1977 they held 
protest marches in Washington, D.C. Their anger dissipated a bit when 
prices and exports recovered in 1978 and 1979. unfortunately, the worst 
was yet to come.
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one new strategy marked the commodity program after 1973. in-
stead of support prices based on some percentage of parity, the new farm 
legislation required Department of Agriculture economists to set annual 
target prices for each crop, based on expected costs of production. The 
targets were almost always above the loan support level, and when market 
prices were below targets, farmers received direct payments to make up 
the difference. When loan rates were above world market prices, farmers 
enjoyed a double subsidy—gains from nonrecourse loans (paid for by 
consumers) and deficiency payments (paid by taxpayers). But low loan 
rates meant that farmers rarely gained much from unredeemed loans. 
instead, they relied on deficiency payments to gain the targeted income. 
These payments went to both farmers who took out loans and those who 
did not. Such deficiency payments remained a part of agricultural price 
supports until 1996, and in the form of counter-cyclical payments they 
still exist today.
the Farm Crisis oF the 1980s 
A deep farm depression that closely resembled the one in 1921 marred 
the first half of the 1980s. The new Reagan administration was commit-
ted to moving back to free markets in agriculture. But at times, pressure 
by Congress and by a powerful farm lobby forced it to do just the op-
posite. Payments to farmers rose to four times their earlier levels, and 
surplus commodities held by the CCC rose to their second-highest level. 
By 1985, the cost of the total farm program soared to more than $20 bil-
lion (approximately $40 billion in today’s dollars), or what many people 
saw as a national scandal. But such was the nature of the program that 
it did not raise the cost of food. in fact, the collapse of farm prices, to a 
limited degree, lowered food prices, since the payments to farmers came 
directly from tax dollars.
in 1980 almost every conceivable factor worked against foreign de-
mand for American farm products. in January President Carter placed an 
embargo on wheat exports to the Soviet union, one of several responses 
to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and an action that helped elect 
Ronald Reagan in the fall. interest rates soared in the midst of rampant in-
flation, in part caused by a major oil crisis, while an overpriced dollar de-
terred purchases of American crops. A developing world depression led 
to a steady drop in grain exports. in five years, from 1980 to 1985, total 
farm exports fell by half. in 1980 alone, farm income fell by 46 percent, 
a faster rate than during the Great Depression. land prices, which had 
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risen rapidly in the booming 1970s, fell sharply from around $1,200 
an acre in 1980 to less than $700 in 1988. Exuberant farmers, many of 
whom had recently purchased new self-propelled combines or bought 
out neighboring farms, were suddenly faced with bankruptcies. Sixteen 
percent of commercial farmers were financially stressed by 1985. The 
income support programs and federal loans helped most farmers avoid 
bankruptcy (only about 2,100 filed for bankruptcy in 1985–1986), but 
up to 300,000 left farming and, in many cases, sold their land. once 
again, surpluses grew, and so did the storage and disposal problem for the 
CCC. Dairy stocks became so large by 1985 that the CCC agreed to pur-
chase whole herds of cows at market price and commit them to slaughter 
if owners would promise to halt dairy production for five years.4
in 1983 Congress approved a new tool to get rid of CCC invento-
ries: it offered a one-year emergency payment-in-kind (PiK) program 
to farmers. if they contracted to reduce acreage by a given amount, they 
could receive certificates, redeemable by the Department of Agriculture, 
that documented their ownership of so many units of a controlled crop, 
in amounts up to 80 to 95 percent of their normal yield on the diverted 
acres. Most of the surplus was in local warehouses or elevators leased by 
the CCC. Farmers greeted the program with unexpected enthusiasm, for 
it allowed them to gain corn or wheat without all the work of farming. 
They diverted 82 million acres from production, or more than a third 
of all cultivated acres in program crops. Aided by a widespread drought, 
surpluses declined for one year at a rapid rate, and most farm prices tem-
porarily rose. As farmers sold their certificates, even exports rose. But the 
cost was very high, since the CCC gave away a huge amount of its assets 
(stored commodities)—an estimated $10 billion to $11 billion worth. 
Since these costs did not come directly from the Treasury, they did not 
show up in those attributed to commodity programs, which reached a 
near-record $18.5 billion. This open-ended PiK program lasted for only 
one year, but the CCC continued to offer farmers generic PiK certificates 
(they could choose any commodity with a large surplus) as an alternative 
to normal monetary deficiency payments, with an added inducement for 
very large farmers (PiKs did not count toward the cap on total payments 
to any one operator).5
At the climax of this farm crisis in 1985, Congress enacted a new 
farm bill. it modified existing crop loans and deficiency payments, added 
some incentives to get farmers to redeem loans early, raised some target 
prices, increased acreage reductions on most crops (up to 27.5 percent 
for wheat), and added to a growing number of export subsidies. Because 
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of new provisions, the former nonrecourse loans were now called mar-
keting loans. They were so devised as to eliminate most storage of crops 
by the CCC. Farmers could still take out loans, but at rates close to world 
prices. Such loans guaranteed a floor price, and farmers could still forfeit 
such loans at the end of the nine-month loan period. But they now had 
a powerful incentive not to do so. At any time during the loan period, 
they could redeem the loan at the daily posted market price in their 
county, even when this price was well below the amount of the loan. This 
gain was called a market loan payment. Those farmers who chose not to 
take out loans could request the same benefit (called a loan deficiency 
payment) at the time of low posted prices. With this system, plus very 
effective export efforts, the CCC was able to eliminate almost all stored 
surpluses by 1990.6
in response to intense lobbying by major environmental organiza-
tions, and in the wake of increased erosion during the expansion of grain 
farming in the booming 1970s, the 1985 bill included new and very 
strict compliance rules for its conservation grants. in fact, this farm bill 
will always be remembered as the “Environmental Act.” For example, 
farmers who owned highly erodible land, such as in the Palouse area of 
eastern Washington, had to submit a plan to cure the problem and carry 
it out within five years in order to retain any payments. Farmers who 
planted crops on wetlands forfeited their eligibility for loans and defi-
ciency payments. Congress also revived the Conservation Reserve pro-
gram. But the high level of payments (up to $26 billion in 1986) created 
public concern about a farm policy that had somehow gone badly awry. 
Fortunately, farm prices began a gradual recovery in 1986, as surpluses 
vanished. one other small program helped. A group of cooperating farm-
ers could form a Farm-owned Grain Reserve, which earned them lower 
loan interest rates and payments for local storage of retained commodi-
ties. For the most part, the 1985 farm program continued until 1996, 
but early in the Clinton administration, budgetary restraints led to one 
significant reduction—farmers could gain payments on only 85 percent 
of their base acres. By then, international issues were impinging on farm 
legislation and marketing policies.
international agreements anD the FeDeral 
agriCultural imProvement anD reForm aCt
Despite high agricultural price supports and payments in the united 
States (up to $20,000 a year for each full-time farmer in 1985), im-
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port quotas or export subsidies in the European union were even more 
market distorting on a per capita basis, and up to four times more so in 
Japan. Such policies impeded u.S. exports, raised domestic food prices, 
and practically excluded farmers in poor countries from Western markets. 
in the international trade negotiations leading to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the united States pushed for a much freer 
market, even though its own policies, which it defended as necessarily 
defensive in nature, clearly violated such principles. By the next omnibus 
farm bill in 1990, the GATT negotiations were under way, but they would 
not lead to a final agreement until 1994, which completed the so-called 
uruguay Round that had started in 1986. GATT created the World Trade 
organization (WTo) to monitor and enforce these agreements.
The stated goal of the long and difficult negotiations leading to the 
1994 agreement was “a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading sys-
tem.” The agreement moved toward such a market system, but not very 
far because of compromises to gain European union agreement and a 
large number of exemptions from the most demanding rules. The main 
goal was a drastic reduction in market-distorting policies. Thus, the com-
plex rules tried to distinguish between benign farm policies with little 
impact on international trade and those that clearly distorted it.  Although 
the united States, which then led the world in the production of corn, 
wheat, and soybeans, was the leading exponent of freer trade, in the ac-
tual implementation of the agreement it resorted to subterfuge to evade 
the intended effect of the new policies.
At first, the agreement included two categories of policies—those that 
significantly distorted trade (“amber box” policies) and those that had 
little or no impact (“green box” policies). To achieve final agreement, 
the negotiators had to accept some seemingly amber policies followed in 
the European union and the united States, such as production-limiting 
controls on acreage or yields or on numbers of livestock, if those applied 
to no more than 85 percent of base production. This compromise led to 
a special “blue box” category.  The amber box of trade-distorting policies 
encompassed most existing u.S. farm policies, including direct payments 
to producers based on units of production and subsidized loans or crop 
insurance.
Green policies—those with a negligible (an imprecise word) impact 
on production and trade—included support for research and education, 
pest and disease control, marketing promotion, public infrastructure, and 
even public storage of crops if collected on behalf of food security and 
purchased at market prices. none of these activities could involve direct 
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payments to producers. Some payments to individual producers were ac-
ceptable, such as direct income support (welfare) when not tied to pro-
duction or prices, safety net programs that did not involve market issues, 
natural disaster assistance, land retirement or other structural changes 
not tied to production, payments for environmental or conservation 
goals, and special assistance to producers in disadvantaged regions. These 
allowable policies were subject to interpretation and, in some cases, such 
as disaster aid, allowed countries like the united States to finesse many of 
the purposes of the overall agreement.
With the possible exception of new Zealand, which had almost no 
agricultural subsidies, none of the negotiating countries was willing to 
exclude all amber policies. instead, they only tried to limit them. The 
countries agreed to reduce amber policies by 20 percent from a base 
period, usually 1986–1988, and phase in these changes over a six-year 
period. By design, these were years of high price support with a high 
starting base.  At the end of the six years, in 2000, the united States could 
spend just over $19 billion on amber policies without violating the 
agreement. This quota had to be apportioned on a crop-by-crop basis, 
with non-crop-specific subsidies aggregated into one class. Even here, the 
agreement made one exception: if the subsidy for a crop totaled less than 
5 percent of the crop’s market value, it did not count against the national 
quota. As one would expect, the countries that were party to this agree-
ment have, by their own interpretation, stayed within their amber box 
quotas, although many, including the united States, have faced challenges 
on the criteria used to calculate what fit into that box.7
The 1994 international agreement helped shape a new farm bill in 
1996, and all subsequent farm bills have included escape clauses in case 
total amber spending exceeded the ceiling. no change in policy since 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 seemed nearly as important as 
the 1996 Federal Agricultural improvement and Reform Act (FAiR). For 
Title i on commodity programs, FAiR seemed revolutionary. For all com-
modities except tobacco, it eliminated all the old touchstones of farm 
policy—no more acreage controls and, because crop loans would now 
be at or below market prices, no more distorting price supports and 
no more stored surpluses (which had all but ended even before 1996) 
beyond congressionally mandated reserves. Even the title, from the per-
spective of long-term critics of farm subsidies, suggested a new era of 
fairness, while Republican legislators dubbed it a “freedom to farm” bill. 
The complicated old system was dead, and few regretted its passage. But 
at the same time, farmers were aware that they had lost a safety net. They 
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made Congress aware of their new insecurity, and Congress responded 
with some wonderful but short-term medicine.8
GATT forced the united States, whenever it threatened to surpass the 
$19 billion ceiling, to decouple any aid program from annual produc-
tion. The 1996 farm bill did much of this decoupling. Thus, to help farm-
ers make the transition from production-based payments, which in some 
years exceeded 20 percent of their net income, Congress provided “pro-
duction flexibility contract payments” over the next seven years. These 
had no direct ties to present production, for the amount of each payment 
was based on base acreage and past production records. This was a ruse 
to save the base and to avoid amber box involvement. Farmers could col-
lect the payments even if they stopped growing crops; likewise, a new 
purchaser of a farm with base acreage could collect payments, even if 
the purchaser did not continue to grow crops (a scandalous provision 
removed in most proposed versions of a 2007 farm bill). The payments 
were not large on a unit basis (for example, 28 cents per bushel for 
corn). But for very large farmers, this could be a significant amount of 
money. Though intended as an income-supporting payment, it provided 
the most funds to the ablest and most successful large farmers because, 
as always, they found ways around the payment limits under the new 
program. one could also argue that these payments influenced farmers’ 
choices—in some cases, helping inefficient farmers remain in agricul-
ture—and thus were market distorting.
The marketing loan program continued, but in a manner that seemed 
devised to gain price stability rather than provide a subsidy to farmers. 
The loan rate was capped at 1995 levels for corn and wheat, a good year 
for farm prices, but it was nonetheless expected to parallel market prices. 
it quickly added to the amber box quota of $19 billion, since farm prices 
fell during the last years of the twentieth century. Thus, the loan rate for 
most crops was soon well above the market price, guaranteeing the loan 
rate for farmers who forfeited their loans at the end of the contract pe-
riod (usually nine months). By 2000, this loan gain reached $8 billion. 
in addition, if prices sagged, farmers could redeem their loans at posted 
county price levels and gain an added subsidy. Farmers could also forgo 
loans and gain a loan deficiency payment equal to the difference between 
the loan rate and the local price; this tactic was followed by a majority of 
farmers, with costs of more than $6 billion by 1999. Even so, gains from 
this loan program were not large enough to violate the $19 billion quota. 
Even when joined with other subsidies, such as those tied to highly sub-
sidized crop insurance, they did not risk WTo limits.9
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Because of falling prices during the late 1990s, the transition pay-
ments and the continued loan program did not maintain farm incomes 
at 1995 levels. Farmers were freer but, as it turned out, much less secure. 
This put pressure on Congress to come to their rescue, and as always, 
it did so. For the 1999 farm year, it began appropriating what it called 
“emergency market loss payments.” These ad hoc payments grew from 
$3 billion in 1999 to $11 billion in 2000, when federal subsidies to 
farmers reached an all-time record, at least in current dollars (more than 
$25 billion, or 47 percent of farmers’ net income). Prices improved in 
2001, and these supplemental payments fell, but the precedent had been 
established. By the time of the 2002 farm bill, these payments came close 
to being a new entitlement for farmers. By any fair evaluation, these pay-
ments should count as part of the amber box.
Beginning in the 1970s, Congress had become increasingly gener-
ous in passing emergency disaster relief for farmers. At first, most such 
assistance consisted of subsidized loans, but in almost every year after 
1988, Congress used ad hoc bills to offer direct payments to farmers in 
counties that suffered major crop losses from flood, drought, wind, or 
disease. The minimum loss required to qualify was usually 35 percent 
of the normal yield, and the payments were usually 65 percent of the 
estimated market price of the afflicted crop for farmers who had bought 
into the heavily subsidized crop insurance program. Those with insured 
crops could recoup all or more than their normal income. The rate of 
relief dropped to 60 percent for eligible farmers who had rejected crop 
insurance. in some years the receipt of such a disaster payment required 
a farmer to buy crop insurance in the next two years. Emergency aid for 
livestock owners usually required a 40 percent loss of available grazing 
for at least three months. in the 2000 crop year, such disaster payments 
totaled $1.8 billion. They soared in succeeding years as Congress lowered 
the threshold for disaster designation. The disaster area always included 
an entire county, which often meant that some farmers eligible for disas-
ter payments had harvested normal crops. in 2003 all 256 Texas counties 
were eligible for emergency livestock assistance.10
the 2002 Farm Bill anD BeyonD
To the despair of many critics of federal commodity policies, FAiR had 
failed. nothing much had changed. Payments to farmers rose rather than 
fell, and with acreage reduction a memory, there seemed no way to bring 
production into line with demand and thus no way for taxpayers to es-
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cape what had become a generous welfare state for the roughly 300,000 
farmers who produced 89 percent of total farm output. The 2002 farm 
bill simply reinforced the new security system by converting the supple-
mental or ad hoc payments into counter-cyclical payments that largely re-
sumed the target prices and deficiency payments in effect through 1995. 
Based on another name change in 1995, all the commodity programs re-
mained under the direction of the Farm Service Agency, the most recent 
incarnation of the old Agricultural Adjustment Administration of 1933.
The 2002 bill expanded the number of crops eligible for crop loans, 
with peanuts added to at least sixteen other crops. of the major storable 
crops, it excluded only tobacco. Congress set the loan rate (in pounds or 
bushels) for each crop. Farmers could forfeit the loan at the end of the 
contract period. Alternatively, they could redeem the loan at any time at the 
posted daily county price for grains and soybeans and at the weekly world 
price for cotton and rice, a tempting option when prices fell well below the 
loan rate. Gains from this loan program clearly fit in the amber box.11
The transitional payments of 1996, scheduled for a seven-year pe-
riod, became a five-year guaranteed subsidy in the 2002 bill and applied 
to even more crops (about ten in all). The legislation set the payment 
schedule for productive units in each crop (corn, for example, at 28 
cents a bushel). These “direct payments” covered only 85 percent of base 
acreage (this provision fit the blue box terms of the WTo). one farmer 
might draw payments for several different crops, but the upper limit was 
set at $40,000 per person, which was effectively doubled if one had a 
spouse or farmed on three different farms, or “entities.” The only other 
stipulation was that farmers comply with conservation or wetland pro-
grams. Because these payments were based on past production and in no 
way limited present crop choices, the united States gave them a green 
box classification.
The new part of the triad of subsidies was counter-cyclical income 
support payments, which became a fixed-rate replacement for the vari-
ous supplemental payments Congress had provided annually from 1998 
to 2001. These counter-cyclical payments were based on the same 85 
percent of base as the direct payments, with the unit amount set by leg-
islation. They applied only when farm prices fell below a target price set, 
at a shifting annual rate, by the bill itself. if crop loan gains and direct 
payments raised returns from a given crop above the target price, then 
the farmer would not be eligible for counter-cyclical payments. The max-
imum payment was $60,000, but with the same escape clause for those 
with spouses or three farming entities. Wealthy farm owners, such as 
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successful businessmen or physicians, whose adjusted gross income ex-
ceeded $2.5 million were ineligible for any payments unless two-thirds 
of that income was from farming. Because the amount of the payment 
was determined by past production levels, the united States claimed 
green box status for these payments, but other countries challenged this 
classification. Brazil won an appeal to the WTo about American cotton 
subsidies, and Mexico and Canada have pending appeals about rice and 
corn payments.
Fortunately for farmers and taxpayers, few crop loans or counter- 
cyclical payments were needed after 2001. Most farm prices increased in 
these years, fueled in part by the ethanol and biofuel boom and, more re-
cently, by a worldwide shortage of wheat stores. Most farmers, at least in 
the commodity areas, are happy with their generous support programs. 
They now have the best of all worlds—the right to produce all they want, 
and a government security blanket to protect their incomes.
The 2002 farm bill was due to expire in September 2007. Thus, 
throughout 2007 Congress debated a new bill that would cost about 
$300 billion over the next five years. The House completed a timely bill 
in July, but a conflicted Senate only passed its version in october. This 
delay required the first of seven eventual extensions of the 2002 bill, until 
June 6, 2008. A conference committee first convened in April 2008, and 
only came close to a final agreement on May 5. The original Senate bill 
had added a new $5 billion permanent disaster relief trust fund and of-
fered more than $2.5 billion in new tax exemptions or credits to farmers 
or agribusinesses (essentially earmarks pushed by individual senators, 
with the most publicized being tax reductions for racehorse owners). The 
House resisted such costs for a bill already well above the 2002 level, but 
in conference succeeded only in reducing the relief fund to $3.8 billion 
and the tax breaks to $1.8 billion.
The economic and political environment shifted radically during the 
extended debates. A surge in farm prices by early 2008 led to a global 
food crisis and a rapid increase in food prices in the united States. Sud-
denly, the existing subsidies for American farmers and the diversion of 
one-fourth of corn production into ethanol seemed irresponsible, or 
even immoral. Yet, the final conference bill made only minor changes in 
the commodity programs. it lowered the annual direct payments ($5.2 
billion) by a token 2 percent. it slightly raised some loan rates or counter-
cyclical target prices. in May 2008, most farm prices (corn at more than 
$6 and wheat at about $10 per bushel) were at double these levels, mean-
ing no governmental costs in the near future. But farmers wanted the se-
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curity these programs would provide in future years if the boom, like the 
one in the mid-seventies, led to another bust. The bill added research and 
marketing subsidies for fruit and vegetable growers (a first), expanded 
several conservation programs, and added subsidies for the development 
of cellulosic ethanol while lowering the subsidy for corn ethanol from 
51 to 45 cents a gallon. Most costly was the addition of more than $10 
billion for nutrition programs, primarily for a badly needed reform of 
the food stamp program. This meant that two-thirds of the cost of the 
farm bill would be for food aid.
Through all the deliberations, one issue divided the Bush administra-
tion and Congress—payment limits. The administration wanted to ex-
clude from all commodity payments any individual farm operator whose 
adjusted gross income exceeded $200,000. Since the existing income 
cap was $2.5 million, this was a revolutionary proposal, one that could 
have cut the cost of the commodity programs by up to half. The adminis-
tration argued that American taxpayers should not have to subsidize indi-
viduals with income levels in the top 2 percent, including many affluent 
physicians, lawyers, and businessmen who owned farms. As one might 
expect, large commercial farmers, those with the most political clout, 
were dismayed by such a restriction. The conference committee did not 
adopt limits acceptable to President Bush, who promised to veto what he 
called a “bloated bill.” But both the House and the Senate passed the bill 
by May 15 with such overwhelming majorities as to assure an override of 
any presidential veto. Thus, what is now the farm bill of 2008 will control 
agricultural polices through the crop year of 2012.
nonCommoDity Programs
Commodity price supports are the most visible, most direct, and, ex-
cept for food aid, most expensive facets of American agricultural policy. 
But commodity programs from the 1930s on have always existed beside 
other means of supporting higher incomes for farmers. Most important 
in the two decades after World War ii were various efforts to expand ex-
ports. The story is complex and is directly related to u.S. foreign policy. 
At the end of World War ii, various agencies distributed food to needy 
European countries. The Marshall Plan required participating European 
countries to use their own currencies to purchase food from the united 
States, with many of these credits returned to Europe for development 
projects. Various loans and credits facilitated the sale of food abroad. 
These programs, many tied to foreign aid, came together in 1954 with 
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the Trade Development and Assistance Act, or what is generally known as 
Public law (Pl) 480. in the early years, most exports involved gifts or 
loans, or sales to countries in their own currencies. Some of these would 
be returned as a type of development aid. A few barter transactions also 
took place. But in 1966 a new Food for Peace program normalized most 
of this trade. Subsidies to American exporters allowed them to buy, at 
reduced rates, higher-priced American farm products. By 1973, Pl 480 
exports totaled more than $23 billion. Today, more than $1 billion a year 
(small in comparison to other programs) is expended under Pl 480 or 
later amendments to it through more than ten different programs, some 
targeted at agricultural development in poor countries. All these pro-
grams help maintain demand for American farm products, as do ad hoc 
appropriations for food relief in the case of emergencies or famines in 
various parts of the world.
Since the new Deal, the federal government has always offered farm-
ers subsidies on behalf of various conservation projects. Today, more than 
a dozen different programs are in place, but two are most important. one 
is a new Conservation Security Program. it provides enhancement grants 
for a wide range of conservation practices in a growing number of major 
watersheds. Farmers submit proposals for projects involving erosion con-
trol, water management, forest improvement, and watershed protection. 
This is an updated version of the conservation payments that earlier sup-
ported farm ponds and terraces. More daring is the Environmental Qual-
ity incentive Program, or EQiP. it was first established in 1997 to help 
farmers deal with requirements under clean air and water acts, wetlands 
legislation, and the Endangered Species Acts. it makes incentive and proj-
ect grants to help farmers reduce nonpoint pollution; improve methods 
of handling farm waste, including manure; reduce emissions from farm 
machinery; reduce soil erosion; and protect wildlife habitats. it is par-
ticularly useful to farmers committed to a more sustainable form of agri-
culture. These grants may encompass new rotation patterns, experiments 
with low- or no-pesticide farming, energy-saving techniques, recycling 
strategies, and wildlife protection. As one might expect, small farms or 
those with limited net income are most likely to avail themselves of these 
two programs. 
land retirement schemes began in the 1930s as a means of reducing 
surpluses and achieving certain conservation goals. After World War ii, 
several conservation programs continued, providing federal subsidies for 
erosion control, soil building, and the development of wildlife habitats. 
land retirement as a crop reduction program revived only in 1956, with 
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the short-lived Soil Bank and Conservation Reserve program (discussed 
earlier). The present Conservation Reserve was born in the 1985 farm 
bill, at the climax of the worst agricultural depression in the postwar era. 
it had three goals: cut the then-growing surplus, remove highly erodible 
land from production, and improve the environment. it offered farmers 
an opportunity to retire erodible land from production for ten years. The 
acres leased to the government had to reduce, acre for acre, the base acre-
age for program crops (on which various payments were based), thus 
curtailing production and income. in the original plan, farmers were to 
negotiate the rent received for retired land, but the congressionally man-
dated maximum rent soon became an almost universal standard. The aver-
age rent per acre was approximately $50 in 2007, thus far below the gross 
income (but not necessarily the net income) from active farming in most 
parts of the country. For certain people, including some retired farmers, it 
offered a way to hold on to land and gain at least enough income to pay 
taxes. Farmers were required to create protective cover, sometimes with 
financial assistance, mow the grassland annually, but not harvest the hay 
except in certain drought situations. Supplemental reserves of farmable 
wetlands and enhanced programs that led to state-federal cooperation in 
specific environmental projects have been added to the program, which 
was originally intended to retire at least 40 million acres, or just over 4 
percent of cultivated land in America. it has not reached that goal, but in 
2007 the reserve contained nearly 37 million acres. its role in curtailing 
food production has been slight, but the individual reserves (renewable 
at the end of ten years) have created wildlife habitats, watershed pro-
tection, erosion controls, and new forestland. Despite the qualification 
that the lands be highly erodible, i am familiar with excellent, though 
hilly, farmland in the reserve. Should circumstances require more food 
production in the united States, the major part of this reserve awaits its 
reentry into farming.12
The present 51-cents-per-gallon subsidy for ethanol producers is an 
indirect farm subsidy. it has increased the market for corn and raised its 
price, to the benefit of corn farmers. indirectly, it has raised the prices 
of other grains and soybeans, which have a smaller but growing market 
for biodiesel fuels. The ethanol boom has already raised the cost of food-
stuffs, and if present projections hold, it will continue to do so in the 
future, when the present 20 percent of corn that goes into ethanol will 
skyrocket. it remains unclear how much energy the use of ethanol saves, 
but at least indirectly, it probably reduces greenhouse emissions (how 
much depends on the fossil fuels that go into the production of ethanol). 
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When biomass is used as a fuel, the carbon dioxide (Co
2
) emitted is that 
just absorbed from the air by growing plants. in this sense, it makes no 
net addition to atmospheric Co
2
. Since only the grain is used in ethanol, 
the Co
2
 in cornstalks remains sequestered until they decay or, possibly in 
the near future, they are used in the production of cellulosic ethanol.
in monetary terms, the largest Department of Agriculture program 
aimed at the creation of demand for farm goods involves domestic food 
aid. in 2008 all food programs were scheduled to cost $57 billion, or 
64 percent of the total budget of the Department of Agriculture. The first 
federal food aid programs began in the Great Depression and consisted 
of a wide distribution of surplus commodities. in 1933 Congress formed 
the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, which worked in conjunction 
with the state-based Federal Emergency Relief Administration. in 1935 
a new Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation became an enduring 
agency for food purchases and disposal. As part of an amendment to the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, section 32 provided that one-third 
of all customs receipts be used in support of agriculture—to facilitate 
exports, encourage domestic consumption, and reestablish farmers’ pur-
chasing power. This legislation underwrote much, but not all, food relief 
until the early 1970s, when the food stamp program became fully estab-
lished. But several food distribution programs, some involving section 32 
funds, have continued to the present. The government has explored every 
possible way to get rid of surplus food, including giving it to charitable 
institutions, county welfare agencies, schools, and needy families. in the 
postwar years, the variety of foods could be limited to only eight or ten 
in excess supply. But after 1954 the government expanded the inventory 
and sought a balanced, nutritional diet. With the world food shortage in 
the early 1970s, the Department of Agriculture had to buy some foods 
for the program in the open market, because it had no surpluses. The 
program sometimes distributed more than a billion pounds of food a 
year to almost 3 million institutional or family recipients, but the cost, at 
least by contemporary standards, was modest—up to only $333 million 
a year.
in 1946 Congress gave enduring form to what had been an on-and-
off distribution of food to some schools during the Depression. The na-
tional School lunch Act had a dual purpose—to safeguard the health of 
children and to encourage the domestic consumption of nutritious agri-
cultural commodities. The act offered federal matching funds to states to 
support lunch programs, but it also provided for the direct distribution 
of food to schools. Participating schools had to serve lunches meeting 
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minimal nutritional standards, provide such meals for free or at reduced 
cost to poor children, and use surplus or donated commodities to the 
extent possible. Eligibility requirements for matching funds were lower 
for states with below-average per capita incomes. By 1973, more than 86 
percent of schools participated in the program, almost half of all children 
received school lunches, and more than a third of these children quali-
fied for free lunches. in 1967 the program expanded to include school 
breakfasts for disadvantaged children. By 1995, the federal cost exceeded 
$6 billion a year; by 2007, it cost $8.2 billion, along with $5.7 billion for 
other child nutritional programs. By then, it served 31.5 million children 
in 101,000 schools.
A smaller program began with the Child nutrition Act of 1967. it 
gave grants to the states for a Women, infants, and Children (WiC) pro-
gram that now costs $5.5 billion a year. it supports food aid for children 
up to five years old, provides nutritional assistance to mothers, and even 
gives referrals for necessary health care. it is basically a welfare program, 
with only a limited impact on overall food demand.
By far, the most costly and important domestic food aid is the food 
stamp program, which cost more than $37 billion in 2007. Food stamps 
were used to provide food aid for a brief period in the late 1930s and 
early years of World War ii, or until food shortages replaced surpluses. 
The Kennedy administration reintroduced pilot programs in 1961. As 
part of the War on Poverty, Congress enacted the Food Stamp Act in 1964, 
with major amendments in 1977 and 2008. The first listed purpose of 
the act was not welfare but the expansion of demand for surplus com-
modities. The Department of Agriculture administers the program, which 
in almost all years costs more than all price support payments combined. 
From the beginning, families with incomes less than 130 percent of the 
official poverty level, and with liquid assets of no more than $2,000 were 
eligible for food stamps. Eligible families paid variable amounts for the 
stamps, based on family size and need, but always less than their mon-
etary value. Recipients could use them in grocery stores for most food 
items, but not for alcohol or tobacco or, in the early years, for imported 
foods, particularly imported meats (this highlights the surplus-reducing 
purpose of the stamps). Today, the enduring label food stamps is anachro-
nistic, for the system has fully converted to electronic transfers, using 
plastic debit cards comparable to bank debit cards. The debit cards have 
eliminated a great deal of fraud, for some recipients used to sell their 
stamps (some still sell the food). it is impossible to determine how much 
food stamps add to the overall demand for food and thus how much 
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they add to the income of farmers, since the families receiving this as-
sistance would have found other ways to get food, including charity. un-
fortunately, despite several educational efforts, it is not possible to get all 
food stamp recipients to buy the most nutritious or the most economical 
foods (present legislation includes funds for nutritional education). Even 
if it does little to increase the demand for crops, food aid has certainly 
benefited farmers in a political sense. in the debates on the 2007 farm 
bill, increases in food aid helped deflect opposition to the commodity 
programs.13
These various methods of supporting the demand for farm prod-
ucts often run counter to other governmental policies. This includes the 
ever-expanding research agenda of the Department of Agriculture and of 
the land-grant universities that carry out most of the research. Research 
helps increase production, as do the highly subsidized irrigation projects, 
largely in the West, and the various credit programs, including some that 
encourage young people to enter agriculture. Rural development pro-
grams, most operated by the Department of Agriculture, improve the 
quality of farm life, although only a small percentage of rural Americans 
live on farms today (less than 10 percent). About half of farm families 
live within statistical metropolitan areas, and thus close to larger cities. 
in my state the leading farm county is within the metropolitan area that 
centers on nashville. Many of the counties that have received the most 
funds for rural development are in parts of the Great Plains or the South 
that are far from urban complexes, but even here most residents are not 
farmers. in fact, one count in 1994 revealed only 556 farming counties 
in the united States, or counties in which 20 percent of earned income 
came from agriculture (and even in these counties, other areas of em-
ployment usually exceeded agriculture).
This survey of federal support programs for farmers only scratches 
the surface of the huge Department of Agriculture and the hundreds of 
different programs supported by a budget approaching $100 billion a 
year. one need only read the proposed farm bill of 2007 to appreciate 
the complexity of farm programs or the density of the bureaucratic prose 
that describes them.
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7. Farming in the 
Twenty-first Century
Status and Challenges
it is impossible to calculate the exact number of farms and farmers pres-
ently in the united States. Since 1974 the Department of Agriculture has 
defined a farm not by acreage but by the volume of sales. The production 
of agricultural goods that sell for $1,000, or would normally sell for that 
amount, qualifies an operation as a farm. in 1999 it added a few catego-
ries that do not meet this criterion: horse farms with five or more horses, 
even if sales did not amount to $1,000, and farms producing maple syr-
up or short-rotation woody crops. A farm census is taken every five years, 
and in 1997 the responsibility for this survey moved from the Census 
Bureau to the national Agricultural Statistics Service in the Department 
of Agriculture. The last farm census for which statistics are available was 
in 2002 and involved not only the survey of farmers but also sophisticat-
ed sampling tests to make up for the inevitable undercount. This revealed 
a total of 2,128,982 farms. note that in any given year, some small farms 
will move out of this class because of low sales, while others will cross 
the $1,000 threshold.1
ProFile oF ContemPorary Farms
Agriculture is, by far, our least diverse economic sector in terms of race, 
ethnicity, and gender. More than 97 percent of principal farm operators 
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are white, and just over 90 percent are male, although women make 
up a much larger share of nonprincipal or secondary operators. African 
Americans, once so critical to southern agriculture, have almost com-
pletely deserted farming. only 29,090 are principal operators, meaning 
either owners or tenants. Farm operators are older than individuals in 
most occupations: principal operators average 55.3 years of age, with an 
older average in the small farm categories. The trend is for the average age 
of farmers to increase in the next few decades, in part because entry into 
farming is so difficult for young people. The average number of people 
in each farm household is just over two, or close to the national average. 
Finally—and i must emphasize this point to skeptical readers—almost all 
farms are owned by families (this includes extended families, in the sense 
that a father and son, with two households, may jointly own a farm), 
not by corporations that are not owned by members of a family. in 2002 
only 7,661 farms were primarily owned (more than 50 percent of the 
stock) by nonfamily investors, and these accounted for only 9,319,000 
acres out of a total of 938 million acres, or only 1 percent of the total. it 
is true that these corporate farms are much larger than average, as are the 
more numerous (66,667) incorporated farms owned by families.2 (See 
table 1.)
But family ownership does not necessarily correlate with what most 
people mean when they refer to family farms. of course, no one defini-
tion of a family farm would please everyone, particularly among those 
who farm and believe themselves to be “family” farmers. Some tradition-
al criteria associated with the much revered family farmer fit only a small 
minority of those who operate American farms. The following are among 
the most prevalent criteria: that a family owns, lives on, and works on a 
farm; gains most of its livelihood from farming; and, perhaps most criti-
cal, makes all the important decisions about the farming operation. This 
managerial independence has supported most images, or myths, about 
farmers as responsible citizens. According to these criteria, most officially 
listed American farms are not family farms. on a majority of these farms, 
the operator does not gain even half of his or her income from farming. 
nearly a fourth do not live on farms. And even among full-time farm 
operators, some of the largest and wealthiest farmers do not have full 
managerial control. This includes most of the factory-like chicken and 
hog farms that are under contracts to large corporations. Finally, many 
very large family-owned and -operated farms, such as a California dairy 
farm with more than 1,500 cows and a dozen or more employees, seem 
more like urban business enterprises than traditional farms.
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narrowly specialized, large-scale farming departs widely from most 
images of the traditional family farm. in what sense does a 10,000-acre 
wheat farm in Kansas fit any definition of a family farm, when machines 
do all the planting and harvesting and the operator does not even live 
on the farm? or what about a family-owned chicken farm with 20,000 
broilers or 2,000 laying hens all housed in one-square-foot stacked cages 
in a large coop or barn, with no direct contact between the owner and 
the chickens? or the 18,000 hog farmers who produce more than 90 
percent of the total product, or the 11,000 beef cattle owners with an-
nual sales over $1 million who market just over half our beef ?
Such huge operations do not match nostalgic memories of family 
farms, where livestock played an indispensable role. Then, the ties be-
tween animals and family members were close, in a sense personal. Cows 
had names. Chickens flocked around the wife who scattered the cracked 
corn. Against all expert advice, local farmers in my boyhood community 
insisted on keeping roosters for the pleasure of the hens and thus sold 
fertilized eggs and, in some cases, would eat no other. After a year, hogs 
that had been lovingly fed and cared for faced a necessary slaughter. But 
in my community, no one would do what was best for the meat—stun 
a hog, hang it by its hind legs, and cut the jugular artery in the throat to 
let the beating heart effectively remove the blood. That seemed too cruel. 
instead, they shot the hog in the head to minimize its suffering, and only 
then slit the throat. in my home, my sister and i cried when we heard 
the shots, and my father could not bring himself to do the shooting. He 
hired someone else to do it. it is this type of farming on a small, human 
scale that many people identify with the true “family farm.”  They see it as 
more of a way of life than a means to gain profits, or as a form of artful 
engagement rather than just a job.
All states have farmers, although very few are in Alaska. in the last two 
decades the former farm states, at least as most people conceived of them, 
have slipped in their share of income. This is true in the Midwest, with 
its dominance in corn, wheat, and hogs, and in the South, with its lead 
in cotton and tobacco (both now declining crops). in 2007, as ranked by 
total farm income, California and Texas easily led all other states and will 
continue to do so. But perhaps surprisingly, north Carolina ranked third, 
with its leap ahead based largely on factory-like hog production. iowa, 
the traditional leader in corn, is now fourth in total farm income. The 
other top ten, in rank order, are Florida, Minnesota, nebraska, Georgia, 
Kansas, and Kentucky. little Delaware leads all states in farm income per 
capita and per acre, based largely on its poultry factories, which require 
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few inputs of either land or labor. Poultry has also boosted Arkansas to 
thirteenth. The shifting patterns, largely influenced by the efficiency of 
poultry and hog farms, have left former leaders far behind. For example, 
illinois now ranks twenty-seventh, despite its traditional first or second 
rank in corn, and Wisconsin, the Dairy State, is now fifteenth in overall 
income and trails California even in dairying.
The relative importance and value of different crops have also shifted, 
though not radically. Such traditional leaders as corn and wheat are still 
near the top, but they have been joined by soybeans (see figure 11). in 
fact, in 2002 the number of acres planted in soybeans (more than 72 
million) was slightly larger than those planted in corn for grain (68 mil-
lion). if one counts corn planted for silage, it remained the leader. Since 
2002, the ethanol boom has pushed corn well above soybeans, or to 92 
million acres in 2007. Hay crops of many types (64 million acres) came 
in third, ahead of wheat (45 million acres). in 1950 very few farmers 
knew anything about soybeans, let alone grew them. At the same time, 
cotton was one of the five leading crops. no more. Cotton is down to 12 
million acres, and tobacco is down to only 428,000 acres and, i hope, 
still declining. Sorghum, as a feed grain, has exceeded the acreage of oats 
and barley combined. orchard crops account for more than 5 million 
acres, rice just over 3 million, and vegetable crops 3.5 million. no other 
crops require more than 2 million acres. But note that acreage does not 
Figure 11. Value of crops sold: 2002. Total = $95,151,954,000. 
(2002 Farm Census)
Nursery products 
15.4%
Fruits & nuts 14.5%
Vegetables 13.4%
All other crops 8.4%
Cotton & cottonseed 4.2%
Tobacco 1.7%
Cut Christmas trees & 
woody crops 0.4%
Grains, oilseeds, dry beans & dry peas 42.0%
Fig. 11
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always correlate with value, especially in the case of vegetables, fruits, 
and nursery stock, which collectively have almost the same value as corn, 
wheat, and soybeans combined.3 Among livestock, what is most signifi-
cant is the rapid rise of poultry (see figure 12).
Farm laBor
Who does the work on farms? How many farmers are there in the united 
States? it is not easy to give a firm answer, in large part because so many 
farm operators have off-farm employment and often devote only a few 
hours a week to managing or working on a farm. it is also complicated 
by the increasing number of temporary and, in some cases, migratory 
farmworkers. A century ago it was more simple. in 1910 around 10 mil-
lion family members lived and worked on farms (this number excludes 
young children and, in most cases, housewives).  About 6 million of these 
were farm operators, either owners or cash or share tenants, and 4 mil-
lion were other adult family members who worked full time. in addi-
tion, these 6 million operators employed about 3.5 million hired hands, 
most of whom lived on the farms where they worked. They made up just 
over one-fourth of all farmworkers. Roughly the same ratio prevailed 
until the climax of the agricultural revolution in 1970. Since then the 
Figure 12. Value of livestock, poultry, and their products sold: 2002.  
Total = $105,494,401,000. (2002 Farm Census) 
Poultry & eggs 
22.7%
Milk & other dairy products from cows 19.2%
Hogs & pigs 11.8%    
Horses, etc. 1.3%
Aquaculture 1.1%
Other animals & products 0.6%
Cattle and calves 42.8%
Fig. 12
Sheep, goats & 
their products 0.5%
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total number of wage workers has increased, now accounting for 30 
to 35 percent of all farm employment. But the structure of wage labor 
has changed dramatically. Few live-in hired hands remain. less than 
half of today’s farmworkers are employed on a full-time basis. And the 
percentage of farm costs devoted to hired labor has steadily decreased 
over the last century, from more than 20 percent in 1910 to just over 10 
percent in the agricultural census of 2002. The ethnic makeup reflects the 
greatest shift, from largely white or African American workers in 1910 
to largely Hispanic workers today, an estimated 70 percent of whom are 
illegal immigrants.4 
in the 2002 farm census the total number of farm operators was 
3,045,318, with 2,128,982 principal operators. until 1997, when re-
sponsibility for the farm census shifted to the Department of Agriculture, 
the Census Bureau had only one classification—farm operator—and this 
was limited to one per farm. This meant that, in some cases, the operator 
was a corporate person, not a human. Even if a husband and wife, or two 
or more equal partners, fully shared the management of a farm, only one 
could be listed as the operator. in a sense, this all but obscured what had 
been, in the past, the vital role of family members or partners. The pres-
ent farm census corrects for this, but it still maintains the one farm–one 
operator system for most calculations of farm income and expenses. in 
addition to principal operators, it designates second and third operators 
(in other contexts, there may be up to five operators on some farms). The 
number of second and third operators in 2002 was 916,336, with the 
larger group designated as second operators. it is clear that most of these 
second operators were spouses, predominantly women (the number of 
female principal operators was only 237,819, but 822,093 were listed as 
second or third operators). This may have reflected farm wives’ demand 
for recognition, but it also had a more self-serving purpose. When wives 
were listed as second operators, this in effect doubled the cap on the 
amount of federal payments to a given farm. The third operator category 
was smaller but in most cases included sons or daughters, who usually 
lived in separate households but worked on or helped manage the farm 
(the average age of third operators in 2002 was around twelve years 
younger than that of principal operators).5
it is impossible to determine the actual number of hired farmworkers, 
particularly as full-time equivalents. The census of 2002, based largely 
on reports by farm operators, lists just over 3 million hired workers, 
with 928,000 working as much as 150 days a year, or half time. This 
leaves 2,109,000 who worked less than 150 days, which might include 
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someone who worked only one day.  Also, these numbers undoubtedly 
include some double counting, particularly among illegal immigrants. 
Each quarter, the Department of Agriculture issues a report on farm la-
bor, with its best possible estimate of the number at work in a given 
week. From April 8–14, 2007, American farmers directly employed 
720,000 workers and, through contracts, indirectly hired 241,000, for a 
total workforce of 961,000. Since this was during the planting season, it 
probably comes close to or slightly exceeds the annual average. of these 
workers hired directly by farmers, 580,000 worked more than 150 days 
a year, and 140,000 less than 150 days. The average wage for all hired 
workers was $10.17 an hour, a figure that reflects the salary (converted 
into hours and wages) of relatively few managerial employees (55,372 in 
2002). For field work, it was $9.41; for livestock-related work (much of 
it on very large dairy farms), it was $9.55. This does not include the value 
of housing and meals, which are sometimes provided free, particularly 
for migratory workers (more than 45,000 farms, often among the larg-
est and most productive, hired migratory workers in 2002). By law, all 
farmworkers are guaranteed minimum wages, and both federal and state 
regulations set reasonably high standards for housing. Still, farmworkers 
are among the poorest in America, with only domestics receiving com-
parable wages. Farm wages have traditionally been roughly half those 
in manufacturing, with more than half of all families living below the 
poverty line. Because of linguistic difficulties and the fear of deportation 
among illegal workers, farmworkers have not been in a strong bargaining 
position to demand higher wages and benefits.6  Today, one of the reasons 
for higher farm incomes and low food prices is the meager wages paid 
to seasonal employees. The venerated hired hand of the past has been re-
placed by a group of nameless, non-English-speaking laborers. labor has 
become almost as impersonal as machines.
if one adds the total number of farm operators and full- and part-time 
hired laborers, more than 6 million people work on or manage farms 
each year. Most of these are part-time workers, and most do not live 
permanently on farms, including a surprising number of operators (al-
most 500,000). Second operators, mostly wives, usually live in the same 
household as the principal operator. Thus, the most prevalent estimate of 
the total number of people now living on farms is around 4.5 million. 
This estimate has leaky boundaries on all sides. Many farm operators live 
on very small farms, have full-time off-farm employment, barely reach 
the $1,000 threshold in sales, and thus scarcely consider themselves to 
be farmers at all. The existing criteria exclude many people who provide 
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vital services to farmers, such as the owners of large tractors or combines 
who make a living entirely by custom work on farms, or crop dusters 
who use airplanes to spread pesticides.
Farm inCome
What about the income of farm operators? once again, confusion reigns. 
A vast majority (more than 80 percent) of farm households have some-
one working off the farm, sometimes accounting for the largest propor-
tion of annual income. in many ways, the one development in the last 
century that has most affected the well-being of farm households has 
been the increasing availability of local jobs in manufacturing and service 
industries. Thus, the total household income of people whom the De-
partment of Agriculture lists as farmers has steadily closed the earlier gap 
between farm incomes and other incomes in the economy. Sometime in 
the 1990s, farm incomes surpassed the national average.  Also, despite the 
increased concentration of farm production and sales in fewer and fewer 
large farms, the gap between the household income of small and large 
farms has narrowed. Today, total farm income from all sources is more 
equal than in any other sector. The poverty rate among farm households 
is now below the national mean, even though it is highest among the 
more than 90 percent of rural Americans who are not farmers. Finally, 
the average wealth per household is higher in farming than in any other 
sector, largely because of the value of land and machinery.7
obviously, off-farm employment explains this leveling of incomes. in 
some cases, small farmers chose to remain on farms and do some farm-
ing, even though they held full-time jobs in a nearby city. in other cases, 
successful professionals and businesspeople chose to buy land, which is 
still a powerful mark of status in the united States, and to operate farms 
as a source of supplemental income, as a hobby, or for the tax break. 
Very high-income hobby farmers help raise the average income of farm-
ers in the lowest 20 percent of production and sales. According to an 
estimate by the Department of Agriculture, the average 2007 household 
income of farmers was expected to be $81,588, but 85.9 percent of this 
would be derived from off-farm employment or other income sources. 
only commercial farm households (those with farm sales over $250,000) 
would earn a majority of household income from farming operations, 
and for this category of farmers, total household income would approach 
$200,000. Thus, income levels among those who meet the very inclu-
sive definition of a farmer tell us very little about the income derived 
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from farming. i might add that tax returns tell us even less about farm- 
produced income, for tax breaks, tax avoidance, and a high level of un-
derreporting of income lead to a dismal, and very misleading, portrait of 
farm income.8
Most data on farm-based income is assembled by the national Ag-
ricultural Statistics Service. The last full survey available as i write is the 
farm census of 2002 (the results of the 2007 census are not yet in). Al-
most all data and analysis involve cash income received by farm operators. 
The net cash income is simply the value of the total agricultural product 
and government payments less farming expenses. These data leave out capi-
tal gains on land, which the Statistics Service does not estimate, as well as 
several farm-related sources of additional income, which it does calculate. 
it refers to cash and farm-related incomes together as net farm income. 
unfortunately, it is all but impossible to determine an accurate figure for 
the net income from farm-related sources, and i doubt that many farm-
ers themselves could give a very clear accounting. This category includes 
income from custom work on other farms, rent for land leased to other 
farmers, timber harvested from the farm, and fees for hunting and fish-
ing privileges. What once was a large category—the amount of products 
consumed at home—has shrunk to less than 1 percent, but another has 
remained important—the imputed rental value of the house lived in by 
the farm operator. This free rent may add 5 percent or more to the annual 
income of a small farmer. in 2002 the estimate of gross income from such 
farm-related sources was $5,689,226,000. To some extent, it is still true 
that the overall welfare of farmers is better than that indicated by what they 
produce and sell, a gain that is partly balanced by often high land taxes. 9
Farmers have always suffered from price instability and thus large 
annual swings in income. Modern governmental policies have helped 
smooth these cycles, but not eliminate them.  After the revolutionary farm 
bill of 1996, farm prices declined, but they have risen erratically since 
2000. From 2005 through 2007, farm prices, gross income, and net in-
come were higher than at any time since the mid-1970s. The value of the 
total product has risen rapidly since 2002, from around $225 billion to 
more than $300 billion in 2007, boosted by record-high corn prices (the 
ethanol effect) and near record-high soybean and wheat prices (caused 
in part by farmers’ diverting acres from these crops to corn). Because of 
a developing worldwide shortage, wheat prices rose to more than $10 
a bushel in late 2007, an all-time record in current dollars, and second 
only to the mid-1970s in real dollars. in March 2008 some wheat futures 
rose to $15 a bushel. livestock prices are also high but are balanced in 
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part by higher prices for feed grains. The Department of Agriculture es-
timated that the net farm cash income for 2007 would be $87.5 billion, 
higher than the 2006 income or the average for the preceding ten years. 
This is a boom time for grain farmers, but they know, from past experi-
ence, that it may not last.
Based on the 2002 farm census, farm income was then only slightly 
below the average of gross and net incomes over the preceding decade 
(table 2 offers a summary of these data). i use this survey to suggest 
certain aspects of farm income and the status of various categories of 
farmers (the 2002 figures should be more representative than the forth-
coming 2007 census, which will come in the midst of a price boom). 
The Department of Agriculture classifies all operators of farms that sell 
products worth more than $250,000 a year as “commercial farmers.” in 
2002 these numbered 159,794. They received just over $160 billion of 
the total $207 billion in farm sales and government payments for that 
year, or more than 76 percent of the total (those with more than $1 
million in sales received 46 percent). These commercial farmers make 
up an elite group in American agriculture. They are the most political-
ly involved, exert the most influence on farm legislation, and are alone 
among farm groups in obtaining a majority of their household income 
from farming (in 2007 almost 70 percent, or approximately $140,000 
a year). The operators in the next lowest category (farms with sales from 
$100,000 to $249,000), on average, receive less than a fourth of their 
income from farming. These 262,831 intermediate farms produced only 
12.6 percent of the total product in 2002.
The concentration at the top is remarkable or, some would argue, 
scandalous. This is dramatically illustrated in figure 13 (page 163). only 
322,625 farms (those with sales over $100,000) sold 89 percent of the 
total product, leaving a measly 11 percent to the other 1.8 million farms. 
if farmers with annual product sales under $250,000 did not rely pri-
marily on off-farm work, the income disparities in American agricul-
ture would be extreme, and class resentment would be intense. note that 
there are a good number of small farmers (annual sales under $100,000) 
who report farming as their only occupation, but if they did not have 
family members working off-farm, their household income would be 
below the poverty level.10
The overall net cash income of farmers in 2002 can be very mislead-
ing, for the 85 percent of low-production farmers are included in the 
overall averages. For farms that made a profit in 2002 (993,861, or less 
than half ), the average net gain (or income) was $56,679, with more 
(continued)
Table 2. Market Value of Agricultural Products Sold Including Landlord’s 
Share, Direct, and Organic: 2002 and 1997. (2002 Farm Census)
Item 2002
Percent of 
total
in 2002
1997
Total sales farms
$1,000
2,128,982
200,646,355
100.0
100.0
2,215,876
201,379,812
Average per farm dollars 94,245 (X) 90,880
By value of sales:
Less than $1,000 farms
$1,000
570,919
63,223
26.8
(Z)
415,952
76,813
$1,000 to $2,499 farms
$1,000
255,639
422,136
12.0
0.2
277,074
461,290
$2,500 to $4,999 farms
$1,000
213,326
762,554
10.0
0.4
265,667
951,581
$5,000 to $9,999 farms
$1,000
223,168
1,577,184
10.5
0.8
267,575
1,897,337
$10,000 to $19,999 farms
$1,000
197,967
2,781,507
9.3
1.4
228,297
3,218,769
$20,000 to $24,999 farms
$1,000
58,190
1,285,921
2.7
0.6
65,342
1,450,207
$25,000 to $39,999 farms
$1,000
109,310
3,438,976
5.1
1.7
123,854
3,909,475
$40,000 to $49,999 farms
$1,000
48,596
2,154,772
2.3
1.1
55,775
2,481,435
$50,000 to $99,999 farms
$1,000
140,479
10,024,295
6.6
5.0
163,510
11,716,046
$100,000 to $249,999 farms
$1,000
159,052
25,401,608
7.5
12.7
190,919
30,406,176
$250,000 to $499,999 farms
$1,000
81,694
28,530,105
3.8
14.2
91,503
31,848,311
$500,000 to $999,999 farms
$1,000
41,969
28,944,401
2.0
14.4
43,973
30,138,101
$1,000,000 or more farms
$1,000
28,673
95,259,672
1.3
47.5
26,435
82,824,271
$1,000,000 to 
$2,499,999
farms
$1,000
20,724
30,618,426
1.0
15.3
19,552
28,603,612
$2,500,000 to 
$4,999,999
farms
$1,000
4,611
15,700,332
0.2
7.8
4,084
13,850,777
$5,000,000 or more farms
$1,000
3,338
48,940,914
0.2
24.4
2,799
40,369,882
Value of sales by commodity or commodity group:
Crops, including nursery 
and greenhouse
farms
$1,000
944,656
95,151,954
44.4
47.4
1,115,959
100,668,794
Grains, oilseeds, dry 
beans, and dry peas
farms
$1,000
485,124
39,957,698
22.8
19.9
(NA)
(NA)
Tobacco farms
$1,000
56,879
1,616,533
2.7
0.8
93,330
2,922,590
Cotton and cottonseed farms
$1,000
24,721
4,005,366
1.2
2.0
33,594
6,227,116
Vegetables, melons, 
potatoes, and sweet 
potatoes
farms
$1,000
59,044
12,785,898
2.8
6.4
(NA)
(NA)
Fruits, tree nuts, and 
berries
farms
$1,000
107,707
13,770,603
5.1
6.9
93,784
12,883,386
Nursery, greenhouse, 
floriculture, and sod
farms
$1,000
56,070
14,686,390
2.6
7.3
(NA)
(NA)
Cut Christmas trees and 
short-rotation woody crops
farms
$1,000
14,744
399,848
0.7
0.2
(NA)
(NA)
Other crops and hay farms
$1,000
359,262
7,929,618
16.9
4.0
(NA)
(NA)
Livestock, poultry, and their 
products
farms
$1,000
1,094,608
105,494,401
51.4
52.6
1,322,054
100,711,018
Poultry and eggs farms
$1,000
83,381
23,972,333
3.9
11.9
75,444
23,389,462
Cattle and calves farms
$1,000
851,971
45,115,184
40.0
22.5
1,121,003
40,927,182
Milk and other dairy 
products from cows
farms
$1,000
78,963
20,281,166
3.7
10.1
102,790
19,097,293
Hogs and pigs farms
$1,000
82,028
12,400,977
3.9
6.2
112,377
13,833,370
Sheep, goats, and their 
products
farms
$1,000
96,249
541,745
4.5
0.3
(NA)
(NA)
Horses, ponies, mules, 
burros, and donkeys
farms
$1,000
128,045
1,328,733
6.0
0.7
(NA)
(NA)
Aquaculture farms
$1,000
6,653
1,132,524
0.3
0.6
(NA)
(NA)
Other animals and other 
animal products
farms
$1,000
29,391
721,738
1.4
0.4
(NA)
(NA)
Value of landlord’s share of
total sales
farms
$1,000
132,567
4,567,940
6.2
2.3
(NA)
(NA)
Value of agricultural products 
sold directly to individuals
for human consumption
farms
$1,000
116,733
812,204
5.5
0.4
110,639
591,820
Average per farm dollars 6,958 (X) 5,349
By value of sales:
$1 to $499 farms
$1,000
32,420
6,645
1.5
(Z)
33,537
6,949
$500 to $999 farms
$1,000
19,145
13,124
0.9
(Z)
19,013
12,997
$1,000 to $4,999 farms
$1,000
42,660
93,611
2.0
(Z)
39,477
86,410
$5,000 to $9,999 farms
$1,000
9,598
64,517
0.5
(Z)
8,293
55,600
$10,000 to $24,999 farms
$1,000
7,256
108,766
0.3
0.1
5,903
89,000
$25,000 to $49,999 farms
$1,000
2,831
96,322
0.1
(Z)
2,224
75,614
$50,000 or more farms
$1,000
2,823
429,220
0.1
0.2
2,192
265,251
Value of certified organically 
produced commodities
farms
$1,000
11,998
392,813
0.6
0.2
(NA)
(NA)
Average per farm dollars 32,740 (X) (NA)
By value of sales:
$1 to $999 farms
$1,000
3,297
1,258
0.2
(Z)
(NA)
(NA)
$1,000 to $9,999 farms
$1,000
5,408
18,562
0.3
(Z)
(NA)
(NA)
$10,000 to $24,999 farms
$1,000
1,344
20,752
0.1
(Z)
(NA)
(NA)
$25,000 to $49,999 farms
$1,000
729
25,100
(Z)
(Z)
(NA)
(NA)
$50,000 or more farms
$1,000
1,220
327,140
0.1
0.2
(NA)
(NA)
(NA), not available; (X), not applicable; (Z), less than half the unit is shown.
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Table 2. (continued)
Item 2002
Percent of 
total
in 2002
1997
Total sales farms 2,128,982 100.0 2,215,876
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Item 2002
Percent of 
total
in 2002
1997
Total sales farms
$1,000
2,128,982
200,646,355
100.0
100.0
2,215,876
201,379,812
Average per farm dollars 94,245 (X) 90,880
By value of sales:
Less than $1,000 farms
$1,000
570,919
63,223
26.8
(Z)
415,952
76,813
$1,000 to $2,499 farms
$1,000
255,639
422,136
12.0
0.2
277,074
461,290
$2,500 to $4,999 farms
$1,000
213,326
762,554
10.0
0.4
265,667
951,581
$5,000 to $9,999 farms
$1,000
223,168
1,577,184
10.5
0.8
267,575
1,897,337
$10,000 to $19,999 farms
$1,000
197,967
2,781,507
9.3
1.4
228,297
3,218,769
$20,000 to $24,999 farms
$1,000
58,190
1,285,921
2.7
0.6
65,342
1,450,207
$25,000 to $39,999 farms
$1,000
109,310
3,438,976
5.1
1.7
123,854
3,909,475
$40,000 to $49,999 farms
$1,000
48,596
2,154,772
2.3
1.1
55,775
2,481,435
$50,000 to $99,999 farms
$1,000
140,479
10,024,295
6.6
5.0
163,510
11,716,046
$100,000 to $249,999 farms
$1,000
159,052
25,401,608
7.5
12.7
190,919
30,406,176
$250,000 to $499,999 farms
$1,000
81,694
28,530,105
3.8
14.2
91,503
31,848,311
$500,000 to $999,999 farms
$1,000
41,969
28,944,401
2.0
14.4
43,973
30,138,101
$1,000,000 or more farms
$1,000
28,673
95,259,672
1.3
47.5
26,435
82,824,271
$1,000,000 to 
$2,499,999
farms
$1,000
20,724
30,618,426
1.0
15.3
19,552
28,603,612
$2,500,000 to 
$4,999,999
farms
$1,000
4,611
15,700,332
0.2
7.8
4,084
13,850,777
$5,000,000 or mor farms
$1,000
3,338
48,940,914
0.2
24.4
2,799
40,369,882
Value of sales by commodity or commodity group:
Crops, including nursery 
and greenhouse
farms
$1,000
944,656
95,151,954
44.4
47.4
1,115,959
100,668,794
Grains, oilseeds, dry 
beans, and dry peas
farms
$1,000
485,124
39,957,698
22.8
19.9
(NA)
(NA)
Tobacco farms
$1,000
56,879
1,616,533
2.7
0.8
93,330
2,922,590
Cotton and cottonseed farms
$1,000
24,721
4,005,366
1.2
2.0
33,594
6,227,116
Vegetables, melons, 
potatoes, and sweet 
potatoes
farms
$1,000
59,044
12,785,898
2.8
6.4
(NA)
(NA)
Fruits, tree nuts, and 
berries
farms
$1,000
107,707
13,770,603
5.1
6.9
93,784
12,883,386
Nursery, greenhouse, 
floriculture, and sod
farms
$1,000
56,070
14,686,390
2.6
7.3
(NA)
(NA)
Cut Christmas trees and 
short-rotation woody crops
farms
$1,000
14,744
399,848
0.7
0.2
(NA)
(NA)
Other crops and hay farms
$1,000
359,262
7,929,618
16.9
4.0
(NA)
(NA)
Livestock, poultry, and their 
products
farms
$1,000
1,094,608
105,494,401
51.4
52.6
1,322,054
100,711,018
Poultry and eggs farms
$1,000
83,381
23,972,333
3.9
11.9
75,444
23,389,462
Cattle and calves farms
$1,000
851,971
45,115,184
40.0
22.5
1,121,003
40,927,182
Milk and other dairy 
products from cows
farms
$1,000
78,963
20,281,166
3.7
10.1
102,790
19,097,293
Hogs and pigs farms
$1,000
82,028
12,400,977
3.9
6.2
112,377
13,833,370
Sheep, goats, and their 
products
farms
$1,000
96,249
541,745
4.5
0.3
(NA)
(NA)
Horses, ponies, mules, 
burros, and donkeys
farms
$1,000
128,045
1,328,733
6.0
0.7
(NA)
(NA)
Aquaculture farms
$1,000
6,653
1,132,524
0.3
0.6
(NA)
(NA)
Other animals and other 
animal products
farms
$1,000
29,391
721,738
1.4
0.4
(NA)
(NA)
Value of landlord’s share of
total sales
farms
$1,000
132,567
4,567,940
6.2
2.3
(NA)
(NA)
Value of agricultural products 
sold directly to individuals
for human consumption
farms
$1,000
116,733
812,204
5.5
0.4
110,639
591,820
Average per farm dollars 6,958 (X) 5,349
By value of sales:
$1 to $499 farms
$1,000
32,420
6,645
1.5
(Z)
33,537
6,949
$500 to $999 farms
$1,000
19,145
13,124
0.9
(Z)
19,013
12,997
$1,000 to $4,999 farms
$1,000
42,660
93,611
2.0
(Z)
39,477
86,410
$5,000 to $9,999 farms
$1,000
9,598
64,517
0.5
(Z)
8,293
55,600
$10,000 to $24,999 farms
$1,000
7,256
108,766
0.3
0.1
5,903
89,000
$25,000 to $49,999 farms
$1,000
2,831
96,322
0.1
(Z)
2,224
75,614
$50,000 or more farms
$1,000
2,823
429,220
0.1
0.2
2,192
265,251
Value of certified organically 
produced commodities
farms
$1,000
11,998
392,813
0.6
0.2
(NA)
(NA)
Average per farm dollars 32,740 (X) (NA)
By value of sales:
$1 to $999 farms
$1,000
3,297
1,258
0.2
(Z)
(NA)
(NA)
$1,000 to $9,999 farms
$1,000
5,408
18,562
0.3
(Z)
(NA)
(NA)
$10,000 to $24,999 farms
$1,000
1,344
20,752
0.1
(Z)
(NA)
(NA)
$25,000 to $49,999 farms
$1,000
729
25,100
(Z)
(Z)
(NA)
(NA)
$50,000 or more farms
$1,000
1,220
327,140
0.1
0.2
(NA)
(NA)
(NA), not available; (X), not applicable; (Z), less than half the unit is shown.
Table 2. (continued)
Item 2002
Percent of 
total
in 2002
1997
Total sales farms 2,128,982 100.0 2,215,876
Table 2. Market Value of Agricultural Products Sold Including Landlord’s 
Share, Direct, and Organic: 2002 and 1997. (2002 Farm Census)
Item 2002
Percent of 
total
in 2002
1997
Total sales farms
$1,000
2,128,982
200,646,355
100.0
100.0
2,215,876
201,379,812
Average per farm dollars 94,245 (X) 90,880
By value of sales:
Less than $1,000 farms
$1,000
570,919
63,223
26.8
(Z)
415,952
76,813
$1,000 to $2,499 farms
$1,000
255,639
422,136
12.0
0.2
277,074
461,290
$2,500 to $4,999 farms
$1,000
213,326
762,554
10.0
0.4
265,667
951,581
$5,000 to $9,999 farms
$1,000
223,168
1,577,184
10.5
0.8
267,575
1,897,337
$10,000 to $19,999 farms
$1,000
197,967
2,781,507
9.3
1.4
228,297
3,218,769
$20,000 to $24,999 farms
$1,000
58,190
1,285,921
2.7
0.6
65,342
1,450,207
$25,000 to $39,999 farms
$1,000
109,310
3,438,976
5.1
1.7
123,854
3,909,475
$40,000 to $49,999 farms
$1,000
48,596
2,154,772
2.3
1.1
55,775
2,481,435
$50,000 to $99,999 farms
$1,000
140,479
10,024,295
6.6
5.0
163,510
11,716,046
$100,000 to $249,999 farms
$1,000
159,052
25,401,608
7.5
12.7
190,919
30,406,176
$250,000 to $499,999 farms
$1,000
81,694
28,530,105
3.8
14.2
91,503
31,848,311
$500,000 to $999,999 farms
$1,000
41,969
28,944,401
2.0
14.4
43,973
30,138,101
$1,000,000 or more farms
$1,000
28,673
95,259,672
1.3
47.5
26,435
82,824,271
$1,000,000 to 
$2,499,999
farms
$1,000
20,724
30,618,426
1.0
15.3
19,552
28,603,612
$2,500,000 to 
$4,999,999
farms
$1,000
4,611
15,700,332
0.2
7.8
4,084
13,850,777
$5,000,000 or more farms
$1,000
3,338
48,940,914
0.2
24.4
2,799
40,369,882
Value of sales by commodity or commodity group:
Crops, including nursery 
and greenhouse
farms
$1,000
944,656
95,151,954
44.4
47.4
1,115,959
100,668,794
Grains, oilseeds, dry 
beans, and dry peas
farms
$1,000
485,124
39,957,698
22.8
19.9
(NA)
(NA)
Tobacco farms
$1,000
56,879
1,616,533
2.7
0.8
93,330
2,922,590
Cotton and cottonseed farms
$1,000
24,721
4,005,366
1.2
2.0
33,594
6,227,116
Vegetables, melons, 
potatoes, and sweet 
potatoes
farms
$1,000
59,044
12,785,898
2.8
6.4
(NA)
(NA)
Fruits, tree nuts, and 
berries
farms
$1,000
107,707
13,770,603
5.1
6.9
93,784
12,883,386
Nursery, greenhouse, 
floriculture, and sod
farms
$1,000
56,070
14,686,390
2.6
7.3
(NA)
(NA)
Cut Christmas trees and 
short-rotation woody crops
farms
$1,000
14,744
399,848
0.7
0.2
(NA)
(NA)
Other crops and hay farms
$1,000
359,262
7,929,618
16.9
4.0
(NA)
(NA)
Livestock, poultry, and their 
products
farms
$1,000
1,094,608
105,494,401
51.4
52.6
1,322,054
100,711,018
Poultry and eggs farms
$1,000
83,381
23,972,333
3.9
11.9
75,444
23,389,462
Cattle and calves farms
$1,000
851,971
45,115,184
40.0
22.5
1,121,003
40,927,182
Milk and other dairy 
products from cows
farms
$1,000
78,963
20,281,166
3.7
10.1
102,790
19,097,293
Hogs and pigs farms
$1,000
82,028
12,400,977
3.9
6.2
112,377
13,833,370
Sheep, goats, and their 
products
farms
$1,000
96,249
541,745
4.5
0.3
(NA)
(NA)
Horses, ponies, mules, 
burros, and donkeys
farms
$1,000
128,045
1,328,733
6.0
0.7
(NA)
(NA)
Aquaculture farms
$1,000
6,653
1,132,524
0.3
0.6
(NA)
(NA)
Other animals and other 
animal products
farms
$1,000
29,391
721,738
1.4
0.4
(NA)
(NA)
Value of landlord’s share of
total sales
f r
$1,000
32,567
4,567,940
6.2
2.3
(NA)
(NA)
Value of agricultural products 
sold directly to individuals
for human consumption
farms
$1,000
116,733
812,204
5.5
0.4
110,639
591,820
Average per farm dollars 6,958 (X) 5,349
By value of sales:
$1 to $499 farms
$1,000
32,420
6,645
1.5
(Z)
33,537
6,949
$500 to $999 farms
$1,000
19,145
13,124
0.9
(Z)
19,013
12,997
$1,000 to $4,999 farms
$1,000
42,660
93,611
2.0
(Z)
39,477
86,410
$5,000 to $9,999 farms
$1,000
9,598
64,517
0.5
(Z)
8,293
55,600
$10,000 to $24,999 farms
$1,000
7,256
108,766
0.3
0.1
5,903
89,000
$25,000 to $49,999 farms
$1,000
2,831
96,322
0.1
(Z)
2,224
75,614
$50,000 or more farms
$1,000
2,823
429,220
0.1
0.2
2,192
265,251
Value of certified organically 
produced commodities
farms
$1,000
11,998
392,813
0.6
0.2
(NA)
(NA)
Average per farm dollars 32,740 (X) (NA)
By value of sales:
$1 to $999 farms
$1,000
3,297
1,258
0.2
(Z)
(NA)
(NA)
$1,000 to $9,999 farms
$1,000
5,408
18,562
0.3
(Z)
(NA)
(NA)
$10,000 to $24,999 farms
$1,000
1,344
20,752
0.1
(Z)
(NA)
(NA)
$25,000 to $49,999 farms
$1,000
729
25,100
(Z)
(Z)
(NA)
(NA)
$50,000 or more farms
$1,000
1,220
327,140
0.1
0.2
(NA)
(NA)
(NA), not available; (X), not applicable; (Z), less than half the unit is shown.
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than 82 percent of these gains on farms (212,965) having profits in 
excess of $50,000, which in most cases were commercial or high-level 
intermediate farms (more than $150,000 in sales). Balancing this were 
the 1,134,879 farms that suffered losses. Thus, for farmers as a whole, 
the total net gain was $40,514,055, or just over $19,000 per farm. Since 
some farms had more than one operator, as well as more than one house-
hold, the average net income of operators was $15,848. Clearly, only the 
ablest, largest, and most efficient farmers are able to make a living on the 
returns from their farms, even if one includes the unrealized capital gains 
from rising land values.11
This summary of income data provides a very positive view of the 
status of at least the key producers among American farmers. They are do-
ing well, and as debates on a 2007 farm bill demonstrated, most are quite 
happy with existing farm policies and have fought against major changes 
(or what critics describe as major reforms).  At the same time, most farmers 
with sales under $100,000 seem to be prospering, if household incomes 
are any indicator. They are better off than most Americans. This is because 
of off-farm jobs, along with either small profits or at least tax benefits from 
farming, and increased wealth because of rising land values. But even from 
the perspective of farmers, all is not well. And from the perspective of 
many outside critics, contemporary American agriculture is a scandal.
Figure 13. Percent of farms and market value of agricultural products sold: 2002. 
(2002 Farm Census)
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CritiCs anD CritiCisms
Everyone has to concede one point: American farmers have achieved 
a level of efficient food production unprecedented in world history. it 
seems almost unbelievable that 322,000 principal farm operators, on 
322,000 farms, guide the production of 89 percent of all domestic foods 
and fibers (cotton, wool) consumed in the united States, with a remark-
ably small supply of family or hired labor. They also produce enough 
food and fiber exports (in excess of imports) to supply the other 11 
percent, at least in quantity if not in balance of products. The principal 
operators of these 322,000 farms make up only slightly more than 0.001 
percent of the population of the united States.
Economists point out that different agricultural policies might have 
slightly increased this level of efficient production. Even most large farms 
have not achieved the maximum possible economies of scale. The race 
toward more specialization, larger farms, and fewer farmers is not over. 
on the other side, it is clear that different policies would have lessened 
the efficiency of production. This includes major subsidies to keep small 
farmers in business. less efficient production would mean a larger share 
of the American labor force employed in agriculture and a proportion-
ately lower amount in manufacturing and services, along with a lower 
average level of consumption for everyone. Also, lower food production 
in the united States could have had a dire impact on world food supplies 
and on efforts to eliminate world hunger.
one can cite many possible benefits from policies that would have 
enabled more Americans to remain on farms. What one believes “ben-
eficial” will always reflect personal taste and values. More small farmers 
would have avoided dislocation and, at times, migration. This would have 
meant, over the long term, a qualitative gain for many farmers and pos-
sibly for the nation as a whole because of the vast social problems cre-
ated by displaced farmers, particularly those from the South. After all, the 
greatest surplus problem in American agricultural history has involved 
not commodities but people. it is conceivable that a nation of smaller 
family farms would have benefited the environment, but this begs specif-
ics. Certainly, smaller farms would have required more land in cultivation 
and thus more forests cut or not allowed to regrow, but possibly fewer 
pesticides and chemical fertilizers, less distant transport of foods, and less 
burning of fossil fuels, although one can dispute each of these claims. 
one could argue that the quality of foods would have remained higher 
with smaller farms and the growing of more flavorful if not more ship-
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pable varieties. Also, more and smaller farms would have helped in the 
survival of small rural towns and villages in remote areas of the country.
Most critics of present-day American agriculture focus on federal pol-
icies that helped produce the present size and efficiency of a few farms 
and policies that now subsidize even the largest and wealthiest farmers. 
Governmental policies helped create the oligarchy at the top and now 
help perpetuate it. Since Congress seems to spend most of its time ca-
tering to various powerful economic interest groups, it has given large 
commercial farmers (the Department of Agriculture definition) almost 
everything they want. This worries critics on two counts: economic fair-
ness, and the effects of such a subsidized agriculture on the environment, 
food safety, animal welfare, nutrition, the fate of small farmers, and the 
health of rural communities and small towns. Mixed in is a sense of loss 
as the traditional farm is passing away, and with it the noncommercial, 
nonconsumer values that Americans purportedly once held dear. The 
“soul” of America is thus at stake.
Much of the critique of commodity policies come from experts with-
in the agricultural establishment. Most notable is Willard Cochrane, who 
has written detailed books on the various farm programs, worked on 
farm bills during the Kennedy administration, and has proposed various 
reforms. He, like so many critics, deplores the amount of subsidies for 
the larger crops and for the large and affluent farmers who need them 
least. He has suggested more support for small farmers and for healthy 
fruits, nuts, and vegetables (since more than half these products come 
from irrigated farms, it is a mistake to argue that they have not received 
any federal support). He has also proposed more federal funds for con-
servation, environmental protection, food safety, and the rural poor. Con-
sistent with proposals that go back to the Brannan Plan in the Truman 
administration, he wants to base support payments not on past produc-
tion records but on the need for income stability among individual farm-
ers. in at least small ways, all these proposals helped shape the debates on 
the proposed farm bill of 2007.12
But such reforms, if one so conceives them, will be difficult to achieve, 
given the present political clout of commercial farmers. The Department 
of Agriculture, a now engorged bureaucracy, has many functions, some 
of which are scarcely tied to farming (the Forest Service, rural develop-
ment). But at its core, it is the one agency that represents successful farm-
ers. its programs helped create these farmers and they remain its main 
constituency. in the same way that the Department of Commerce repre-
sents the interests of business enterprises, the Department of Agriculture 
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represents the most productive farmers. Beginning with the Resettlement 
Administration and the Farm Security Administration in the new Deal, 
the Department of Agriculture has exerted some effort to aid small farm-
ers (and, only recently, minority farmers) through rehabilitation loans, 
tenant-purchase plans, and enlarged payments. The proposed farm bill 
of 2007 was full of gestures to these constituencies, with almost every 
program offering special subsidies to “beginning and socially disadvan-
taged” farmers. But there is a bit of irony here, for if these presently 
disadvantaged farmers make good, or even survive as full-time farmers, 
they will do so by gaining the demanding managerial skills needed in 
contemporary agriculture and, in most cases, by developing large-scale, 
highly capitalized farms. They will thus become part of the ruling elite. 
A few may make a good living in niche farms, or what i call “alternative 
agriculture.” But most are doomed to failure, and continued subsidies to 
them will be a form of welfare, not an aspect of industrial policy.
Race is now a prominent issue in farm politics. This is a bit ironic, 
because the concern for African Americans, in particular, comes much 
too late. Most blacks have long since departed agriculture. Many reasons 
lay behind their exodus, but one was the unfair treatment they received 
from the federal government, beginning with the Morrill Act of 1862. in 
the South, they were excluded from the large, segregated land-grant col-
leges and had to make do with small, underfunded, academically inferior 
agricultural and mechanical schools for blacks. The outreach programs 
from the land-grant institutions also discriminated against blacks, with 
only a few black extension agents to serve their needs. Beginning in the 
new Deal, despite a long and bitter controversy in the Department of 
Agriculture, both sharecroppers in general and black sharecroppers in 
particular rarely received their legal share of payments to farmers.  African 
American farm owners were rarely represented at all in the local commit-
tee system that determined allotments. And so it continued even after the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, when most of the aggrieved blacks had already 
moved away from their former farms. The few remaining black farmers 
have successfully sued in the court and, in one case, won compensation 
for past injustices.13
Even without overt, or unintended, discrimination, most black farm 
owners had a limited chance of success in the competitive revolution 
after 1950. Most owned small farms, lacked the education of whites, 
had limited political clout, and could not compete with the large-scale, 
highly mechanized cotton, tobacco, and soybean farms or dairy and live-
stock operations that soon dominated southern agriculture. A head start, 
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including the original base acreage won in 1933, usually determined 
later outcomes. in fact, in retrospect, it is amazing how federal policy 
from 1933 on ratified existing inequalities. Thus blacks, along with most 
tenants and farmers who owned small or poorly located farms, were 
almost doomed to failure unless they were able to gain off-farm em-
ployment. As it turned out, a much higher proportion of small white 
farmers continued part-time farm operations, combined with factory or 
service employment, than did blacks. This was a matter of choice, job 
discrimination, and the fact that such a small portion of blacks owned 
their farms.
other issues cited by outside critics involve animal welfare and food 
safety and quality. Animal rights advocates are having some impact on 
consumer demand, if not on government policies. of course, from a 
vegetarian perspective, the whole livestock enterprise is a story of enor-
mous cruelty as well as the source of an unhealthy diet. But plenty of 
nonvegetarians protest the way we grow and kill animals. i need not 
dwell on the caged chickens that cannot roost normally and cannot even 
spread their wings, or the hogs kept in such small cages that they cannot 
turn around, or the calves that are taken from their mothers at birth and 
grown to veal size in cages and on artificial feed. one could also cite the 
huge, crowded feeding lots for cattle and the enormous confinement 
dairy farms where cows do not have access to pasture. i noted earlier the 
antibiotics routinely fed to chickens, the steroids given to almost all beef 
cows, and the hormones fed to dairy cows. These realities have led to a 
growing market, among those who can afford it, for free-range broilers 
and hogs, eggs from noncaged chickens, grass-fed beef, and organic beef 
and pork. Yet one has to acknowledge the obvious: these contested meth-
ods have tremendously lowered the price of meat proteins. So far, only a 
small minority of consumers is concerned enough about animal welfare 
to pay up to double the present price for less efficiently produced meats.
Safety and flavor are valid concerns about any food. Whatever the safe-
guards in the meatpacking process or in its transportation and sale, meat 
will always pose potential dangers to consumers. This is not a new prob-
lem. in fact, the meat available in supermarkets today is less likely to be 
contaminated with botulism or other deadly bacteria than that available 
in the past from local farmers or village meat markets. But many more 
people are at risk. Farmers boast (with justification, i think) that the food 
consumed by Americans is safer than at any time in the past. never before 
in history have consumers had such a wide array of food choices, with 
almost every imaginable food, both domestic and exotic, available at any 
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time of the year. Given the scope of the food distribution system, it is a 
marvel that more outbreaks of bacterial infection, like the one affecting 
spinach in 2006, do not occur. More rigorous inspection and tougher 
regulations may allow marginal improvements, but overall, our food is 
safe.
But is our food tasty? As an avid gardener, i deplore most store-bought 
tomatoes. They are hard and almost totally lacking in flavor. My favorite 
varieties of melons are too thin skinned for shipping at any distance. it 
is almost impossible to get fresh ears of corn that have the full flavor of 
those just picked from one’s garden. Pineapples and other exotic fruits, 
except for bananas, suffer from being picked half green. Cold-storage 
apples rot too quickly when purchased and sometimes lack flavor. in lo-
cal markets in Tennessee, i often have to buy inferior California peaches 
because they are the only ones available; the more flavorful southern va-
rieties are nowhere to be found. And so it goes. The trade-off for having 
access to almost any fruit or vegetable at any time of the year and at an af-
fordable price is inferior flavor. one can shop in specialty stores and, for 
a price, buy very fresh foods shipped overnight by air, but this is largely a 
luxury enjoyed by expensive restaurants. Buying locally grown fruits and 
vegetables in season at farmers’ markets is one way to get better-tasting 
produce, but most Americans are addicted to year-round availability. My 
assessment is more positive for frozen foods. in most cases, flash-freezing 
by commercial processors preserves flavor and texture better than home 
freezing.
agriCulture anD the environment
What about farming and the environment? This involves three issues: the 
inevitable effects of any type of farming on the environment, the added 
environmental effects of traditional American agriculture, and the new 
environmental hazards created by modern agriculture with its large ma-
chines and abundant chemicals.
in the jargon of economists, almost any economic enterprise involves 
unpaid externalities, most of which are environmental in nature. in the 
case of agriculture, farmers in the past rarely had to pay for the necessary 
or unnecessary damage they did to the soil, air, and water, damage that 
inflicted a burden on the larger public. of all human activities, the culti-
vation of crops has had the largest impact on the face of the earth, begin-
ning with the elimination of up to half of all forests. if one places a high 
value on an environment little affected by humans, then agriculture by 
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necessity is hostile to environmental health. it has eliminated wilderness, 
shifted the balance of plant and animal species, altered the hydrological 
cycle, and, in a limited way, altered climate. But whether these effects are 
all good or bad depends on one’s values. For example, the orderly, green, 
garden-like fields of England or the netherlands may appear, to some 
at least, to be an improvement on wild nature. in any case, these built-
in effects of farming were necessary for the growth of human popula-
tions and the types of civilization that ensued from that increase. Today, 
any strategy to eliminate crop farming and domesticated livestock would 
have to include the means of eliminating most humans now on earth, for 
only a small remnant could live by hunting and gathering.
Thus, the only environmental costs that are pertinent to present-day 
policy choices are those that are open to mitigation by farmers without 
impossibly high economic costs or, in some cases, such as soil erosion, 
with major economic gains. Soil is the one resource most closely tied to 
farming. Erosion and nutrient depletion are the greatest threats to soil. in 
America, from colonial times to the Great Depression, American farmers 
as a whole were reckless in their use of the land. So much land was avail-
able that they could afford to deplete soil nutrients or let hillsides erode 
with little consequence, for they could clear new land or settle in new 
areas. often, in the short term, they gained extra income by making such 
extravagant demands on the land, even as they benefited by a rapid, often 
wasteful, clearing of trees. But they incurred high future costs for the 
larger society, costs that began to come due, in a major way, by 1930.
it may surprise many people (or disturb those who are most critical 
of contemporary agriculture) to learn that almost all evidence suggests 
that American soils are now eroding at a slower rate than at any time in 
the last two centuries. This was not true as recently as the mid-1980s. By 
then, the conservation policies enacted in the new Deal had eliminated 
the worst forms of erosion. The deep gullies of the Southeast, the blow-
ing dust of the Great Plains, did not reappear. But the boom of the 1970s, 
the push of grain farming onto new and more erodible lands, and the 
relative neglect of conservation issues by too many farmers created a situ-
ation in which the actual soil loss each year rivaled that of the drought-
stricken 1930s. This loss led to new and more vigorous efforts to control 
erosion and a gradual improvement over the next two decades.
Erosion is part of nature. in time, all soil, and even all rock, will erode. 
Such loss is compensated for by tectonic forces that create new rock and, 
eventually, new soil. But clearly the cultivation of crops, or the overgraz-
ing of grasslands, hastens erosion by wind and water. Because of recent 
170 a revolution Down on the Farm
conservation efforts, well over half of American cropland is now free of 
the degree of erosion that threatens sustainable production—that is, the 
amount of soil lost per year per acre is less than the two to six tons (the 
exact amount varies with soil types and vegetation) that could seriously 
threaten production over the next century. But there are major exceptions 
to this good news, for around 10 percent of soils are still quite vulner-
able to erosion. At the same time, the amount of land in cultivation was 
stable or even declining until the recent ethanol boom, and the amount 
of forestland has increased over the last hundred years. The old American 
custom of clearing new ground is all but over, even as the enormous an-
nual demand for wood as fuel is history.14
The natural supply of nutrients, and the level of organic matter, is at an 
all-time low in most soils that are intensively cultivated. only a few tradi-
tional, or organic, farmers still carry out the old nutrient replenishment 
tactics, such as a complex pattern of crop rotation, the use of legumes for 
soil building, or the use of manure. Commercial farmers buy fertilizer 
instead, which so far costs less than the loss of production required by 
past methods. From the public’s perspective, this present practice poses 
two risks: future scarcity of fertilizers, and the pollution that results from 
the overuse or careless use of synthetic fertilizers. if fertilizers became too 
expensive for profitable use (since nitrates are so dependent on methane, 
this is not an impossible scenario), farmers might have to return to older 
means of preserving soil fertility, including the planting of cover crops. 
This would reduce the amount of land devoted to grains, beans, and 
cotton; raise the price of such basic crops; and risk more food scarcities 
in underdeveloped areas of the world. in effect, synthetic fertilizers are 
now necessary to feed the world’s population of more than 6.5 billion 
people.
Because of the heavy use of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, water 
pollution has become an even greater environmental risk than erosion. 
in any form of cultivation, some soil content ends up in streams and 
lakes, either by erosion or by the leaching of phosphates and nitrates into 
the subsoil and eventually into groundwater. This is less of a problem 
with no-till or low-till farming. Thus, the majority of nonpoint water 
pollution in most of the world derives from agriculture, followed by 
household wastewater. nonpoint sources are small but widely distrib-
uted sources of pollutants that are difficult to identify and control, unlike 
the point-specific pollution of a factory or a large hog or poultry farm. 
The normal flow of soil nutrients into groundwater is increased by the 
use of fertilizer, and particularly its overuse. This is an ever-present risk 
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with nitrogen, which leaches quickly from the soil. So if farmers apply 
nitrogen-containing fertilizer before the time of rapid plant growth, they 
almost ensure the loss of much of the nitrogen before the crop absorbs it. 
Too much nitrogen in groundwater can reach toxic proportions. A heavy 
load of both phosphates and nitrates supports the rapid growth of algae 
in streams and lakes. This in turn strips oxygen from the water, which can 
lead to fish kill and hastens the filling in of marshes and speeds up the 
gradual death of lakes (eutrophication). The only defense against these 
effects is a better-calibrated application of fertilizer, and even this can-
not fully solve the problem because of such variables as the amount of 
rainfall. For this reason, modern fertilizer-based agriculture has a greater 
pollution risk compared with traditional farming. The rotation of row 
crops with grasses allows a recharging of soil nitrates through decaying 
vegetation, and the planting of nitrogen-fixing legumes adds nitrogen 
from root nodules. This organic nitrogen is only slowly converted to the 
inorganic, soluble nitrates that plants can absorb and thus poses much 
less of a threat to groundwater than synthetic fertilizer.
in the next two decades, water scarcity may be the greatest threat to 
American agriculture. irrigation accounts for more than 80 percent of all 
fresh water utilized in the united States. More than half the crops west 
of the 100th parallel use irrigation water drawn from dammed rivers or 
from aquifers. By some estimates, at least 25 percent of water used for 
irrigation is not replenished annually. This is most true for the ogallala 
aquifer in the Great Plains, which is shrinking each year and may, in the 
next three decades, be all but exhausted. in the Colorado River watershed, 
urban demands are already affecting agricultural users, some of whom 
have sold their water rights to nearby cities. By 2007, several years of 
drought had shrunk by half the two largest Colorado reservoirs—Mead 
and Powell—and it is feared that they may never fill again. Global warm-
ing is already shrinking mountain glaciers and the amount of snow cover 
that remains into the summer to feed streams. in the past, western farm-
ers enjoyed cheap, federally subsidized water. in the future, they may 
have to use water more efficiently (covered canals, drip systems), which 
will add greatly to costs.
Earlier, i enumerated the possible problems posed by the use of anti-
biotics and hormones in livestock. insecticides, fungicides, and herbi-
cides have the potential to harm those who apply them or possibly a 
larger population if residues remain on foods or spread beyond the fields. 
However, few certified pesticides leave toxic wastes in the soil. Agricul-
ture can rarely be blamed for toxic waste sites, with one exception—large 
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lagoons for the storage of poultry, hog, or cattle manure, which some-
times leak or burst in floods and spread toxic materials into streams, kill-
ing fish or endangering public water supplies. north Carolina has had the 
worst problems with such manure disposal.
Many of the environmental problems created by farming are shared 
with the larger society. Agricultural machines, powered by fossil fuels, 
contribute to air pollution in the same way automobiles do, and to the 
greenhouse gases that boost global warming. in the area of air pollution, 
however, farmers have a unique problem—the methane expelled by ru-
minants (particularly our large population of cows) and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the methane generated by manure disposal and flooded rice fields. 
Together, these contribute nearly a third of methane from human origins, 
or nearly 3 percent of the greenhouse gases emitted in the united States. 
unless Americans become vegetarians, there is no way to eliminate this 
methane production, although it may be possible to collect the methane 
from manure lagoons and use it for energy.
Despite the problems caused by large cow feeding lots and hog and 
poultry factories, they are at least easily identified as sources of pollu-
tion. This is not true for another worrisome problem endemic to grazing 
livestock. There is no way to prevent their excrement from percolating 
into groundwater. Also, except in a few counties, a large proportion of 
these animals have direct access to small streams and creeks. That is where 
they get their drinking water and where, in the hot summer months, 
they congregate to cool off. The result is trillions of E. coli bacteria in our 
streams. A few strains of E. coli are toxic to humans, causing a range of 
symptoms from diarrhea to intestinal bleeding and even death. These 
bacteria can directly affect the meat supply, as in the hamburger scare of 
1993, or get into the water supply used to irrigate or wash vegetables, as 
in the spinach scare of 2006. Present efforts to pass local laws requiring 
the fencing of all creeks, at great cost to farmers, would solve only part 
of this problem. The burden falls largely on the processors of meats and 
vegetables. When E. coli infects springs and wells—the sources of drinking 
water for many rural people—there is no easy solution. Beyond the hu-
man cost is the problem of dead streams that support no fish.
The livestock problem is more widespread than any other environ-
mental issue tied to farming. This is because 108 million cows, sheep, 
horses, and goats reside on over 1 million farms, or almost half of all 
farms. of these, more than 95 million are cows. unlike so many other 
aspects of farming, cows are still widely distributed. it seems that almost 
all farmers, including small and hobby farmers, have some beef cows 
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at pasture. in much of the West, the land is suitable only for grazing. in 
much of the country, range cattle remain outside all year long, and their 
manure helps recycle nitrogen. This is a blessing, except for groundwater 
seepage. in the past, cows were usually housed and fed in barns in the 
winter, with straw bedding to soak up both urine and manure. When 
scattered on fields in the spring it was a wonderful source of nutrients. 
This traditional method is almost gone, and manure, once a great asset on 
farms, is now more of a problem.15
This concludes my summary of the present status of farming in the unit-
ed States and of the various challenges faced by farmers. These issues are 
continually being addressed by Congress and by lobbyists from many dif-
ferent interest groups, and they are often of paramount concern among 
active farmers. They will remain at the center of public policy debates, 
as they were in the discussions of the proposed 2007 farm bill. But one 
assumption of most of these debates is that our overall system of farm-
ing, which developed over the last century, is beyond challenge. Thus, 
the focus has been on internal adjustments to and reforms of the existing 
agricultural establishment. This suggests a final challenge to my effort to 
write an update on American agriculture. Can one imagine a different 
agricultural system for the united States? Are there viable alternatives to 
the way we grow our food? This is the subject of the next chapter.
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8. Alternatives
Are there workable alternatives to the dominant agricultural system in 
the united States? Thousands of people believe there are, and they are 
hard at work promoting what they see as necessary substitutes for the 
present large-scale, specialized, mechanized, chemical-intensive farming 
that produces most of our food and fiber. These critics of the present 
system may agree on what is wrong with the present system, but they 
advocate different prescriptions for its reform. The labels they use for 
these alternatives also vary—permanent, sustainable, regenerative, bio-
dynamic, holistic, natural, ecological, organic, low-input. in this chapter, 
i survey some of these alternatives.
lonely Farmers
At least in a global perspective, some deeply ingrained aspects of farm-
ing in America were soon ubiquitous, particularly those involving farm 
placement and ownership. The first English settlers in America came 
largely from a village-based agriculture. Homes and churches were lo-
cated in a rather compact area, with fields and forests surrounding the 
village. This pattern prevailed briefly with the first settlers in Virginia and 
for at least a few decades in parts of new England. in new England some 
of the new towns even kept the open field system of East Anglia, with 
heads of families assigned areas of the commons to cultivate each year. 
The early new England towns, with more land than they could clear and 
cultivate, retained ownership of the forests and meadows, as well as a 
village commons (some of these still survive). But as the population in-
creased, and maturing sons needed land of their own, towns made grants 
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of land located farther away. Many of these new landowners built homes 
on their land, creating a mixed pattern of village dwellers and dispersed 
farmsteads. in time, the majority of farmers would live outside the town 
centers, with some too far away to attend church and school or even 
participate and vote in town meetings. Communal norms became more 
difficult to enforce, and the sense of community weakened.
in the southern colonies, a somewhat different pattern developed. 
There, large royal grants led to sales to individual farmers, who usually 
chose to live on their land. Widely scattered homesteads became the rule. 
Towns and villages were few in number, and any type of close communal 
life was almost impossible. This was also the pattern in most of new York 
and Pennsylvania. But in the Hudson Valley and in the South, a few very 
large landowners were able to acquire dependent workers (indentured 
servants or tenants in new York, servile workers in Maryland and Virgin-
ia), which led to clusters of dependents around the principal plantation 
home. Thus, by the eighteenth century, the typical American farm family 
lived in near isolation in its own small kingdom, with very little external 
control over its operations.
The geological survey after 1794, and the township pattern it created 
from ohio westward, reinforced this pattern of settlement and an agri-
cultural system of widely dispersed farmsteads. in the nineteenth century, 
as settlements moved into the more arid Great Plains, wheat farming 
or, farther west, the grazing of cattle led to farm and ranch homes that 
were a mile or more apart. European visitors were often amazed at what 
they perceived as the lonely lives of American farmers. Some eastern re-
formers lamented the antisocial aspects of such settlement patterns, and 
European immigrants, particularly women, suffered from their lonely 
lives on the plains. only in the twentieth century did improved roads and 
automobiles lessen the isolation. ironically, today the patterns are shifting 
again. unregulated suburban sprawl and strip development along high-
ways have blended urban and rural settlement patterns, even as an inte-
grated employment market has allowed most rural Americans to work for 
urban or suburban firms.
The most influential critic of dispersed farms was economist Henry 
C. Carey. He was a friend of Ralph Waldo Emerson, an adviser to Abraham 
lincoln, and one of the founders of the Republican Party. He eventually 
rejected free-market theory and free trade. The son of an irish immigrant, 
Carey had an animus against the united Kingdom and its new factory 
system that had reduced low-paid workers to something close to slaves. 
He wanted tariffs high enough to foster American manufacturing and 
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stressed consumer demands and mild inflation as engines of economic 
growth.
Carey absorbed some of the ideas of Comte Claude Saint-Simon and 
sought a richer communal or associative life for Americans. From his 
perspective, farming in America was a major scandal. As he put it, we had 
no agriculture, for our system lacked anything close to culture, in the 
sense of either artful engagement or the maintenance and improvement 
of land. instead, we had a system of land mining that gradually degraded 
the great soil bank on which life depends. Farmers used up the soil in the 
East and then moved west to lonely, isolated farmsteads. He pitied them. 
There, they too often grew commodities for export, such as wheat and 
cotton, or they grew corn to produce pork and beef (Carey, a near veg-
etarian, believed such animal fats were harmful to health). in either case, 
they drew down on soil nutrients, with only limited recycling of waste 
products, which he collectively referred to as manures. He particularly 
resented shipments of grain abroad, for these represented nonrecoverable 
withdrawals from our soil. Equally wasteful were large commercial cities, 
which consumed the products of the soil without any recycling at all.
Carey believed that a scientific agriculture, with better tools, would 
enable farmers to prosper on smaller and smaller plots of land. They could 
live in or close to villages, enjoy good schools, and find vocations that fit 
their varied skills and talents. He applauded the type of localism that re-
formers today call bioregionalism, with small factories interwoven with 
small farms and almost no external trade. He believed that it was possible, 
with the recycling of all waste products and the use of legumes, not only to 
preserve but also to replace the natural fertility of soils. His ideal economy 
was that of the netherlands. With the steady improvement of our soil bank, 
and with farms dedicated primarily to vegetables and fruits, we could sup-
port an almost unlimited growth in population. And since people were 
the greatest economic asset of all, the more the better.1
alternatives in lanD tenure
The other prominent feature of American agriculture, and one so appeal-
ing to European immigrants, was fee simple ownership of land, which 
Carey applauded. Except for lingering commons in new England, Ameri-
can governments quickly alienated land in behalf of rapid development. 
of course, in a strictly legal sense, the sovereign entity still owned all land. 
The federal government and the states granted conditional land titles to 
individuals (by eminent domain, American governments could reclaim 
178 a revolution Down on the Farm
the use, but under our constitutions, only with due compensation to title 
owners). We thus eliminated the last remnants of feudal hierarchies, soon 
outlawing even entail or primogeniture laws. People who, in Europe, had 
lived as tenants or with long-term leases or had paid quitrents were now 
free of all such dependency.
This almost unrestricted control over land, and often even the miner-
als beneath the land, created an agricultural system that still exists today. 
But today the sovereign people, acting through their governments, have 
placed more and more restrictions and qualifications on the managerial 
prerogatives of title holders. Some reformers wanted even more regula-
tion or planning (a socialization of management), while others repudi-
ated private ownership in favor of communal or corporate property (a 
socialization of property). The push for regulation, often in the further-
ance of environmental goals, continues to grow. Attempts to socialize 
land have largely failed, although a few isolated examples of commu-
nal agriculture have at least illustrated one alternative to the American 
agricultural system. i do not consider forms of institutional ownership 
(prison farms or county poor farms, monastic farms, university-owned 
demonstration farms) as alternatives.
i have written extensively on communal colonies. in the mid-nine- 
teenth century the ideas of Robert owen and Saint-Simon led to at least 
fifty socialist colonies in the united States. in the late nineteenth century 
the cooperative commonwealth movement, informed by Marxist ideas, 
led to a dozen or so rural colonies, only one of which survived for as 
long as thirty years. Some estimate that radical or countercultural youth 
formed more than 3,000 communes—most of them short-lived—in the 
1960s and 1970s (a struggling few survive today). Yet none of these ef-
forts came close to demonstrating a realistic alternative approach to farm-
ing. none lasted long enough to gain generational continuity, let alone 
any appreciable growth in membership. But there are three significant 
exceptions that do meet these criteria: the Shakers, who were doomed to 
near extinction after a century because of their practice of celibacy; the 
Amana Society in iowa, which remained communal from 1855 to 1931; 
and the Hutterites. Since only the Hutterites survive today, i will use them 
as an example of communal success, just as i would use the kibbutzim of 
israel, and not the coercive state farms of the former Soviet bloc, if i were 
surveying global agriculture.
The Hutterites were an Anabaptist sect that formed in 1536 in what is 
now Austria. Doctrinally similar to the Mennonites and the later Amish, 
they distinguished themselves by adopting a community of goods. 
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Though much persecuted, the Hutterites experienced a golden age in 
Moravia in the late sixteenth century. This ended in 1593, and the move-
ment barely survived during the next 200 years. The Hutterites moved 
first to Slovakia, then to Transylvania, where only one colony survived by 
1762. By 1771, a small remnant had settled among Mennonites in the 
ukraine. There they were unable to continue their communal life and 
almost blended into the Mennonite population. in 1857 the Russian gov-
ernment permitted a small group of Hutterites to buy their own land and 
reestablish a bruderhof. Two more followed, and it was these three bruderhofs 
that established colonies in South Dakota beginning in 1874. They fled 
conscription laws in Russia and gained a firm promise from President 
Grant that they would face no conscription in the united States because 
there would be no wars (a promise broken in 1917).
in America, the three original Hutterite colonies, each of which re-
tained some distinct practices, soon began to found daughter colonies. 
With strict prohibitions on birth control, the population doubled every 
fifteen years. By 1950, the Hutterites had the highest fertility rate of any 
known population (averaging more than ten children for each moth-
er). After suffering hostility and oppression in World War i, most colo-
nies moved to Canada, but some moved back after the war. They spread 
through the Dakotas and Montana and to three Canadian provinces. To-
day, they number more than 40,000, living in about 475 colonies (the 
number grows each year). By far, they are the most successful communal 
sect in either Canada or the united States.
The Hutterites try to follow the original Church at Jerusalem. They 
hold all property in common, live in colony-owned apartments, and, 
through most of their history and on most colonies, share common meals. 
They are complete pacifists and do not participate in politics. unlike the 
Amish, they never rejected modern farming machines or methods, but 
they traditionally rejected all worldly attractions (no radio, television, or 
passenger cars, and only periodicals that relate to their farming business), 
restrictions that have recently broken down in some of the more liberal 
colonies. At first, on the sparsely populated Great Plains, they maintained 
their own public elementary schools, with outside but understanding 
teachers. Today, many have to attend non-Hutterite high schools, and a 
few attend Mennonite colleges. At first they were primarily grain and 
cattle farmers. But in time, land prices and hostility in Alberta made it 
difficult to gain enough land for daughter colonies. Thus, they turned to 
more intensive agriculture, such as poultry, and to small manufacturing. 
They continue to stress self-sufficiency, but they cooperate with extension 
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agents and, in some cases, have moved ahead of small farmers in their use 
of technology. They face some resentment because their bulk purchases 
typically bypass local retail merchants. All is not idyllic. They have faced 
internal schisms, have struggled to resist assimilation near cities such as 
Winnipeg, and have a low per capita income. But the Hutterites continue 
to grow and have proven that, given a binding ideology, communal agri-
culture can compete with individualistic, dispersed farmers. in the 1960s 
they became an inspiration to many countercultural rebels.2
agrarian reForm
Despite the limited appeal of religiously inspired communes or social-
ist experiments with common ownership, one reform movement— 
agrarianism and closely related single-tax schemes—offered a widely ap-
pealing challenge to the American system of landownership. By agrarian-
ism, i mean schemes to provide broad access to land and legal methods 
to prevent land monopolies. For some reason, in the united States even 
historians have turned the word agrarian into a near synonym for agricultural 
and, in the process, obscured its radical implications. in much of the world 
the label still identifies the land reform policies pushed by tenants or peas-
ants who want to gain access to land—to their share of a natural resource 
not created by human labor yet monopolized by large landowners.
Anglo-American agrarian reform efforts began in 1775 in England. 
Thomas Spence published a book on the real rights of man and soon 
formed the Society of Spencean Philanthropists. He correctly noted that 
a natural right to property, as clarified by John locke, is the right of every 
individual. Every person is entitled to have access to and a share in the 
products of nature, of which land is the most important component. To 
provide such equality of access, Spence proposed that parish corpora-
tions assume ultimate ownership of all land. They could not sell it, for 
land should not be a marketable commodity. instead, they should rent the 
land to farm families and use the rent to fund all governmental services 
(a single-tax system). When these tenants died, the land would be avail-
able for new farm families.
Thomas Paine accepted the basic ethical principle enunciated by 
Spence—that every person has a right to his or her share of the inherent 
or unimproved value of soil. in 1795 he wrote an essay titled “Agrarian 
Justice” in which he advocated an inheritance tax on all estates and the 
use of this tax revenue to create what amounted to a birthright fund. 
This fund would pay each maturing adult, at age twenty-one, the sum of 
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money equivalent to the value of his or her rightful share of the nation’s 
land. Thomas Jefferson bought into this principle and proposed that each 
child born in Virginia receive a fifty-acre birthright.
These agrarian proposals turned more radical in the 1820s, when 
organized urban artisans formed the Working Men’s Party and gradually 
embraced agrarianism as a possible solution to their declining incomes. 
They faced competition from imported factory goods and from a surplus 
of workers in many trades. As proprietors, they wanted to escape the ser-
vility of employment, or wage labor. in Philadelphia in 1828 they asked 
the federal government to reserve from entry and sale all the remaining 
public lands and to lease twenty to forty acres of public land free to each 
working family, or what they called their birthright. if these families oc-
cupied and cultivated the land, they could enjoy it without cost for their 
lifetime. These men did not believe that anyone should “own” land or 
alienate it for loans, but they did believe that tenants rightfully owned 
any improvements they made to the land (which they had produced, 
whereas God had made the land) and could sell those improvements 
to new homesteaders. in 1829 Thomas Skidmore took these ideas to 
their logical conclusion. in one of the most radical books of the century, 
The Rights of Man to Property, he asked the state of new York, which he be-
lieved was already cursed by monopolistic estates, to use a constitutional 
amendment to vacate all land titles and cancel all debts. Each person older 
than twenty-one would receive a credit instrument that vested in him or 
her the value of that person’s share of all the land in new York. The state 
would use an auction to offer life-tenure leases to farmers, and anyone 
could use his or her certificate to bid on land. on the death of the origi-
nal purchaser, the land reverted to the state. only such a drastic policy, he 
believed, would uphold the right of every person to property.
Skidmore gained few disciples, but the Working Men’s Party had un-
leashed a powerful idea—free homesteads. one of its new York members, 
publisher George Henry Evans, launched the most influential agrarian 
movement in American history in 1844. He first called it the Agrarian 
league but soon changed the name to the national Reform Association 
(nRA). it gained a large following, with local chapters in every state. it 
had one major platform—that the federal government provide a free, 
exempt, and unalienable 160-acre homestead to every American family 
that wanted to go onto the land and cultivate it. These homesteads could 
not be sold or used as debt instruments. A second, less significant reform 
involved state laws to limit the amount of land owned by any individual 
(a bill to limit the amount to 300 acres almost passed in Wisconsin). The 
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nRA and sympathetic congressmen kept homestead bills before Con-
gress throughout the 1850s and gained a partial victory in 1862 with 
the Homestead Act. unfortunately (at least from the nRA’s perspective), 
it did not make such homesteads unalienable. Homesteaders could sell 
their land, collect capital gains, and even buy up extra land, which in 
time would restrict ownership. The nRA faded rapidly after the Civil War, 
but the principle involved would gain its most influential advocate in the 
rightful successor and inverted namesake of George Henry Evans: Henry 
George.3
Henry George is rightfully considered the most persuasive advocate 
of a single tax in his famous book Progress and Poverty. He accepted the moral 
arguments of Spence and Evans and tried to turn the principle into a 
compelling economic theory. in effect, George tried to socialize access 
to land by means of the single tax. He believed that people deserved the 
fruits of their labor and thus full and free ownership of both capital and 
consumer goods. He loved a free, competitive form of capitalism, and 
inimical to this, he believed, was land monopoly. Because of inherent 
fertility or favorable location, land values rose with the growth of popula-
tion and industry. But those who profited from such rising values did not 
deserve these unearned benefits, which gradually allowed landowners 
(in cities even more than in the countryside) to gain great wealth, even as 
an increasing share of nonlandowning workers fell into poverty. Since the 
unearned increments were relatively minor in farming areas well away 
from cities, the single tax would be small, usually much smaller than 
existing taxes on land and improvements. Thus, George believed that his 
single tax would benefit most farmers, particularly those who wished 
to enter farming. it would force wealthy owners to assume the major 
burden of paying for all governmental services. Such a tax meant that, in 
all areas, access to land would be, in effect, free, although in many cases 
property values would largely reflect the earned value of improvements. 
Capital and labor would be able to collect a full return for what they pro-
duced, in what would be a rent-free society.
The single-tax philosophy had broad influence, particularly in such 
European countries as Denmark. it seemed beguiling to many who read 
George’s books. But it had a limited impact on land policies in the united 
States, where the large amount of underused land meant low agricul-
tural rents, at least until the Great Depression. in several ways, his argu-
ments are more applicable today, when land prices are high. in part they 
are high because of the nonagricultural demand for land, not only for 
suburban development but also for rural amenities, such as hunting, or 
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even for tax breaks among the affluent. in metropolitan areas, farmland 
is often so valuable that it is not rational to continue farming, a problem 
that would disappear under a single-tax system. The opportunity costs are 
now so high that many farmers could sell their land, invest the returns, 
and earn a higher income than that obtained from farming. But even in 
more remote areas, land prices are in part a product of subsidized agri-
cultural prices or incomes. This involves some fairly technical arguments, 
but in effect, the greatest long-term gain by farm owners from subsidies 
is the gain in land prices, particularly when a base acreage is tied to the 
land. Thus, the problems of equity, and of constraints on entry into farm-
ing, still involve the same issues raised by nineteenth-century agrarians.
alternative or sustainaBle agriCulture
Today, the advocates of alternative systems of agriculture rarely challenge 
fee simple ownership or advocate more compact villages, although some 
want to retain, or return to, smaller farms. until the post–World War 
ii revolution in American agriculture, the need for major alternatives 
scarcely existed, although the roots of what we now call organic farm-
ing predate the war. Most of those who support alternatives to what they 
pejoratively call industrial agriculture celebrate earlier American farms 
that were operated with skill and devotion. in some cases, these celebra-
tions are colored by nostalgia or a misplaced idealism. At the same time, 
descriptions of contemporary, mainstream farming too often descend to 
caricature. Despite well-targeted criticism, the picture that emerges does 
not fit the self-image of most of today’s successful farmers. likewise, the 
almost ritualistic condemnation of official agricultural policy conceals 
the increasing interest in, and support for, alternative agriculture in the 
Department of Agriculture and among some congressional policy mak-
ers. Finally, few advocates of sustainable or even organic agriculture offer 
compelling explanations of how more labor-intensive and environmen-
tally friendly approaches to farming will be able to maintain the present 
level of agricultural productivity.
When one looks at the history of twentieth-century agriculture, a key 
question is: What has changed? What has been lost and what gained? if 
one goes back to 1930, certain patterns are obvious. Then, most farms 
were mixed, in the sense that typical farmers grew several different crops 
and kept a variety of livestock, even when one crop was most crucial to 
the overall operation. Such variety was not necessarily a matter of choice 
but one of necessity. until the revolutionary addition of nitrogen to fer-
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tilizer, crop rotation was a necessity for maintaining soil fertility. A rota-
tion from corn to small grains to hay crops, preferably legumes, was the 
only way to avoid severe soil depletion. Although the tractor was slowly 
replacing horses, as late as 1930 almost all farms still used horses, at least 
for cultivating crops. And until herbicides were available after 1945, all 
row crops required cultivation. A small number of often beloved cows, 
hogs, and chickens were the least expensive way to provide for home 
consumption of meat, eggs, and dairy products. Vegetable gardens and 
orchards were also a near necessity.
in 1930 no one had ever dreamed of huge factory-like barns full of 
caged chickens or hogs. no one had heard of organic insecticides and 
fungicides, let alone animal antibiotics and hormones or genetically 
modified organisms. no one had envisioned gangs of migratory workers 
hired to do much of the harvesting. Such traditional farms were not or-
ganic farms in any sense of the term, but they were close to being sustain-
able farms, in the sense that such farming operations, if carried out with 
due concern for erosion control (this was a big if ), could continue indef-
initely, with only a few externalities to plague the larger public. But this 
sustainability came at a high cost—inefficiency, demanding labor inputs, 
low production, and low income (farmers had few off-farm employment 
opportunities, and farm incomes were only about half those in other sec-
tors). For consumers, this meant proportionally much higher food costs 
than today. it is not surprising that, so far, financial support for alternative 
forms of agriculture has come primarily from affluent consumers, those 
who can afford to pay more for what they perceive (sometimes correctly) 
as safer and more flavorful food. They buy from farmers’ markets, from 
community-based suppliers, or from Whole Foods or Wild oats.
Almost all the organized advocates of sustainable farming want to 
go back to an older or, in their terms, integrated or mixed farm pattern. 
What they bring to this model is a much greater concern for certain en-
vironmental issues that were largely ignored or completely unrecognized 
by farmers in 1930, who were often indiscriminately draining wetlands 
or killing varmints. The words ecology and biodiversity were not part of 
anyone’s vocabulary, and farmers were too busy, and too preoccupied 
with floods or droughts, to notice the beauty that surrounded them. They 
battled nature rather than appreciated it, but as a matter of self-respect, 
they did try to keep their fencerows clear, birds be damned. i became a 
dedicated bird-watcher in college, and some farmers probably thought 
i was crazy.
Today, there are dozens of organizations, many state-based, that pro-
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mote what is often called “sustainable” agriculture. The word is now so 
popular, so widely embraced, that it always begs contextual definition. i 
doubt that, in the strictest sense, any system of farming is fully sustain-
able, because of at least a few nonrenewable inputs such as fossil fuels. 
But all the groups discussed in the next few pages try to minimize exter-
nal inputs. They want to raise crops and livestock either without synthetic 
fertilizers and pesticides or with as few as possible. The goal is to retain 
or increase soil nutrients and always to improve the physical quality of 
the soil so that it will be available for future generations. At the same 
time, they want to avoid any environmental costs that will penalize the 
larger public, such as air and water pollution, damage to wildlife, soil 
erosion, and wetland removal. An increasing proportion of such farmers 
now qualify as certified organic producers, and it is the organic wing 
of the larger movement that now receives the most publicity. Although 
organic agriculture is only a subclass, not the whole, all advocates of 
sustainability sympathize with organic farmers and adopt many policies 
that overlap with organic farming. note that almost all advocates of alter-
native farming are very much indebted to the research and development 
carried out in the past by governmental agencies. They also use the best 
machinery and crop varieties. in fact, alternative farming requires more 
technical knowledge and greater managerial skills than does convention-
al agriculture.
The sources of sustainable or organic agriculture are many, including 
Henry Carey. But the modern crusade can, arguably, be traced back only 
to 1924 and the intellectually versatile Rudolf Steiner, who, in a lecture 
the year before his death, launched what he called biodynamic agricul-
ture. Steiner was a scientist and philosopher, a Goethe scholar, and a mys-
tic or spiritualist (he joined the theosophist movement and believed in 
reincarnation). Born in 1861 in what was then southern Austria, he later 
moved to Switzerland, where he established the headquarters of a philo-
sophical-religious movement.
Steiner believed that soil embodied cosmic laws and planetary rhythms. 
Humans could renew the force and vitality of soil by using a special 
type of therapeutic compost consisting of animal manure and silicates, 
chemically enriched by mixtures of six varieties of plant material and 
then seeped in water. He then advocated spraying this liquid fertilizer 
on growing crops. To ensure harmony with lunar and planetary cycles, 
Steiner’s disciples worked out a rather elaborate calendar to guide the 
timing of crop planting, or essentially a type of astrology. His system 
required livestock on any farm and a diverse blend of crops, all to match 
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the unique qualities of a given farmstead. He wanted all people to un-
derstand this type of holistic agriculture and to gain the health benefits 
from consuming biodynamic food. in a sense, he invented a type of 
community agriculture. His ideas, along with his cult-like rules, led to 
biodynamic associations in Europe and the united States. Some survive 
today and make up a tiny segment of the alternative farming movement. 
Steiner’s form of agriculture, as developed by his disciples, often proved 
successful, probably because his soil improvement methods happened to 
overlap what is now considered good organic practice.4
Most advocates of organic farming, and even those espousing a less 
rigidly circumscribed form of sustainable agriculture, celebrate Sir Al-
bert Howard of Great Britain as their founding father. Born in 1873 on 
an English farm, Howard attended Cambridge university, briefly taught 
in an agricultural college, and in 1905 moved to india to direct several 
agricultural research centers. He was a soil scientist and was knighted in 
recognition of his specialized research. in india he developed theories 
about proper farming methods, which centered on a type of compost-
ing. He was not directly influenced by Steiner and did not buy into his 
esoteric philosophy. Back in England in 1931, Howard began publishing 
articles and books about his composting system, which he referred to as 
the indore process (named after a state in india). Howard believed that 
synthetic fertilizers ultimately harmed the soil and advocated, in their 
place, the recycling of all vegetable and animal wastes. Since animal ma-
nure was essential to his compost methods and the creation of humus, 
he believed that all farms should have a mixture of livestock and crops. 
in words that echoed those of Henry Carey, he talked of a law of return, 
by which he meant that agricultural productivity and human health re-
quired that we return as much to the soil as we take away. By World War ii, 
his publications were well known in Britain and, increasingly, in the 
united States. But Howard was gradually becoming more hostile toward 
the existing agricultural establishment in Britain and wary of the grow-
ing role of agribusiness in farming.5
in 1941 Howard gained his most influential disciple in Jerome i. 
Rodale, the leading name in American organic farming. Rodale did not 
grow up on a farm. in 1941 he lived in Emmaus, Pennsylvania (near Al-
lentown) and owned an electrical equipment dealership. He had also es-
tablished Rodale Press, which published a health magazine. After reading 
one of Howard’s books, Rodale was quickly converted to his theories and 
began a correspondence with him. Before the year was out, Rodale had 
bought a sixty-acre farm in order to try out Howard’s methods. in 1942 
187Alternatives
he began publishing a new magazine called Organic Farming and Gardening 
and made Howard the associate editor. Almost no farmers subscribed, 
but an increasing number of backyard gardeners did. He changed the 
name to Organic Gardening and Farming and, eventually, just Organic Gardening. 
By 1980, it had 1.3 million subscribers. in 1945 Rodale published a book 
to promote organic farming, Pay Dirt, which included an introduction by 
Howard.
in these early years, Rodale was ignored by established farmers and 
often ridiculed by agricultural scientists. in 1951 his son Robert became 
the president of Rodale Press and an able promoter of organic methods. 
J. i. Rodale died in 1971, at age seventy-two. At that point, Robert bought 
a 305-acre farm at Kutztown and made the Rodale Research Center an 
experiment station for organic agriculture; it soon attracted a number of 
well-trained agricultural scientists. By 1985, the thriving Rodale enter-
prises had gained increased respect from the agricultural establishment, 
and Robert Rodale joined the Department of Agriculture in conducting 
workshops on organic farming. The Rodale Research Center sponsored 
affiliates abroad, and on a trip to the Soviet union in 1990, Robert was 
killed in a car accident. His wife and son took over leadership of the press 
and the center. By then, they had become well-known American institu-
tions with increasing acceptance and support from the government.6
other early but quite heterogeneous advocates of a sustainable agri-
culture often sympathized with the organic movement but did not choose 
to adopt all its strict rules. Collectively, these critics of contemporary ag-
riculture made up a self-conscious network, for they knew one another, 
gathered at meetings, and corresponded extensively. What all shared was 
a profound distrust of the existing forms of commercial agriculture in 
America. i have space for only a brief introduction of a few of these pio-
neers. Some pushed single ideas. one of these was Edward H. Faulkner, 
who published a small, best-selling book in 1943 with the arresting title 
Plowman’s Folly. He painted a dismal picture of American agriculture at the 
end of the Great Depression, or of rampant erosion, sour soils, mounting 
floods from runoff, a lowering water table, even vanishing wildlife. in a 
sense, he was an organic farmer, for he decried the progressive loss of or-
ganic matter in American soils and the substitution of synthetic fertilizers 
to replace the nutrients. He blamed almost all these problems on the use 
of the moldboard or turning plow. it buried litter, manure, or green crops 
at too great a depth to allow new plantings to gain from the nutrients be-
fore they were leached deeper into the ground.  Also, the smooth and clear 
soil on top was highly erodible. He believed most crops produced better 
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with no plowing than with such deep plowing and urged farmers to use 
a shallow tillage with either disk plows or chisel plows, both of which 
mixed the organic material in the top three inches of soil. His elaborate, 
quasi-scientific defense of this theory did not persuade all readers and 
clearly fit some soils better than others. But it did contribute to a surge 
of new tilling techniques, including no-till methods that became feasible 
after the introduction of herbicides. Minimal tillage would become an 
article of faith by most advocates of a sustainable agriculture.7
Equally influential was novelist louis Bromfield. Much influenced by 
Howard, he wanted to prove that new farming methods could restore de-
graded farms in his boyhood community in ohio. With his wealth from 
publishing, he built a large mansion and began to restore to its original 
fertility the thousand-acre Malibar Farm. He spent unlimited amounts of 
money and was guided by both the organic methods of Howard and the 
most up-to-date scientific knowledge borrowed from experiment sta-
tions. He used some synthetic fertilizers along with all the compost he 
could gather, used different cover crops to control erosion, and reported 
impressive yields after a few years of rehabilitation. Yet, in the end, the 
farm was not profitable, and it was clear that anyone without Bromfield’s 
wealth would be unable to duplicate his results. He admitted his failure 
and shifted to a more conventional form of farming. His prominence 
nonetheless helped advertise what he often described as an ecological 
form of agriculture.8
other pioneers in alternative farming methods included Richard 
Thompson, a graduate of iowa State. Thompson used a mixed, integrat-
ed farming system that involved most of the practices of the emerging 
organic movement but with one distinctive contribution—a ridge-till 
method. He planted crops on ridges, a system that required only minimal 
tilling and was suited to the colder soils of iowa, where no-till retained 
so much moisture as to retard spring planting.
Wes Jackson, a persuasive writer, biologist, and geneticist, became 
disillusioned with conventional agriculture and established an experi-
mental land institute in Salina, Kansas. He came to believe that the lush, 
sustainable growth of long-stem grasses on the prairie offered a possible 
model for a chemical-free agriculture. Jackson tried to find or breed a 
group of seed-producing perennial plants that could serve most of the 
food needs of humans, a system he labeled perennial polyculture.
in new England, John Todd helped found the new Alchemy insti-
tute, which sought technologies to enable the type of small, intensive, 
village-based farming earlier praised by Henry Carey. The institute tried 
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out different (and soon fashionable) crops, such as Jerusalem artichokes 
and amaranth; used greenhouses and geodesic domes; and referred to its 
system as permaculture.9
in the late 1960s and early1970s, many rebellious youth fled to the 
woods and countryside to set up communes. Along with their rejection 
of most aspects of the larger culture, they tried various new farming 
methods, flirted with vegetarianism, and, above all, rebelled against the 
unhealthy foods produced by the American agricultural establishment. 
Probably the most influential examples for such modern homesteaders 
were Scott and Helen nearing. As a young man in 1905, Scott near-
ing settled in the single-tax town of Arden, Delaware, and planted what 
would be classified an organic garden by later criteria (many similar gar-
dens existed at the time). A youthful advocate of a social gospel, nearing 
eventually left the church, joined the Socialist Party, condemned u.S. in-
volvement in World War i, briefly joined the Communist Party, and even 
ran for mayor of new York. in 1932, already committed to the simple 
life, he and his wife, Helen, decided to move to a homestead in Vermont 
and later to one on the coast of Maine. They were dedicated vegetarians, 
had a deeply religious commitment to a preserved natural order, and 
devoted themselves to a simple life based largely on what they made and 
grew on their homesteads. in 1954, soon after moving to Maine, they 
published a book, Living the Good Life, which became very influential after 
they published a new edition in 1970. it attracted thousands of visitors 
to their homestead, who came to gain inspiration and learn how to live 
on the land.10
The most far-reaching critique of contemporary American agriculture 
is by Wendell Berry, a farmer who lives in Henry County in northern 
Kentucky. He is also a poet and a brilliant essayist and for many years 
was a university professor. His views are fully reactionary and, because of 
that, as radical in their implications as the views of any critic of our pres-
ent farming system. His departure point is his direct knowledge of a rela-
tively small, diversified tobacco farm, or the kind of farm that has almost 
disappeared even in his part of Kentucky. My description of my own 
family farm in the 1930s (in chapter 2) stands as a reference point for 
understanding Berry. He knows, from firsthand experience, the dark side 
of farming, but he chooses to idealize it at its rare best. But Berry, unlike 
other defenders of beleaguered small farmers, offers a critique of Ameri-
can culture as a whole, from which he is completely alienated. Today’s 
maladies are not unique to contemporary agriculture but are even more 
deeply rooted in other sectors of the economy. The total culture is ill.
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Berry idealizes a nation made up of independent, freestanding citizens. 
in each case, whether among farmers or craftsmen, their independence 
reflects their ownership of land and tools, their pride in good workman-
ship, and their goal of providing for families and nurturing supportive 
communities. For farmers, this means a love of the land and a concern 
for the health of those who depend on it. Modern, industrialized pro-
duction, whether in a factory or on a farm, negates these simple values. 
Profits, growth, progress, efficiency, productivity, specialization, markets, 
and greed have replaced the traditional values and led to the reckless 
exploitation of our natural resources. Fossil energy has replaced artistry, 
technology has supplanted morality. Behind the changes in agriculture 
are those people who embrace these new values, such as the bureaucrats 
in the Department of Agriculture, the overly specialized scientists in our 
agricultural colleges, and the few highly competitive farmers destined to 
survive on this treadmill of progress.
Berry has embraced the idea of ecological balance, admires the work 
of Albert Howard, and recognizes the benefits of an organic approach, 
but he has a more eclectic approach to agricultural policy and fears that 
commercially oriented farmers are already co-opting organic techniques. 
He wants to support traditional farmers, with their own special knowl-
edge about local soils and climate, such as his friends and neighbors 
in Kentucky. He deplores agricultural policies that have abetted only the 
large commercial farmers who have pushed small farmers off their land. 
He seriously proposed, in 1977, that small farmers go back to horses and 
reject tractors. He would like to retrieve local markets for local produce 
such as eggs, butter, and cheese. He wants farms to grow as much of their 
own food as possible. He knows that farmers have to make a living, but 
clearly he does not believe that people have half as many needs as our 
consumer economy pushes on them. He resents governmental regula-
tions as much as centralized corporate farms.11
Berry’s ideals are closest to those of a range of relatively small farmers 
who do not necessarily subscribe to the orthodoxy of organic farming 
but still try to prosper by adopting a sustainable form of farming. Some 
have organized, and others are simply older farmers trying to hold on to 
old ways. Berry knows, and idealizes, a few of those. The organizations 
that support such local farmers are numerous, but they have much in 
common. Among such groups are Sustainable Farming Associations in 
Minnesota and Pennsylvania, the Ecological Farming Association in Cali-
fornia, the Practical Farmers of iowa, the Regenerative Agriculture Asso-
ciation, the institute for Alternative Agriculture, and the national Family 
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Farm Coalition. Animal rights organizations and several religious orga-
nizations have identified with sustainability efforts, including the Men-
nonite institute for Sustainable Agriculture and the Catholic Rural life 
Conference. Such organized groups are most active in the upper Midwest 
(particularly in iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin), in new England, and 
on the West Coast; they are least active in the South. The farmers who 
formed these associations, or those who join them, have farm opera-
tions that may not be distinguishable from some traditional farms, such 
as small dairy farms (100 to 300 acres) that have survived in the upper 
Midwest or new England.12
What the advocates of sustainability want to regain is the rotation of 
both crops and pastures (with cows alternating between pastures, allow-
ing time for recovery in the idle fields). Such rotation patterns preclude 
huge fields of corn or wheat and do not require the huge tractors and com-
bines that go with them. These advocates want to protect wetlands and native 
species, and they often celebrate an almost mystic or religious identification 
with the land itself. They seek natural forms of fertilizer, use biological insec-
ticides when possible, recycle all manure and crop residues, adopt various 
methods to prevent water runoff, and practice minimal tillage. Most farmers 
in these organizations are not organic farmers, for they may use synthetic 
fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides (but as little as possible). They use 
the latest tools, although in a size that fits their operations. They accept 
whatever support they can get from federal programs. They may admire 
Amish or Mennonite farmers but do not join them in rejecting modern 
technology. They also admire certified organic farmers but are not willing 
to accept the stringent requirements for such certification.
one question remains. Can they make a living with alternative forms 
of agriculture? This depends on many factors, including location, soil 
type, crop selection, and the size and scale of operations. in some cases, 
profitability depends on market strategies. For example, one cannot meet 
the cost of growing free-range chickens or hogs at existing market prices. 
For most crops, certified organic farmers have to sell their produce above 
market prices to compete with conventional farmers. Effective demand 
for such higher-priced produce requires broad community support, as 
in the case of consumers willing to buy weekly baskets of food from lo-
cal farmers (community-based agriculture) or patronize well-developed 
farmers’ markets. Perhaps surprisingly, the Department of Agriculture of-
fers the most detailed information on developing such local markets, and 
recent farm bills have offered grants and subsidies to help increase such 
markets.13
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FeDeral suPPort oF sustainaBle agriCulture
The official response to the movement for sustainable and organic agri-
culture began in the early 1980s. Because of many pressures, particularly 
from organized environmental organizations, both Congress and the De-
partment of Agriculture had to respond to a growing number of critical 
voices. in a sense, this began in 1962 with Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, 
which placed pesticide-using farmers on the defensive. A decade later, 
the Department of Agriculture had to respond to another best-selling 
book, Jim Hightower’s Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times. Based on a research project 
headed by Hightower, a former agricultural commissioner in Texas, this 
book contained a broadsided critique of what Hightower called the land-
grant college complex, with the Extension Service a primary target. The 
agricultural establishment, with its close ties to agribusiness, had pushed 
farm laborers to a servile status, had gradually impoverished the 87 per-
cent of small farmers, and, despite low costs, had burdened consumers 
with poor-tasting foods (thus the hard tomatoes of the title) and health 
risks from pesticides and hormones. in Hightower’s words, “Genetically 
redesigned, mechanically planted, thinned and weeded, chemically read-
ied and mechanically harvested and sorted, food products move out of 
the field and into the processing and marketing stages—untouched by 
human hands.”14
in 1980 Robert Bergland, secretary of agriculture in the Carter ad-
ministration, believed that the department should investigate the alterna-
tive and organic farming movements. He solicited a report, which was 
sympathetic. in 1981 the American Society of Agronomy concluded that 
organic methods could contribute to a more sustainable form of agri-
culture. Just before leaving office, Bergland created a new position, the 
organic resources coordinator. under the new Reagan administration, an 
unsympathetic Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz eliminated the position 
and publicly ridiculed the organic “cult.” The fired coordinator joined the 
Henry A. Wallace institute for Alternative Agriculture. Despite this put-
down by Butz, some extension stations were doing research on organic 
farming. in 1984 the Michigan State Extension Service and Experiment 
Station joined with Rodale Press in sponsoring a conference on sustainable 
agriculture and integrated farming systems. in 1988 the Department of Ag-
riculture established the small low-input Sustainable Agriculture Program, 
which used funds to support research on low-input farming. The title re-
flected a desire to broaden such research beyond organic farming. its head 
was the same official that Butz had dismissed in 1981.15
193Alternatives
The broader scientific community was increasingly aware of alterna-
tives in agriculture. in 1989 the Board on Agriculture, a component of 
the national Research Council, published a report entitled Alternative Ag-
riculture, which challenged conventional wisdom and scientific dogma in 
the Department of Agriculture. it provided the most ambitious evaluation 
of alternative agriculture ever completed in the united States. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, it was able to demonstrate, quite clearly, the environmental 
benefits of what could best be described as low-input agriculture. Such 
methods lowered the amount of nonpoint pollution, lessened soil ero-
sion, eliminated most residues from pesticides, and improved the quality 
of soils. Thus, these methods could preserve the resource base, reduce 
costs, and protect human health. The report’s list of alternative methods 
included crop rotation, the recycling of nutrients, integrated methods of 
controlling pests, and no-till or low-till farming. it found that the ablest 
alternative farmers produced as much per acre as conventional farmers, 
earned as much income, and secured major benefits for the larger society 
(fewer externalities). The board used eleven case studies to illustrate the 
diversity of such farms—from a Colorado ranch with more than 200,000 
acres to a 160-acre farm in iowa, from crop farming in the humid East 
to irrigated vegetable and fruit farms in the West, from farms that mini-
mized the use of synthetic fertilizers and chemical pesticides to fully or-
ganic growers. Two of the case studies involved Richard Thompson’s farm 
in iowa and part of the Rodale lands in Pennsylvania.
The Board on Agriculture was very critical of existing commodity 
programs in the united States. in this critique, it largely agreed with the 
most fervent advocates of alternative farming methods. Existing policies 
almost forced farmers to grow the same crops year after year in order 
to retain their base acreage, channeled their production into subsidized 
crops and away from more healthy food crops without subsidies, and 
often encouraged farmers to expand into highly erodible land. Such pres-
sures rewarded high production and expansion of existing methods and 
offered disincentives to soil-improving, disease-preventing crop rotation 
or mixed patterns of crops and livestock. The public not only had to pay 
the cost of subsidies but also had to suffer the long-term environmental 
consequences of such policies.16
Such criticisms had an impact on the Department of Agriculture and 
on Congress. in 1990 the department’s office of Science and Education 
sponsored a workshop titled “Sustainable Agriculture Research and Edu-
cation in the Field,” with Robert Rodale as one of the participants. in 
the 1990 farm bill, Congress changed the name of the tiny low-input 
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Sustainable Agriculture Program to the Sustainable Agriculture Research 
and Education Program (SARE), which still exists. With its limited fund-
ing, it makes research grants to a diverse group of educators, agricultural 
scientists, and extension agents. it publishes the research results in what it 
calls the Sustainable Agriculture Network. in 1985 the librarian of the national 
Agriculture library at Beltsville, Maryland, used SARE funds to launch the 
Alternative Farming Systems information Center. it is now the best source 
of information on alternative methods of farming, including detailed 
guidelines for organic farming. its intended audience is broader than the 
organized sustainable or organic groups, but its bias is clearly in favor of 
alternative approaches. At the same time, by its original intent, the En-
vironmental Quality incentive Program offers grants that are congruent 
with the concerns and goals of alternative agriculture and is a favorite 
resource among many alternative farmers. Thus, it is unfair to argue that 
the huge bureaucracy in the Department of Agriculture favors only large 
commercial farmers. So far, however, funds for alternative approaches are 
small, though proportionate to the 1 or 2 percent they contribute toward 
total farm production.
CertiFieD organiC Farming
Today, most people identify alternative farming with organic farming, 
and with good reason. until 1990, organic growers usually belonged 
to local associations, some at the state level. These groups developed and 
published standards for organic farming, as did the state of California. 
But the label “organic” did not always have the same meaning, and there 
was nothing to prevent growers from using the label, even if doing so 
violated conventional rules. Committed organic farmers wanted some 
form of third-party control and successfully pressured Congress to pass 
the Federal organic Foods Production Act of 1990. This act required the 
Department of Agriculture to certify organic producers as soon as a panel 
was able to agree on standards. over the next two years the European 
union enacted organic standards, but it took much longer in the united 
States. The American panel took a decade to complete its work because of 
contending factions. The first version of its standards allowed the use of 
sewage sludge, food irradiation, and genetically modified crops. Because 
of intense opposition from many organic farmers, it finally eliminated 
these options in the standards that took effect in 2001. it retained a few 
contested provisions, including permission to use synthetic micronutri-
ents in the case of a demonstrated need (these are trace elements that 
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may be lacking in some soils and are almost impossible to remedy with 
organic fertilizers).17
The standards are tough. Beginning in 2002, all growers who sold 
more than $5,000 of purportedly organic crops had to obtain official 
certification from the Department of Agriculture, which only then would 
allow them to display an organic seal. Those selling less than $5,000 
could seek certification but often chose not to complete the costly cer-
tification process. in any case, these smaller growers had to follow the 
same standards, but without certification they could not display the seal 
or provide inputs to larger, certified organic growers. Some small organic 
farmers have protested this policy and fear that certification will lead 
to, in effect, a large commercial involvement in organic agriculture. The 
Department of Agriculture does not do the actual certifying of growers 
but turns this over to local, private certifying agencies, which it accredits. 
The farmer has to pay for the certification process, which can cost up 
to $2,000 and involves not only long forms but also an on-site inspec-
tion. The 2002 farm bill contained a small sum ($5 million) to provide 
matching grants to help farmers pay for certification.
The rules for organic growers are quite complicated and not easy 
to fulfill. These rules apply to at least five areas: soil maintenance, crop 
inputs, farming methods, care of livestock, and food processing. Farmers 
must commit to conserving and improving the soil. in fact, soil condi-
tions are the key to the organic promise of healthier food. Totally apart 
from the organic rules, everyone who has farmed or gardened realizes 
the importance of the physical quality of the soil. The correct pH (acid-
ity) and vital nutrients are only part of the equation. By adding lime 
(produced by the kiln firing of limestone) to sweeten the soil or sulfur 
compounds to raise its acidity, anyone can obtain the optimal pH (usu-
ally close to a neutral 7 on a scale from 0 to 14). Synthetic fertilizers in 
the right concentration can provide optimal levels of the three major 
nutrients. But beyond this, the soil needs abundant organic matter (pro-
vided by decaying plants, manure, or compost) to make it porous and 
pliable, to stimulate microbial and worm activity, to allow the mixing of 
water and oxygen, and to ensure a gradual release of nitrogen and other 
nutrients. When these conditions are all present, plants thrive. They grow 
rapidly, with full foliage, and gain a high degree of insect and disease 
resistance. They also taste good.
it is difficult to disagree with this central and obvious claim of organic 
farmers—organic matter is critical to soils, and the maintenance of rich, 
organic soils is a prescription for success in growing the most flavorful 
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and healthy foods. What is more easily challenged is the claim that inputs 
of lime and synthetic fertilizers are in all cases harmful to the soil and to 
its products. organic growers can, and at times must, use ground lime-
stone to sweeten soil (unlike lime, which is a processed product, lime-
stone is a natural ingredient that works much more slowly). They also use 
rock phosphate, which very slowly releases phosphates that plants can 
absorb. organic farmers use several forms of organic fertilizer, including 
manure, compost, and ground plant or animal materials (bone, cotton-
seed, or alfalfa meal). The nutrients from such “natural” sources are iden-
tical to the nutrients in synthetic fertilizers, although some of the organic 
sources have the advantage of a generally slower release and thus less 
leaching into groundwater. What outsiders cannot comprehend is why 
a farmer, who has soils with ample organic content, cannot use faster- 
acting lime or synthetic fertilizer to get the needed pH or nutrients.
organic rules prohibit any synthetic pesticides. only natural elements 
such as sulfur or zinc, or biological agents such as Bt, are allowed to con-
trol insects and diseases. The rules do not allow any genetically modified 
crops. Generally, for vegetables, these rules do not pose a major prob-
lem. Most healthy, fast-growing vegetable crops are very resistant to both 
diseases and insects, but not in all cases or at all times. The problem is 
greatest for orchard crops. The introduction of new disease- and insect-
resistant varieties of apples has helped. But in some cases, organic fruit 
simply is not as blemish or insect free as those treated with synthetic pes-
ticides. in 2007 organic farmers were most concerned about a threat to 
one of their favorite food crops, soybeans. Asian soybean rust can destroy 
a crop, with the infection easily blowing from field to field. Researchers 
are searching for resistant varieties, but these may well involve genetic 
engineering and thus be unusable by organic farmers.
Weed control is a major problem in organic farming. Since herbi-
cides are banned, some form of tilling or cultivation is often needed. Be-
cause deep cultivation invites erosion, organic farmers use shallow tilling 
methods or, when possible, deep mulching. The use of fire (torches) to 
kill weeds is allowed in the few cases where this is possible. Crop rota-
tion can lower the amount of weeds and reduce soil diseases. Ridge-till 
methods may allow deeper stubble to smother weeds or make cultivation 
easier.
To convert to the more labor-intensive, but at times more profitable, 
organic mode, existing farmers have to go through a long, tough pro-
cess. Since organic foods often sell for double the price of nonorganic 
foods, some farmers have a strong economic motive to make the switch. 
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For those converting to organic farming, it takes three years to clear the 
existing land from the effects of synthetic fertilizers or pesticides, and 
sometimes five years or more before yields begin to match those on 
conventional farms. in their application for organic certification, farm-
ers have to agree to use specific practices that will improve the physical, 
chemical, and biological conditions of the soil, such as the use of cover 
crops, manure or compost, and crop rotation. They cannot use raw ma-
nure in the 120 days before the harvest of food crops that have direct 
contact with the soil, or within 90 days for other foods. Even the com-
mon practice of composting manure, despite the heating involved, does 
not always kill E. coli or Salmonella bacteria. Thus, organic farmers usually 
limit the use of unsterilized manure to cover crops grown in the year 
before conversion to food crops.
For organic livestock, all feed has to be organic. in the midst of the 
present ethanol boom, organic grain has become both scarce and very 
expensive. organic farmers can use no chemical additives in feed and no 
antibiotics, steroids, or hormones. The rules proscribe any type of cruel 
treatment of animals. one has to take into account animals’ natural be-
havior, which means that cows and sheep must have access to pasture and 
shade, and hogs and chickens must have room to roam in either barns 
or feedlots.18
Contamination from the outside is often a problem for organic 
farmers. nearby farmers may use pesticides or graze their cattle along a 
boundary fence. isolation from neighboring nonorganic farms is the best 
strategy, but one that is not always feasible. The possibility of contami-
nation haunts the processing, transportation, and marketing of organic 
foods. The only solution is tight packing at the point of origin, clear 
labeling, and strong mandates for retailers to protect the integrity of the 
food and to display it in segregated areas. Perfect control over this process 
is probably impossible, for it involves too many workers who may not 
recognize, or care about, the problem of contamination. Thus, the surest 
way to maintain purity is for organic growers to market the food locally, 
to restaurants or to organic food markets. But this is not feasible for large 
growers, who often ship organic products from California to the East 
Coast. At present, it seems unlikely that organic foods will become an 
important component of food shipments to foreign countries, because 
of both its high price and problems of integrity.
Although growing rapidly, organic farming remains a small compo-
nent of American agriculture (about 0.05 percent). in 2005, 8,493 op-
erators grew crops on just over 4 million acres, more than double the 
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amount in 2002. in a few vegetable crops, such as carrots, the proportion 
of organic produce is relatively high (7 percent), but it remains very low 
in grain crops and is only 1 percent in dairy farming. What is not clear 
is the average yield, or how organic prices compare with those gained 
by conventional farmers. The proposed 2007 farm bill contained funds 
for such data collection and analysis. in the farm census of 2002, just as 
the certification began, approximately 80 percent of organic farms were 
small, with annual sales under $50,000. Yet the 1,220 organic farms with 
sales over $50,000 accounted for 80 percent of the total product.
At present, i see no possibility that organic farming will become any-
thing more than a small but rapidly growing niche in American agricul-
ture. The rigid requirements will limit its growth, and the prohibition 
on synthetic fertilizers and herbicides will make it almost impossible 
for farmers in certain crops to adopt its methods. At the same time, the 
inability to use herbicides will conflict with conservation policies, partic-
ularly the increasing support for no-till cropping in many major water-
sheds. But in some smaller crops, particularly vegetable and fruit crops, 
organic farming may capture a large share of the market. ironically, it will 
do so not because of the idealistic, environmentally driven ideology of 
the early movement but because of purely economic reasons—it can be 
profitable, so long as its products garner premium prices. i sense a major 
gap developing between the small, low-income, often part-time idealistic 
organic farmers who produce less than 20 percent of organic foods and 
the few large-scale organic farmers who produce all the rest.
i anticipate a much larger role for nonorganic, low-input, sustainable 
farming. in fact, the boundaries between conventional and alternative 
agriculture are blurring. Several current realities that are sure to become 
more important in the near future will make it profitable for more farm-
ers to rotate crops, seek internal methods of preserving fertility (more 
recycling and more cover crops), and use integrative pest management 
tactics to reduce pesticide use. These realities include the end of cheap oil, 
and thus higher fuel and fertilizer costs; more rigorous conservation and 
pesticide legislation; and a warming climate, with more extreme weather 
events and more constraints on water use. in the twentieth century, a 
plentitude of resources, including good land (we still have this), abun-
dant and cheap energy, easily mined phosphates and potash, subsidized 
and inexpensive water for irrigation, and an array of new and relatively 
inexpensive but environmentally risky pesticides, made possible the pro-
ductive revolution. Except for land, all these inputs are going to be less 
plentiful and more costly in the twenty-first century, which should favor 
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some of the more traditional methods pushed by alternative farming or-
ganizations. But such methods must be efficient, which in most cases 
will require that farming remain mechanized, scientifically informed, 
and chemically supported. only such an agriculture will be able to feed 
9 billion people by 2050.
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Afterword
The growth in population and consumption in the twentieth century 
was not only unprecedented but also unrepeatable. The world population 
quadrupled, from 1.5 billion to more than 6 billion. The u.S. population 
quadrupled between 1900 and 2008, from 76 million to 304 million. 
The level of consumption in industrialized countries grew much faster, 
reaching a level that would astonish and possibly dismay earlier genera-
tions, for at least half the consumption in wealthy countries involved lux-
uries and all manner of frivolous goods and services. Such a continued 
growth rate in the twenty-first century would mean a world population 
of 24 billion by 2100 and an American population of around 1.1 bil-
lion. The earth’s resources cannot support 24 billion people. it is almost 
inconceivable that the united States could support a billion people with 
much more than subsistence incomes and after an enormous drawdown 
of such finite resources as soil, water, forests, and fossil fuels.
Agriculture is the only economic sector that is tightly correlated with 
population. Food supplies set a limit to how many people can live on this 
earth. At the same time, the demand for food is so inelastic that farmers 
cannot profitably grow more food than people need or want to consume. 
Today, more than 800 million people on earth are hungry, and perhaps 
just as many more malnourished. in this sense, people in some regions 
have probed the limits of growth, and millions of people, particularly 
infants, have died for lack of adequate food. The Malthusian equation fits. 
This does not mean that the world as a whole cannot produce enough 
food for the present 6.5 billion people. in fact, it can, because some 
countries, particularly the united States, can easily expand food produc-
tion. The problem is getting the food to where it is needed most.
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These realities suggest a different perspective on American agricul-
ture than i have emphasized in this book. over and over farmers, as 
well as American consumers and taxpayers, have struggled to find ways 
to cope with too much food. our farm problem, as we usually con-
ceive it, has been excess production. But from a larger, and particularly 
a global, perspective, how lucky we have been. Even as our population 
has quadrupled, the total output of agricultural goods has slightly more 
than quadrupled, in part because we have exported anywhere from one-
fourth to one-third of that product (about 28 percent in 2007). Some 
Americans still suffer hunger, but not because of any scarcity of food in 
the economy.  The average American family tosses enough food in the 
garbage every day to feed a villager in india.
in view of such good fortune, some questions that still challenge 
both historians and economists may seem relatively insignificant. one 
is the role of American farm policy in supporting or possibly retard-
ing the productivity revolution on American farms. Citizens, as consum-
ers or taxpayers, have paid for various subsidies. if one adds the cost of 
these commodity programs to what we all pay for food, the question 
is whether the public has benefited from these programs or suffered a 
net loss in income relative to what they would have gained from a free 
and open market. This is only the first in a series of “what if” questions. 
Would farmers, in a freer market, have produced more or less food? Has 
the structure of production controls and price supports forced American 
farmers to expand production, enlarge their base acres, seek the greatest 
possible efficiencies, use the best and latest tools, and adopt the most 
potent chemicals? Have these controls and subsidies provided the type 
of long-term security that encouraged farmers to use credit to upgrade 
technologies at a much faster pace than they would have in an unregulat-
ed and often hazardous marketplace? From a different perspective, given 
the social costs of the mass migration of displaced farmers to cities, were 
the subsidies misdirected? is it possible that income support programs 
for small farmers, allowing them to remain on the land and rural com-
munities to thrive, would have contributed more to national welfare than 
the policies actually chosen, despite higher food costs?
i have not answered any of these questions in this book. The reason 
is simple: the complexities of the issues, the impossibility of engaging 
all the counterfactual possibilities, the inability to test any position taken, 
the frequent merging of issues of value and economic returns, and the 
lack of sufficient data to gain a high probability ranking of causal factors 
all intimidate me. i also lack the skills to carry out research on many of 
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these highly technical problems. But i have gained one strong impres-
sion from my work on this book—that free-market theory, a model and 
not an empirical body of knowledge, does not always help one under-
stand American agriculture. Most economists assume that governmental 
management of economic activity in the form of tight regulation is, in 
the long term, conducive to inefficiency. At the same time, they assume 
that special aid, or subsidies, for any class of producers will harm the 
overall economy. in the case of American agriculture, such model-based 
generalizations do not seem to fit, given that over the last seventy years 
agriculture has been our most efficient and most productive sector. it is 
possible that it would have been even more productive without govern-
mental guidance and help, but before buying into that proposition, i 
would like to see proof.
in this book, i have pointed out how our farmers more than met the 
challenge of a rapidly growing population. it is remarkable that they could 
increase food production fourfold, and the number of cultivated acres by 
a roughly equivalent amount, even as the labor expended slowly declined 
to one-fourth the amount required in 1900. it is equally remarkable that 
the oldest tool ever used by humans, fire, made this possible. The con-
trolled combustion of hydrocarbons that cooked food and warmed caves 
in the distant past now powers combines and extracts nitrates from the 
air. Decaying vegetation, over millions of years, bequeathed to us a huge 
storehouse of sequestered hydrocarbons that, in the form of coal, natural 
gas, and, above all, petroleum, fueled the growth of the twentieth cen-
tury. it was a century of cheap oil, as humans drew down this bank of 
energy by a greater amount than in all past history. The age of oil is not 
over, but in all probability, cheap oil is a thing of the past. Before the end 
of this century, the oil that is now available by conventional methods, 
and at a price that encourages its use, will be gone, and natural gas will 
be in short supply.  This is only one of many challenges faced by humans, 
and particularly by farmers. Water shortages and possibly major shifts in 
climate are two others.
Yet, despite all the challenges, American farmers are better situated 
to meet them than are farmers anywhere else in the world. We still have 
plenty of good soil. our population may rise to 400 million by 2050, be-
fore leveling off. our present birth rate is at a replacement level, or higher 
than in any other industrialized country. The projected growth largely 
involves immigration. Such growth may lead to multiple problems, in-
cluding major environmental ones, but the food supply is not at risk. our 
farmers, even at present, could feed 400 million. They could do it more 
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easily if food habits shifted away from meat and toward more vegetables. 
They might have to clear some forests, end conservation reserves, shift land 
from such nonfood crops as cotton and tobacco, stop the diversion of food 
crops into biofuels, and possibly even renew cultivation in highly erodible 
areas, but they could do the job without major shifts in the structure of 
farming. if Americans had to, they could plant gardens in suburban yards, 
convert golf courses into fields, or actively farm strips along highways.
i doubt that farmers will be able to maintain the pace of growth that 
has blessed consumers over the last half century. As always, farmers will 
continue to produce enough food to keep up with population growth, but 
probably with fewer surpluses. The level of growth in bushels or pounds 
of food will be largely determined by population growth in the united 
States, with one qualification—it could include a much larger volume of 
exports to help feed the less fortunate parts of the earth. The word growth 
is always a bit loaded. For agriculture, it can refer to either the volume of 
products or their monetary value. if farmers become even more efficient, 
they might well meet the food needs of a growing population, yet at 
prices that would lower the “value” of what they produce relative to oth-
er goods and services. if they can do this without increased externalities, 
such as environmental damage, then everyone would benefit, assuming 
an equitable distribution of the income received. in part, it was just such 
a process that so benefited consumers, and at least highly competitive 
farmers, over the last half century. Can such a pattern continue?
no one can be sure. But there are reasons to doubt it. in fact, it seems 
likely, from the perspective of 2008, that food prices will continue to rise, 
reversing a century-old pattern. This is because of much higher input 
costs for energy, irrigation works, fertilizers, and many chemicals. The 
recent upsurge in extreme weather events, including a record drought in 
the Southeast and Southwest in 2007, may be a sign of things to come if, 
as seems likely, the pace of global warming continues.
The surge in productivity that follows the introduction of new tech-
nologies, such as the combine or herbicides, eventually flattens out. only 
comparable new tools can maintain the pace of growth. it is always dan-
gerous to conclude that there will be no such comparable innovations in 
the near future. At present, farmers are benefiting not from dramatic new 
machines but from a gradual improvement in existing ones. if anything, 
because of new environmental constraints, the benefits of farm chemi-
cals will stabilize or even decline. Gains from plant and animal breeding 
may have peaked already; they have certainly slowed. The one, possibly 
dramatic exception is the present growth in genetically modified crops, 
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a growth that may flounder on consumer resistance or the discovery of 
some long-term genetic danger to humans. of course, dramatic techno-
logical breakthroughs could occur at almost any time, either in agricul-
ture or in needed inputs. For example, the early development of fusion 
power could lower the costs of electricity, success in achieving a cost- 
effective method of producing cellulosic ethanol might open up new 
markets for farmers, and new battery technologies could make electric 
tractors and combines a reality. Also possible are new managerial skills and 
additional gains from economies of scale. That is, farm consolidation could 
continue, and the number of farm operators could continue to decline.
i am not sure that higher food costs are undesirable, but i have to 
qualify such a judgment. in an economy as prosperous as that of the 
united States, it seems appropriate that food should cost more than it 
does at present. it would be nice if that more expensive food was healthier 
than indicated by present American diets. When American consumers as 
a whole are building houses more than double the size of 1950s homes, 
keeping two or three automobiles in every garage, spending more on 
recreation than the annual national income in more than half the world’s 
nations, paying more than $100 million a year to compensate baseball 
players and billions to pay chief executives, providing dozens of toys for 
every child, indulging in every conceivable electronic innovation, and 
even throwing away $20 billion annually on bottled water, why not shift 
some of the national income back to food?
Here are the qualifications. First, the shift to higher costs should be 
based in large part on the pricing of as many externalities as possible in 
agriculture. Consumers of food should be willing to pay (subsidize?) 
farmers to reduce air and water pollution, control erosion, preserve soil 
quality, treat livestock humanely (no more drugged and cheap chick-
ens), and pay higher wages and improved benefits to farm laborers. if 
this sounds like a prescription for the types of alternative agriculture 
described in chapter 8, so be it.
The other qualification involves income policy. Based on average 
incomes, the united States can afford a more expensive and healthier 
food system, but with the present income distribution, such higher costs 
would threaten the livelihoods of those in the lower one-third in terms 
of income. Thus, a more responsible, environmentally friendly agricul-
ture would require a larger and more costly food aid system. Americans 
are certainly wealthy enough to afford this change, but whether they 
are willing to make the political decisions necessary to implement it is 
doubtful.
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